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From “Private” Managed Forest Lands to Sts’lunuts’amat Forest Relations: Indigenous Jurisdiction, Ecological Integrity, and Fee Simple Title on Vancouver Island

Sarah Morales,* Estair Van Wagner,** and Michael Ekers***

A.   Introduction

Quiet, yet protracted, conflicts over private forest lands on Vancouver Island represent one of the most important, complicated, and yet largely unknown forestry issues in British Columbia, and perhaps across Canada. Most forestry companies in Canada operate on land formally deemed “Crown” land that is simultaneously subject to pre-existing Indigenous interests. Well-known iconic struggles to protect old growth forests from industrial harvesting have taken place on Crown land controlled by private forestry companies through long term licenses.[1] Decades after Indigenous Peoples blockaded logging roads to assert rights and title and protest logging throughout the province,[2] most iconically illustrated in Clayoquot Sound,[3] news cycles are once again dominated by old-growth conflicts in British Columbia. Media accounts of violent arrests, criticisms of the government’s responses by Indigenous leaders and scientists, and divisions between hereditary and elected leadership highlight the high stakes of these disputes.[4] Yet, the battle to save the old growth is not the only longstanding “war in the woods.” A deregulated harvesting regime specific to private forest lands has left vast swathes of Indigenous forest territory enclosed and managed for private profit, with minimal oversight and almost no enforceable standards, all the while being effectively excluded from the treaty table.[5]

In 2003, the provincial Liberal government introduced the Private Managed Forest Land Act (PMFLA) — a new regulatory framework for forest lands held in fee simple title.[6] The legislation deregulated forestry operations for companies that own and manage (harvest and reforest) private forest lands. An intensive harvesting regime was introduced through removing limits to the annual allowable cut, streamlining planning processes, and greatly reducing oversight and enforcement of forest practices.[7] The Act failed to recognize and protect cultural values on private land and no language was included to uphold constitutionally protected Indigenous title and rights.

In contrast, legislation governing forestry companies operating on Crown land imposes a much more detailed regulatory scheme to control harvesting and infrastructure and subjects forestry operations to ministerial oversight. Amendments in 2021 and 2022 also attempt to align the regime with provincial commitments to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[8] While this reformed regime remains the subject of critique,[9] the PMFLA is much weaker. It has been critiqued in policy circles, and a small number of academic articles have touched upon the legislation, but at this time, we lack a sustained evaluation of the PMFLA and its implications for forest management, Indigenous jurisdiction, rights and title, and the settler public.[10] This article builds on our prior work investigating the ongoing impact of a series of historic land grants and the operation of the PMFLA on the ground by focusing on the context and structure of the contemporary legislative regime.

The impact of the PMFLA is place-specific. The legislation structures how 818,000 hectares of private forest land in British Columbia are managed, most of which is located on Vancouver Island (see Figure 1).Of the total, 585,678 hectares are owned by Island Timberlands and TimberWest, almost all of which is located in a thirty-two-kilometre-wide belt of land running from the southern tip of Vancouver Island, north to the community of Campbell River. This massive tract of fee simple land was established through land grants made by the Dominion government in 1887 to the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway Company and is commonly referred to as “E&N land.”[11] Under settler law, the land was transformed from Indigenous territory into private property as payment for a short 115 km railway running from Esquimalt to Nanaimo.[12] Notably, Island Timberland and TimberWest are now owned by three Canadian public sector pension plans and are jointly managed by Mosaic Forest Management (Mosaic) on behalf of the pension plans.

Figure 1: Map of Private Managed Forest Lands Vancouver Island. The land in green represents the private land predominately owned by TimberWest and Island Timberlands. Created on 30 July 2018 by the British Columbia Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural Resource Operations, and Rural Development (GeoBC, Division Support Services, RD). Copyright (c) Province of British Columbia. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission of the Province of British Columbia.

The so-called private land created through the E&N grants, and now controlled by Mosaic, is Indigenous land.[13] The vast majority was never subject to any treaty between the Crown and Indigenous owners, and the Vancouver Island (or Douglas) treaties covering the remainder are the subject of considerable critique and differing interpretations.[14] In this paper, we are particularly focused on the territory of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG) Nations, which makes up roughly 60 percent of the granted lands and is the home territory of one of the authors. The land grants privatized 85 percent of HTG Nations’ territory without consultation or consent, much of which was converted to industrial forest land. The regime put in place through the PMFLA has accelerated the rapid deforestation of HTG territory and facilitates the ongoing extraction of value for private benefit.[15] Indigenous Nations have been excluded from decision-making about vast areas of territory and have lost access to harvesting and spiritual sites and culturally and economically significant resources.[16] The fee simple title has also proven to be a significant obstacle in ongoing treaty negotiations. Indeed, the HTG successfully petitioned for a hearing on the merits before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights based on the lack of domestic mechanisms to pursue their right to property and compensation.[17]

Below, we provide a close reading of the PMFLA to demonstrate how the regime has enabled intensive harvesting on private lands, provided inadequate oversight and enforcement for the protection of environmental values, and failed to recognize and protect the inherent jurisdiction and constitutional rights and title of Indigenous Peoples. We show how significant regulatory gaps in the PMFLA and outstanding questions of access, consultation, jurisdiction, and title continue to profoundly impact the territories, economies, and social and cultural rights of Indigenous Nations with private forest lands within their territories. We demonstrate how the regime is inconsistent with, and in violation of, the Coast Salish laws applicable to the majority of private forest lands. Our goal in this paper is to set out an agenda for strategic reform as a first, and interim, step in addressing the underlying injustices of private forest lands in British Columbia. Our detailed examination of the PMFLA is meant to serve as a resource for the First Nations and members of the setter public who have long been concerned with the harvesting regime enabled on so-called private forest lands. Addressing the limitations of the PMFLA and the underlying injustices on which it is founded requires more than tinkering around the edges of the current regime. We aim to contribute to this transformative work.

At the time of writing, the British Columbia government, led by the New Democratic Party, is engaged in a broad effort to “modernize” forest policy in the province. This has involved modest changes to the Forest and Range Practices Act, the Old Growth Strategic Review, the Interior Forestry Sector Renewal, and the Coast Forest Sector Revitalization. Under the umbrella of the latter initiative, the government is completing a legislative review of the Private Managed Forest Land Program. Though the review was initiated in 2019, no changes have been contemplated to the private forest land regime even as reforms have been introduced regarding old growth deferrals and the Forest Act and Forest and Range Practices Act.[18] These Crown land amendments included changes aimed at aligning the legislation with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[19] Thus, the review of the private forest land program lags behind other, albeit modest, policy changes in the forestry sector.

As we argue below, the transformative change to forestry governance in Island Hul’qumi’num territories must be guided by the Coast Salish legal principles that ground Island Hul’qumi’num people-place relations. The principle of sts’lunuts’amat (kinship) would require land use governance that fosters good relationships with others in order to “produce harmony” within and beyond the immediate, physical world, including with ancestors and future generations.[20] In addition to existing in relation to one another as human beings, sts’lunuts’amat (kinship) encourages people “not to disrupt the natural order”[21] and requires decision-making that always involves observation of, and communication with, the natural world, demonstrating respect for agreements made with the natural world.[22] Renewed forest relations would be shaped by the principle of si’emstuhw (respect), which encourages individuals to consider how their decisions might impact those who may be affected by them in the future, including the more-than-human world.[23] Si’emstuhw emphasizes the importance of caring for ancestors’ final resting places and ensuring they remain undisturbed.[24] It is long past time that Coast Salish law be recognized and implemented in the structure of forest relations on Vancouver Island.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Part B grounds our discussion in the Coast Salish territory of Vancouver Island through a brief discussion of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Nations’ relationship to territory and the E&N land grants. In Part C, we unpack how the PMFLA has structured forestry operations on private land. We offer a close and critical reading of the legislation and compare it to regulations centred on “Crown” land, as well as to key Hul’qumi’num and Coast Salish legal principles. In Part D, we consider the constitutional context in which the PMFLA is operating and provide a critical analysis of its legal shortcomings. We conclude by offering a number of short-term policy recommendations and considering the broader question of redress that should be central to any reconsideration of the regulatory regime for private forest lands.

B.   The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and the E&N

Any discussion of the PMFLA must be grounded in the context of the land and communities it impacts. As noted above, this article focuses on the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG) territory, both because this research is being undertaken in partnership with the HTG and because of the disproportionate impact of the regime on Hul’qumi’num lands. The HTG is a political organization formed in 1993 to engage in comprehensive negotiations with the federal and provincial governments for the recognition of Hul’qumi’num Peoples’ rights, title, and governance.[25] The five First Nation members of this organization include Cowichan Tribes, Penelakut Tribe, Lyackson First Nation, Halalt First Nation, and Ts’uubaa-asatx (Lake Cowichan) First Nation. While not all Island Hul’qumi’num communities are members of the HTG, these five communities have together articulated a clear vision for the recognition of their title, rights, and governance.[26] These member First Nations represent a community of approximately 7,500 people living in and around the southeast coast of Vancouver Island. Culturally and linguistically, they are Coast Salish Peoples who have lived in this area since time immemorial, with archaeological sites in the area showing continuous occupation for at least 5,000 years.

When settlers arrived, people-place and inter-personal relationships were already governed by an existing legal tradition that actively shaped and managed lands and resources within the territory.[27] For Island Hul’qumi’num Peoples, this system of land management was grounded in the seven fundamental teachings that produce or maintain the state of snuw’uyulh (“living a good life”) within the Coast Salish legal world. While a thorough discussion of snuw’uyulh is beyond the scope of this article, the following concepts are particularly relevant to our discussion of the PMFLA and inform our analysis below: Sts’lhnuts’amat (“Kinship/Family”); Si’emstuhw (“Respect”); Thu’it (“Trust”); and Sh-tiiwun (“Responsibility”).[28]

The 1887 E&N land grant purported to turn the majority of Hul’qumi’num Peoples’ lands on Vancouver Island into land privately owned in fee simple by settlers overnight.[29] The grant included title to over 800,000 hectares of land, timber, and subsurface rights, including over 280,000 hectares in Hul’qumi’num territory (see Figure 2). In the simplest terms, British Columbia transferred a large area of land, much of which was Hul’qumi’num and Nuu-Chah-Nulth land, as well as some areas covered by the Vancouver Island (Douglas) Treaties in T’Sou-ke and Kwakiutil territories, to the Dominion government to satisfy the Terms of the Union under which the province came into confederation in 1871.[30] The Dominion government then agreed to transfer the lands to the E&N Railway Company upon their completion of the railway, which took place in 1887. None of the governments of the day consulted, accommodated, or compensated First Nations for the E&N land grant or subsequent land sales.[31] Even the right-of-way of the railway line itself, where it passed through Hul’qumi’num Reserves, was acquired through expropriation with little or no consultation with the leadership of the day.[32]

Colonial processes of land dispossession, including the E&N land grant, mean that the First Nations of the HTG now live in and around 5,790 hectares of reserve lands. Their communities are divided into over twenty-three individual Indian Reserves located at ancestral village sites of the Hul’qumi’num Peoples. While these remain significant places to HTG communities, they represent only a tiny fraction (roughly 2 percent) of Hul’qumi’num Territory.[33] Not all ancestral sites were made into Reserves and most of the broader territory of familial or communally held land was privatized, enclosing many sites of economic, cultural, and spiritual significance.[34] In contrast, and as noted in the introduction, 84 percent of the territory is owned in fee simple, principally by two forestry companies (Island Timberlands and TimberWest, operating as Mosaic).[35]

Island Hul’qumi’num Nations have consistently asserted their title and jurisdiction with regard to their territory both prior to and since the time of the grants.[36] Early colonial incursions were met with resistance from the removal of survey stakes, to deputations to colonial authorities, to the invocation of trespass laws and the strategic use of colonial law.[37] A 1909 Petition to the King invoked the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to protect Hul’qumi’num possession and occupation of their territory.[38] Since 1994, the HTG has continued to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Crown. One of the key goals of treaty negotiations for the HTG is “getting to 100%” recognition of title in order to regain a territorial land base. The HTG position is that 100 percent does not mean getting complete ownership of the land back, given the practical constraints of third party interests. Rather, “Hul’quimi’num people should benefit from and have a meaningful say on 100% of the territory that belonged to our ancestors,” through a combination of restoration of ownership, recognition of jurisdiction, and law-making authority (both sovereign and shared where appropriate), harvesting and access rights, cultural and heritage protection, and compensation.[39] However, the concentration of private lands has remained an intractable roadblock to a negotiated solution. All the member Nations filed writs for Aboriginal title claims in Canadian courts in 2003; however, these are in abeyance.[40] The Crown has pursued a “litigate or negotiate policy” whereby the process could be terminated if the Nations pursue litigation about the treaty lands individually or collectively and until recently the Nations have been required to repay the state funding allocated to the negotiations.[41] This “catch-22” means that the Crown can continue to claim that HTG title remains “asserted” rather than legally established, even though the Crown’s own policy makes it practically impossible to pursue a judicial declaration of title.[42]

Figure 2 Map depicting private land ownership of Island Timberlands, TimberWest, and Western Forest Products and E&N land grants. Source: Ekers et al, above note 15. Special credit to Glenn Brauen, Tian Lin & Saman Goudarzi for their work in creating this map.

Given the profound limitations of the negotiation process, the HTG has sought to leverage international law to push for a resolution.[43] In 2007, the HTG filed a petition to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights claiming that the failure to recognize and address their rights vis a vis privately-held lands in their territory is a violation of human rights, including the right to property and the right to equality before the law.[44] Despite HTG having presented the merits of its case in 2011, no decision on the merits has been issued.[45] Nonetheless, the Commission’s admissibility decision starkly illustrates the challenges faced by the Nations in their struggle to use colonial legal tools to seek justice.[46] Noting the limitations of the modern treaty process and the barriers to any legal remedies through the courts, the Commission found these were not “effective mechanisms” to protect the rights of the HTG Nations.[47]

The dispossession, disconnection, and ongoing destruction of territory has caused immense emotional suffering, mental anguish, stress and anxiety for the Hul’qumi’num Peoples,[48] who fear that their culture and way of life upon these lands will soon become extinct.[49] The loss of forestlands has a profoundly negative effect on the ability of the Hul’qumi’num People to practice and transmit their laws and way of life.[50] The forest resources of Hul’qumi’num traditional lands, while layered with fee simple title, continue to be a necessary source of vital sustenance for Hul’qumi’num People:

Throughout the traditional territory of the Hul’qumi’num, state “privatization” and the 150 years of intensive logging that has flowed from this has irretrievably damaged forests and essential water supplies, straining plant and wildlife populations and threatening access to and use of Hul’qumi’num natural resources and sacred sites.[52] Pollution and noise from private logging operations and commercial and residential developments adversely affect and interfere with Hul’qumi’num hunting, fishing, and plant management, as well as ceremonial practices, all of which are essential to Hul’qumi’num cultural and physical survival.[53] HTG Nations have repeatedly been subject to boil water advisories and gone without clean water on reserve.[54] One Hul’qumi’num Elder, the late Wesley Modeste, explained his feelings about the situation in his affidavit to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: “To have our forests in the hands of private forest companies takes away the ability of our community to keep our forests sustainable.” He described how large corporate entities have come into the territory and indiscriminately clear-cut the forests in a very short period, stripping off all of “the resources the forest sustains, including animals and fish.”[55] Modeste, along with other Hul’qumin’um Elders, described to the Commission how settlers have made Hul’qumi’num Peoples trespassers on their own lands.[56]

The cultural practices and traditions Hul’qumi’num Peoples are fighting to sustain are means of transmitting cultural knowledge and teachings.[57] As use of and access to forest products have diminished, this knowledge and teachings, and the laws accompanying them, have also been threatened.[58] Imperative in Coast Salish law is the need to build and maintain good relationships and “produce harmony”[59] not only with human kin (family and community members)[60] and non-kin (strangers),[61] but also with the natural world,[62] as well as ancestors and future generations.[63] Respecting the agency of more-than-human entities is a core aspect of the Coast Salish worldview.[64] The maintenance of good relations relies on access to the forest as a crucial site of connection to the more-than-human world through ceremony and encounters with spirit power.[65] As the connection to the forest is threatened, so too is the connection of the Hul’qumi’num People to their ancestors and spirituality.

C.   Unpacking the Private Managed Forest Land Act

The structure of the PMFLA entrenches private property rights and perpetuates the dispossession and destruction of Hul’qumi’num territory. Throughout the 1990s, the social democratic New Democratic Party government introduced significant changes to forestry legislation to more carefully regulate the sector and calm the factious “war in the woods.”[66] The Forest Land Reserve Act, introduced in 1994, was the legislation most focused on private forest land and was a major irritant to companies that owned forest lands in fee simple title.[67] It mimicked the more well-known Agricultural Land Reserve and placed strict limits on the sale and conversion of forest lands to other uses.[68] Owners of fee simple forest lands saw the legislation as an egregious overstep of government that impinged on private property rights.[69]

When the subsequent Liberal government assumed office in 2001, it conducted a “core-services review” that resulted in a roll back of the limits on companies operating on private forest lands. The government’s first move in 2002 was to repeal the Forest Land Reserve Act and thus the restrictions on conversion of private forestry land to other uses. The second move was to introduce the PMFLA in 2003. When introducing the bill in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly, Stan Hagen, then Minister of Sustainable Resource Management, explained: “this bill is consistent with the government’s new era commitments and deregulation initiative. The bill also underscores the government’s goals of operating more efficiently and responsibly in managing the province’s natural resources.”[70] The PMFLA scheme described below is consistent with the broader trend of environmental deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s in Canada, including in British Columbia. So-called results-based regulatory regimes were put in place to reduce “red tape” and improve “efficiency,” resulting in less government oversight, less stringent standards, and minimal or ineffective enforcement and compliance mechanisms.[71]

Historically, much of the private forest land in British Columbia was managed in concert with Crown land. Two Royal Commissions led by Sloan J, the first in 1945, the second in 1956, highlighted the abhorrent forestry practices on private land holdings, and specifically within the E&N belt. The resulting legislation sought to bring forestry operations on private land under the umbrella of government regulations. Since the late 1940s, “Forest Management Licences,” later renamed “Tree Farm Licences,” have been the main regulatory means for managing both fee simple and “public” land. Forestry companies have been given large and inexpensive access to Crown forests in return for managing their private land under the same regulatory framework.[72] Thus, in practice, private forest land was treated “as if it was Crown land” insofar as it was bundled together with “public” land in TFLs and regulated through different iterations of the Forest Act and the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia,[73] the precursor to the current Forest and Range Practices Act.[74] The PMFLA drastically changed this uniform regulatory approach. In order for the PMFLA to work, private forest land had to be “separated” or “removed” from the system of Crown forest tenures. While landowners could seek approval of the Minister of Forests to remove their fee simple holdings from their TFLs under the prior regime, it was not until enactment of the considerably leaner and more industry-friendly PMFLA that forestry companies had an incentive to do so. As Smith J concluded in Hupačasath v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the application of the PMFLA intentionally resulted in “reduced level of forest management and a lesser degree of environmental oversight.”[75]

1.     The Act: (De)regulation by Omission

With this brief background in mind, we turn to the structure and operation of the Act. The PMFLA has fostered an extractive forestry regime on private forest lands, with limited oversight and a complete lack of recognition of, and respect for, Indigenous rights, title, and jurisdiction. As a minimal regulatory scheme focused on facilitating extractive timber harvesting on private land, it is an incentive-based scheme under which the owners of private forest land can apply for designation as “private managed forest land,” which results in a substantial tax benefit under the provincial Assessment Act.[76] To obtain and maintain the designation, landowners are required to comply with five vague and broadly described objectives with respect to soil conservation, water quality, fish habitat, critical wildlife habitat, and reforestation. Consistent with the hands-off regulatory approach, the Act has just forty-six sections and provides for almost no direct government involvement in the operation of the scheme. Instead, the Act establishes the Private Managed Forest Council.

2.     The Private Managed Forest Council

The regime relies on  the Managed Forest Land Council (now referred to as the “Managed Forest Council”) to implement the Act. The objective of the council is to “encourage forest management practices on private managed forest land, taking into account the social, environmental and economic benefits of those practices.”[77] The concept of “benefits” is therefore central to the operation of the Act; yet it is left undefined. The operative sections discussed in detail below reveal a narrow and extractivist understanding of benefits, privileging private property rights and economic profit. As we discuss in more detail in the final section, benefits would be defined very differently if informed by a Coast Salish legal perspective. Interpreted relationally through the fundamental principles of snuw’uyulh, benefits would uphold sts’lunuts’amat (kinship), si’emstuhw (respect), and sh-tiiwun (responsibility) with both the humans and more-than-humans impacted by the Act.

The structure of the council is also significant. The council is made up of five members: two members are government-appointed representatives and two are elected by the owners of private managed forest land.[78] The nominated four members select a fifth member to serve as the chair. There is no requirement for Indigenous representation and there has never been an Indigenous member of the council. There is also no requirement for municipal representation on the council, though knowledge of forestry practices or local government is one of two possible criteria for government appointees set out in the Act.[79] There are no statutory criteria for the selection of owner members.[80]

The council’s Governance Policy characterizes its role as protecting both “key environmental values on private Managed Forest class land” and “landowners’ right to harvest.”[81] This sets up an inevitable conflict at the heart of the council’s mandate. It also fails to address Indigenous rights and interests with respect to private managed forest lands. While Indigenous Peoples may have concerns about the impact of forestry activities on the environment, the concept of “environmental values” cannot encapsulate Indigenous interests and values in relation to private managed forest land. As the Supreme Court has noted, consideration of environmental impacts is not sufficient to discharge constitutional obligations to Indigenous Peoples, thus the regime fails to uphold the Crown’s obligations, as discussed below.[82] These gaps and conflicts are compounded by the regime’s sole source of funding being the owners it is tasked with regulating.[83] The council is funded solely by a levy on private forest landowners calculated as a percentage of their land value. The 2009 Five Year Review of the council noted the funding issue and raised the possibility of public funding of investigations as “they involve public values” and often impact public lands and resources.[84] This has not been addressed by the council or the government. The reliance on self-regulation is also evident in the lack of reporting and transparency requirements under the Act.

3.     Information and Planning Requirements and Standards

The PMFLA contains few requirements for landowners to provide information to any government bodies or the public about their land and operations. What is required is largely submitted only to the council. In order to gain a “private managed forest land” classification under the Act, the owner must submit a management commitment to the council.[85] It must include a commitment to use the land for the production and harvesting of timber, long term forest management objectives and strategies for achieving them, reforestation information, and a soil quality assessment.[86] There is no requirement to provide any information with respect to non-timber resources or biodiversity and species habitat on the property. Landowners must also submit an annual declaration to the council detailing the location and size of harvesting areas, the amount of timber harvested, and the locations of roads, though notably not the locations of reforested areas.[87] In addition to what must be reported to the council, owners must also submit a Timber Harvest Return to BC Assessment setting out the volume of scaled and unscaled harvested timber for the purposes of assessing the PMFLA levy.[88]

None of this information is publicly available. Nor is it available to relevant First Nations governments or municipalities. More tellingly, from our understanding, the ministry does not monitor harvesting volumes on private land. While the Managed Forest Council may possess information on annual harvesting volumes, it is not clear what it does  with this information, if anything, given that there are no limits on harvesting volumes on private land, as we discuss below. Additionally, there is no indication that the information submitted to BC Assessment is used to assess and enforce sustainable management of private forest land.

Information and planning requirements are stronger under the Forest and Range Practices Act (FRPA), which requires a Forest Stewardship Plan, now to be replaced by Forest Landscape Plans (FLPs) per the 2021 amendments in Bill 23.[89] Indeed, the introduction of FLPs is one of the amendments intended to address UNDRIP alignment, as these plans require prior consultation and cooperation with affected Indigenous Peoples and include mandatory consideration of “values placed on forest ecosystems by Indigenous [P]eoples.”[90] Amendments in Bill 23 strengthen information and planning requirements by making information-sharing obligatory for rights-holders within FLPs. For example, amended subsection 2.31(1) of FRPA empowers the chief forester to order rights-holders to produce a broad array of information in the interest of producing FLP reports every five years.[91] The amendments establish both reactive obligations to respond to orders of the chief forester and default obligations to report the locations of intended cutblocks and road construction before 31 December each year.[92]

The Forest Act also requires the holder to provide the chief forester of the province with a management plan and empowers the chief forester to require inventories to manage the “forest, recreational and cultural heritage resources” in the licence area prior to approval.[93] Bill 28 amendments expanded the government’s power to order the production of information from license-holders. [94] License-holders are obliged to produce and maintain forest resource inventories, with updates required at least once every ten years.[95] Crucially, forest resource inventories are subject to random inspection by inventory officials, who are authorized to both order information production and physically enter lands.[96] Moreover, companies must prepare publicly available site plans wherever they will be constructing roads or harvesting timber from a cutblock.[97] Amendments adopted in 2021 require approval of a Forest Operations Plan locating and describing both existing and proposed roads and cutblocks, and applicants must demonstrate “reasonable efforts to engage with Indigenous nations.”[98] In addition to an analysis of the short and long term viability of the timber resources in the area, the plan must also include inventories of the “forest cover, terrain stability, recreation, visually sensitive areas, lakes, wetland and stream riparian zones, ungulate winter ranges, wildlife habitat areas, old growth management areas, community watersheds, cultural heritage resources and archaeological sites.”[99] The chief forester can require the holder of a Tree Farm Licence to provide whatever information considered necessary to calculate the maximum allowable cut.[100] Thus, activities on PMFLA lands are subject to drastically lower reporting and planning requirements, leaving impacted First Nations, local governments, and members of the public without crucial information to understand and assess impacts on their social, economic, and ecological interests. This compounds the lack of regulatory oversight in the PMFLA, particularly with respect to biodiversity, waterways and fisheries, and culture and heritage protection.

4.     Biodiversity Protection

With the highest biodiversity of any province or territory in Canada, and the highest number of species at risk, British Columbia is at the centre of the global biodiversity crisis.[101] This biodiversity is essential to maintaining ecosystem services such as food, medicine, and clean air and water.[102] It is also integral to sustaining Indigenous communities, economies, and cultures, including the HTG Nations.[103]

The 2019 United Nations Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services report specifically identified land use change as the single most important driver of biodiversity loss.[104] Yet the PMFLA and its regulations do not contain any reference to biodiversity, including no protection for old growth forest and the Coastal Douglas Fir (CDF) ecosystem, despite the concentration of PMFLA land in this ecosystem. While much of the E&N land has been highly disturbed by industrial forestry operations, remaining pockets of intact landscapes are of critical importance to HTG communities, as is the restoration of disturbed areas. Further, Hul’qumi’num legal obligations may require positive action to protect and restore damaged landscapes and the well-being of other more-than-human entities in order to uphold reciprocal obligations.[105]

Sustainable long-term management of forests for ecological, cultural, social, and economic values requires clear, prescribed, and enforceable standards. At present, the PMFLA falls well short of this. Rather than prescribing standards, the Act sets out five limited and broadly defined objectives for private managed forest land: 1) protection of soil productivity;[106] 2) protection of human drinking water;[107] 3) protection of fish habitat through retention of sufficient riparian vegetation;[108] 4) long term protection of critical wildlife habitat;[109] and 5) reforestation with healthy, commercially valuable timber stands.[110] The legislation and accompanying regulations prescribe very loose protective measures, and it is largely up to landowners to determine how to meet these environmental objectives. The legislation is results-based, rather than prescriptive, which can result in irreversible effects only measurable post-harvest. This has particular implications for species at risk.

In contrast to the PMFLA, the FRPA contains several objectives for biodiversity in different ecological areas (riparian areas and at the landscape and stand level for forests).[111] There are specific limitations relating to biodiversity. For example, there are limits on cutblock sizes in different management areas for major tenure holders;[112] wildlife trees must be retained in cutblocks;[113] and specific amounts of coarse, woody debris must be left behind after harvesting activities in cutblocks.[114] Biodiversity factors must be considered in forest stewardship plans, including remaining trees suitable for wildlife habitat and for the ecological requirements of the biodiversity of the area.[115] Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the FRPA also falls short and that biodiversity protection for all forest lands should be strengthened as a result of the ongoing reviews and proposed amendments. As recognized by article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, this should include incorporation, protection, and maintenance of Indigenous knowledge and practices.[116] Amendments in Bill 23 did not directly alter biodiversity protections for Crown land forestry, but they may do so indirectly through the prioritization of Indigenous values in FLPs where these values align.

5.     Riparian and Fisheries Habitat Protections

The PMFLA provides limited protection of riparian zones and fish habitat. While it does prescribe tree retention adjacent to some streams, the term “stream” is not defined in the PMFLA. An interpretive clause in the associated regulations refers to the Water Sustainability Act, in which a stream is defined as virtually any body of water other than an ocean or an aquifer.[117] However, it is not clear whether owners apply the broader definition of “stream” in practice. The 2009 Private Managed Forest Council Review noted there were rules for streams but not for lakes or wetlands.[118]

The regulations prohibit, with exceptions, the construction of roads within certain distances of streams to prevent sediment delivery and to preserve sufficient stream-side vegetation for habitability for relevant species of fish.[119] Private owners are also prohibited from undertaking activities in riparian zones that will have a “material adverse effect” on streams that provide fish habitat or human drinking water.[120] These requirements involve retaining specified numbers of trees and undergrowth within specified distances of the certain classes of streams in order to provide shade and water temperature variation in fish habitat.[121] This discretionary “material adverse effect” standard leaves it to private owners to determine what kinds of activities will have a material adverse effect and how to avoid damage. Compliance is managed by complaints and the potential of a council audit. Given the limited access of the public to private land, a complaints-based system means that impacts will generally have already occurred and been identified on adjacent land before any investigation or enforcement takes place. Notably, a 2012 Audit Report of the council cautioned that the minimal PMFLA requirements could compromise the long-term stability of some streams and downstream resources.[122]

Activities on Crown lands face more prescriptive standards. The government sets both general objectives and detailed practice requirements for working in riparian areas.[123] Regulations under the FRPA contain detailed classifications of streams, lakes, and wetlands, as well as establishing riparian zones, including restricted riparian reserve zones.[124] Specific protections are prescribed for vegetation by class of riparian area (presumably due to the particular sensitivities of different kinds of water bodies). The regulations give specific guidance regarding how much basal area must be preserved in riparian areas after harvesting timber from a cutblock.[125] They also prescribe detailed standards relating to the output of even small streams, particularly where fish and aquaculture is concerned.[126] Notably, Bill 28 Amendments require forest resource inventories to report lakes, streams, wetlands, and riparian areas under the Forest Act.[127] Overall, the standards under the FRPA are more rigorous and apply both more broadly and with greater specificity.

6.     Habitat & Wildlife Protections

Wildlife and habitat protections are even less defined under the private land regime. The PMFLA relies on voluntary agreements between government and private landowners for the protection of critical wildlife habitat.[128] The wildlife Minister may establish an area of private land as critical habitat when at-risk species require that land and when there is no suitable Crown land in the ecological region.[129] Private owners and operators theoretically face restrictions on timber harvesting and road building activities within declared critical habitat areas.[130] The PMFLA does allow government representatives to enter private land for any purpose relating specifically to critical wildlife habitat.[131] However, without the consent of the landowner, the minister cannot designate more than 1 percent of the private land as critical habitat, and any such designation has a time limit of one year.[132] No such designation has ever been made. Considering the size of the E&N belt concentrated on Vancouver Island, and the 585,678 hectares owned by Island Timberlands and Timberland, there is little the minister can do to establish a contiguous land-base to protect wildlife, even where at-risk species require it.

On Crown land, the Government Actions Regulation under the FRPA enables the minister to establish wildlife habitat areas and special wildlife measures to manage those areas.[133] Wildlife habitat areas need to meet the requirements of either at risk species or regionally important species, including requirements for harvests to resemble natural disturbance patterns and to retain wildlife trees.[134] Bill 28 Amendments to the FA require forest resource inventories to report on the status of wildlife in FLAs.[135]

The protection of at-risk and regionally important wildlife cannot rely on voluntary agreements with landowners whose interests may conflict with the habitat needs of at-risk species. Critical habitat for a species should be identified based on independent objective criteria and managed in accordance with independent objectives and standards informed by science and Indigenous knowledge for the survival of the species. Weak habitat and wildlife regulations have a direct effect on Indigenous Nations for whom private forest lands double as traditional territory and specifically on the exercise of section 35 rights and title. Deer, elk, and bears were the primary land mammals hunted by HTG Nations.[136] These animals continue to be important for HTG people for reasons of both sustenance and spiritual practices.[137] In a study conducted by HTG, 58 percent of all Hul’qumi’num households interviewed considered current levels of white tail deer inadequate for their needs, followed by black tail deer (44 percent), elk (45 percent), moose (44 percent), mountain goat (14 percent), black bear (13 percent), and rabbit (9 percent). The most important animal species for households in HTG Nations are white tail deer (63 percent), elk (48 percent), black tail deer (47 percent), moose (46 percent), black bear (14 percent), mountain goat (14 percent), rabbit (9 percent), cougar (6 percent), and wolf (5 percent).[138] The significant amount of HTG territory that is held as private land, and the intensive harvesting taking place on this land, threatens wildlife and jeopardizes the exercise of constitutionally protected Indigenous rights and the fulfillment of stewardship obligations to particular species and places under Hul’qumi’num law.

7.     Watershed Protections

A number of communities adjacent to or impacted by private managed forest land have identified serious water quality and watershed issues.[139] Climate change is amplifying these issues, and it is itself exacerbated by deforestation. Increasing temperatures are changing precipitation patterns and resulting in extreme weather events affecting HTG territory. In 2022 drought, conditions extended well into October, with most water systems in the region moving to the most extreme water conservation restrictions in regional history.[140] As noted by the Cowichan Valley Regional District (CVRD), “[s]ummer drought is the ‘new normal’ in the Cowichan Valley.” In early June 2019, the CVRD had already announced “significant concerns” about low lake and river levels, as well as record low levels in some wells and impacts on groundwater aquifers. The situation was “especially critical in the Cowichan watershed” in which lake and river tributaries were already drying up.[141] Deforestation also contributes to flooding and the Cowichan Valley has been heavily impacted by extreme flooding events in recent years, including the November 2021 floods, which caused dangerous mudslides, closed roads, and resulted in property damage and boil water advisories for communities on reserve.[142] The Cowichan Valley Regional District declared a state of emergency for flooding in both 2020 and 2021, and in 2021 added an additional level of water restriction, which were implemented again in 2022.[143]

The PMFLA requires that human drinking water be protected from contamination by timber harvesting activities and road construction.[144] The associated regulations are concerned with contamination by sediment, debris, and fertilizer.[145] There are particular limitations on road construction near streams and upslope from licensed waterworks intakes, and, as of July 2019, on individual waterworks intakes.[146] Private landowners or their agents are required to investigate and rectify the causes of declines in water quality when contacted by licenced waterworks intake operators who have reasonable cause to believe that activities on private land have caused declines in water quality.[147] Private owners are also required to avoid interrupting the flow of water to those intakes by maintaining natural surface drainage patterns.[148] However, regulation of fertilizer upslope of a licenced waterworks intake has important limitations. While the Wildlife Minister can establish water quality objectives for streams that are upslope of the intake with respect to broadly cast applications of fertilizer, they must consult with affected landowners and any new objectives are delayed for six months after the minister has notified the Managed Forest Council of the objective.[149]

As with fisheries and wildlife impacts, a complaints-driven system for drinking water issues is particularly problematic on private land as the public does not have access to harvesting areas and issues are therefore identified only once problems have occurred and are potentially irreversible or difficult to remedy. Establishing a “reasonable cause to believe” in the context of private land and complex watershed dynamics may be difficult for waterworks intake holders. Drinking water contamination should be prevented at its source rather than remedied after the fact.[150] Further, watershed protection has particular cultural and spiritual implications for Hul’qumi’num Peoples.

8.     Cultural and Spiritual Values Protections

The PMFLA currently contains no requirements for cultural heritage or values and no protection for access to culturally and spiritually significant sites.[151] In contrast, a stated objective of the FRPA is the conservation of resources used by and important to Indigenous Peoples and any cultural resources that are not covered by the Heritage Conservation Act.[152] This gap in protection is particularly striking given the history of Indigenous relations with PMFLA land outlined above and the ongoing consequences of the E&N railway grant on HTG Nations.

There are 1,052 recorded archeological sites in Hul’qumi’num core traditional territory (see Figure 3). Eight hundred and thirty-nine of these sites are found within private land. Figure 3 below depicts “Known First Nations Archeological Sites” and an “Archeological Potential Model” indicating the potential for further identification within HTG territory. While many of the recorded sites are along the coast and are not held within private forest lands, much of the land associated with the “Potential Model” is owned by Island Timberlands and TimberWest.[153] The Environmental Appeal Board specifically noted the use of private forest land for spiritual and ceremonial purposes by Cowichan Tribes, including “meditating, visiting birth sites, and taking part in ritual bathing and cleansing ceremonies for the purpose of physical, emotional and spiritual purification.”[154] As noted earlier in the paper, the destruction of many of these sites has been compounded by the lack of access to remaining areas and the incompatibility of these activities with industrial resource extraction.[155] HTG members seeking to use ancestral sites are met with locked gates and trespassing signs, as described by the late Wesley Modeste: “Our territory is filled with modern gates, blocking our trails, and affecting our people’s freedom of movement over all parts of our territory.”[156]

Notably, while the Heritage Conservation Act (HCA) allows the Lieutenant Governor in Council to designate any land as a Provincial Heritage Site, including private managed forest land, the Act is not noted on the council’s website as “key relevant legislation.”[157] Nor does the council have a policy or practice guideline relevant to cultural heritage. Further, the HCA itself fails to provide adequate protection to Indigenous heritage values and does not require shared decision or even acknowledge the need for consultation with First Nations.[158] Thus, the lack of attention to cultural heritage in the PMFLA magnifies the need for broader reforms to ensure the meaningful participation of Indigenous Nations in cultural heritage protection, particularly on private land.[159]

Figure 3: Known Archeological Sites and Archeological Potential in the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Traditional Territory, 2009. SOURCE: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group

9.     Freedom to Manage or Enabling Extraction?

The PMFLA contains no language regarding the maximum annual cut on private land and there are no regulations under the PMFLA that place any limits on the rate of harvest. Neither the Managed Forest Council nor the ministry determines the annual allowable cut on private lands. Given the large private forest land base on Vancouver Island, the inability of regulatory bodies to determine and enforce sustainable harvesting levels is of particular concern. The liquidation of timber on private land is a direct product of the PMFLA eliminating restrictions on harvesting volumes. Moreover, without harvesting limits and oversight, it is extremely difficult to see how the PMFLA could achieve its own management objectives (protecting water quality, fish habitat, critical wildlife habitat, and soil conservation) and the broader objectives we discuss above.

In contrast, under the Forest Act the timber on a Tree Farm Licence is subject to a maximum allowable cut every year (the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC)). The amount is determined by the province’s chief forester, who must make the determination once every ten years.[160] When determining the maximum allowable cut, the chief forester must consider a number of factors, including natural factors like the rate of growth of the forest,[161] the use of the area for activities other than timber harvesting,[162] different kinds of licences and agreements, and the “economic and social objectives of the government…for the general region of British Columbia.”[163] With this goal in mind, the ministry seeks to ensure a “sustained yield” within Tree Farm Licences and within Timber Supply Areas. The objectives of establishing an annual allowable cut are to maintain a productive forest land base and to manage for broader cultural, economic, employment, and ecological values. We note that even under the Forest Act regime there are ongoing concerns about the lack of involvement of First Nations in determining the AAC on public lands, and a shift towards collaborative forest management is urgently required on both public and private lands.[164] The amended Act does contemplate joint-forest management with First Nations on Crown land, and prior government-to-government agreements have created opportunities for collaborative decision-making and revenue sharing in the forest sector.[165] Such shared decision-making structures have resulted in significant reductions in harvesting rates.[166] Bill 28 amendments provide for the designation of “special purpose areas” for the fulfillment of non-timber harvesting objectives. This includes the power to authorize the disposition of Crown land to a First Nation to implement or further an agreement respecting treaty-related measures, interim measures, or economic measures.[167] These measures aim to facilitate the restructuring of the forest industry from large corporate holdings to small companies and First Nations. The system provides for a detailed compensation scheme where third party interests are influenced through resulting reductions to the AAC.[168] However, no similar shared decision-making or redistribution reforms have been suggested or implemented for the PMFLA.

Compounding the absence of limits to the rate of harvest, the PMLA contains no language limiting the size of cutblocks. Without limits on the size of cutblocks, the PMFLA remains an ineffective and fatally flawed regime with respect to the objectives for soil conservation, water quality, fish habitat, and wildlife habitat. The council does not provide any oversight about the size and location of cutblocks, either. The Management Commitment required to join the Managed Forest Land Program does not require a description of the location or size of cuts. While the Annual Declaration that owners submit to the Managed Forest Council requires information regarding how many hectares were harvested and the volume (m3) harvested, this information is highly generalized, especially when you consider that a single entity, Mosaic Forest Management, manages 71 percent of the private forest land in the province. The map included with the Annual Declaration does not require a representation of the location and area of harvesting activities. Therefore, the council does not have any means of scrutinizing the size of cutblocks.

In contrast, the FRPA requires holders of a forest stewardship plan to create a site plan, now a Forestry Operations Plan, for any construction of any road and cutblock. As discussed above, the site plan must identify the location of cutblocks and be in accordance with the plan itself and the regulations detailed in the FRPA.[169] Given the more prescriptive legislation regulating TFLs, there are far more limits placed on the size of cut blocks under the Crown land regime. The government can enact regulations regarding cutblocks prescribing: “(a) the size, including the maximum allowable size of a cutblock; (b) the shape of a cutblock, and; (c) the spatial distribution of cutblocks, including green-up.”[170] Thus, while environmental concerns about forestry practices remain significant under the Crown land regime, the PMFLA fails to even monitor, never mind regulate, harvesting levels on private land.

10.  Inclusion and Protection: Voluntary Inclusion, Land Removals, and Land Use Conversion

Prior to the enactment of the PMFLA, land assessed as private forest land had been largely automatically included in the Forest Land Reserve since the enactment of the Forest Land Reserve Act (FLR) in 1994. The FLR restricted what forest land could be used for, including prohibiting subdivision and the withdrawal of land without approval of the administrator of the Reserve, the Land Reserve Commission.[171] The purpose of the FLR was to “minimize the impact of urban development and rural area settlement on forest reserve land.”[172] Before it was repealed, 920,000 hectares of private land were included under the FLR, in addition to designated public lands. We note that the inclusion of private forest land in the FLR was not compensable, and it is our view that it would continue to be non-compensable today should the FLR be reinstated, as discussed below.

In contrast, private managed forest lands program is voluntary to join and there are weak incentives to discourage land removals. Currently, private land owners may withdraw management commitments for their lands, and the land is then reclassified under the Assessment Act. In most circumstances, when an owner withdraws the commitment, they must pay an exit fee to the Managed Forest Council.[173] The fee is set by regulation on a sliding scale. If the land has been under a management commitment for five years or less, then the fee is equal to the difference between the property taxes that were paid under the preferential treatment of private managed forest land and the property taxes that would have been paid if the land had not received preferential tax treatment for the time it has been managed.[174] If the land has been held for between six and fifteen years, then the exit fee is calculated as above and then multiplied by an adjustment factor. The factor varies inversely with the number of years that the land has been managed.[175] No exit fee is payable for land held as private managed forest land for more than fifteen years.[176]

The fifteen-year “management commitment” under the PMFLA is far too short to encourage sustainable forestry and to dissuade land conversions. This short-term commitment to retaining forest land exacerbates the lack of environmental standards. Private land owners are able to benefit from tax incentives while being subject to weak regulatory standards and enforcement capacity and then remove their lands without penalty prior to even one cycle of reforestation. Landowners are also under no obligation to harvest trees within the fifteen-year commitment, which means they can enjoy the substantial tax benefits associated with a managed forest land assessment, remove their land from the program in year sixteen, and proceed to cut the timber outside of any regulatory framework. This short-term and voluntary commitment undermines the public interest, the interest of First Nations within whose territory this land is situated, and the planning capacity of local municipalities.

As the above discussion demonstrates, the PMFLA is an inadequate regime even when measured against its potential to achieve its own minimal stated objectives. The regime operates to uphold the primacy of private property rights, particularly the power of private owners to self-regulate, and to profit from and alienate forest lands, over the protection of both constitutionally protected Indigenous rights and interests and the public interest in ecologically sustainable land governance. In doing so, it leaves privately-owned forest lands, and the Indigenous territories in which they are situated, to be managed to a drastically lower standard than those under the Crown land regime.

D.  Aboriginal Title and Rights and Private Lands

The regime outlined above had serious constitutional implications in the context of the Hul’qumi’num Nations. Indigenous relations with land are grounded in place-based legal orders, which have been regulating the territories now making up Canada for millennia.[177] These enduring systems of governance continue to shape contemporary Hul’qumi’num relations to the forests of their territory.[178] At the same time, they have been entangled with the E&N land grants, colonial Canadian law, and, most recently, the PMFLA. In this section, we consider the settler-colonial legal context in which Hul’qumi’num forest relations endure.

Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution formally recognizes and protects Aboriginal rights and land title in settler law.[179] The purpose of section 35 is the “reconciliation of the pre-existence of [A]boriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”[180] This underlying goal of reconciliation extends to the relationship between private property and Aboriginal title and rights. However, the relationship between fee simple private property rights and Aboriginal rights and title is not settled in Canadian law.[181] In his 2018 survey of Aboriginal law in Canada, Jim Reynolds stated that the relationship between private property and Aboriginal title is “probably the most important” issue for Indigenous-settler relations in British Columbia. Over twenty years ago, Southin J of the BC Court of Appeal called the lack of certainty about it “a cloud . . . over the whole of the Province” outside treatied territories.[182] In the early stages of the Tsilhqot’in v British Columbia litigation, Vickers J also acknowledged the significance of this relationship: “Any tenure holder’s interest derives from the interest of British Columbia. If the plaintiff’s aboriginal rights and title affect the title and interest of British Columbia, then the interests of tenure holders are also affected.”[183] At the time of writing, multiple cases involving fee simple lands and Aboriginal title were before the British Columbia courts, and title litigation about industrially owned lands in New Brunswick was underway.[184]

In this unsettled legal context, the history of the E&N land grants raises serious questions about British Columbia’s title and interest in private forest lands. Therefore, the title and interests of contemporary third party tenure holders are also affected. As the HTG Nations have consistently asserted, and as we have argued elsewhere, the original land grants were constitutionally invalid.[185] No treaty was signed for the E&N lands in Hul’qumi’num territory. According to the Supreme Court, the province never had the power to extinguish Aboriginal title. Therefore any extinguishment had to come from the Dominion in “clear and plain” legislation.[186] However, the statute authorizing the transfer to the E&N corporate body expressly saves all existing rights.[187] In Canadian law, the Aboriginal title protected by section 35 was “crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted” and therefore was an existing right at the time of the grant.[188] Thus, there is no legal basis for the extinguishment of Hul’qumi’num title and the creation of third party interests. This leaves significant questions about the contemporary status of private forest lands.

Following the Supreme Court decision in Delgamuukw, the HTG Nations filed legal claims for title in 1993.[189] However, as the Nations have also been in modern treaty negotiations with the federal and provincial governments, these claims have been in abeyance since that time. Because the modern treaty process is understood as an alternative to litigation, the processes do not run parallel.[190] Therefore, despite the significant legal deficiencies in the E&N land grants, and any subsequent interests created through them, the HTG Nations do not have a Canadian court declaration of Aboriginal title at the time of writing. Nonetheless, the acknowledged lack of a historic treaty or compensation for the E&N grants, and the ongoing modern treaty process, demonstrate the strength of Hul’qumi’num People’s enduring relationship to the land in Canadian law. As the treaty process itself illustrates, the Crown does not require a court declaration to recognize Aboriginal title and jurisdiction. Indeed, the courts have strongly encouraged the parties to pursue negotiated solutions to title disputes.[191] In the words of Vickers J in the trial decision in Tsilhqot’in, the parties must work together to answer the “real question” about the consequences of acknowledging Indigenous possession and governance of their territories.[192] Thus, while we acknowledge the lack of a specific judicial determination of the scope of Hul’qumi’num title in Canadian law, we maintain that the continuity of that title is not in question. What remains uncertain is how Canadian law will be used to take up the “real question” of what consequences flow from acknowledging the relationship between Indigenous title and subsequent third party interests in the context of so-called fee simple lands.

As we noted above, Indigenous title and jurisdiction in relation to traditional territory are grounded in Indigenous laws and systems of property relations. Thus, they are not equivalent, nor reducible, to fee simple title. Indeed, even the colonial construct of Aboriginal title in Canadian law recognizes that Indigenous relations with land are distinct, in part because they are collective in nature.[193] One of the characteristics of Aboriginal title is a jurisdictional or governance power rooted in pre-existing sovereignty and Indigenous systems of law and governance.[194] This collectively held right to control the land conferred by Aboriginal title means that the governments and others seeking to use the land are required to obtain the consent of the Aboriginal title holders as a nation, not as individual title-holders.[195] Aboriginal title also includes intergenerational collective obligations to care for the land.[196] The Crown is bound by these obligations, and the inherent limit restricting uses of land is incompatible with the Indigenous relationship to the land.[197] Therefore, in our view, the legal status of the private forest lands in Hul’qumi’num territory should nonetheless be understood as subject to the jurisdictional elements of Aboriginal title, as they correspond with the Hul’qumi’num articulations of the relationship to territory.

This unique jurisdictional content of Aboriginal title is not dependent on the contemporary tenure of the land in Canadian law: it is equally relevant to land deemed Crown land and fee simple land. Fee simple title has no equivalent to the collectively held authority or obligations of Aboriginal title.[198] Thus, these governance dimensions could not be subsumed by subsequent individual private ownership. The material reality of the lands and thus the nature of fee simple ownership are necessarily shaped by how the underlying Indigenous legal order frames people-place relations. Even if we assume the jurisdictional element of Indigenous title could have been presumptively transferred to and is now being lawfully exercised by the Crown, this means jurisdiction could be restored to Indigenous title holders without unsettling third party interests. Thus, without assuming where and when it would be appropriate to maintain specific fee simple relations, we can nonetheless understand them as subject to Indigenous systems of governance and land use law. The restoration of a broad range of environmental and land use decision-making with respect to lands overlaid with fee simple grants would enable Indigenous Nations to better uphold relationships with, and responsibilities to, each other, the lands, the waters, and other beings. Therefore, while the return of wrongly alienated lands is a crucial element of justice for Indigenous Peoples, there are a range of potential approaches to reconciling subsequent settler-colonial interests to pre-existing Indigenous title and jurisdiction. Indeed, as discussed in the final section, different approaches may be appropriate as strategic interim interventions while Nations and colonial governments grapple with the underlying questions outlined above. As we detail in the final section, a reimagined framework for so-called private forest lands could be designed on this foundation.

1.     The Duty to Consult and Accommodate Applies Prior to a Declaration of Title

While in our view the Crown’s obligation to account for the jurisdictional content of Aboriginal title should shape land use governance in HTG territories regardless of a judicial declaration about the scope of that title in Canadian law, the duty to consult and accommodate does specifically constrain the Crown’s treatment of private forest lands prior to such a declaration. Thus, in the context of the underlying title claim and ongoing treaty negotiations, the Crown owes a prospective duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous Nations when it acts in a manner that may adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.[199] Grounded in the honour of the Crown and the fiduciary relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the Crown, the duty arises from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in the face of Indigenous Peoples’ pre-existing occupation and requires the Crown to act honourably in all of its dealings with Indigenous Peoples.[200] Because the duty applies prior to any court declaration of Aboriginal rights or title, these must only be credibly asserted.[201] Adverse impacts include both physical impacts and high level strategic decisions that may affect rights or title; however, the duty is not triggered by past wrongs and the claimant must show a “causal relationship” between the impugned Crown conduct and any pending claims and rights.[202] Given the long and expensive processes for establishing title through litigation and modern treaty making, the duty has become a primary window through which assertions of Indigenous relations with land and resources are mediated in the Canadian legal system.[203] Therefore, while the courts have interpreted the duty as largely procedural, and it thus falls short of free, prior, and informed consent, it remains one important concept informing our call for the transformation of the PMFLA.[204]

In articulating the duty in Haida Nation v British Columbia, the Supreme Court concluded that third parties did not owe a duty to consult and accommodate to Indigenous parties. In overturning the Court of Appeal on this issue, the Supreme Court held that the duty sits with the government alone, as it flows from the assumption of sovereignty and is rooted in the honour of the Crown.[205] The government, they note, retains a number of tools to regulate third parties: “The government’s legislative authority over provincial natural resources gives it a powerful tool with which to respond to its legal obligations.”[206] Thus, while private parties do not owe a duty to consult and accommodate, third party interests are nonetheless necessarily subject to the Crown’s duty in its role as a regulator and decision-maker. This includes private lands, which are not excluded from the duty to consult and accommodate.[207] The Crown retains jurisdiction to regulate land use on privately held lands in a variety of ways, and as a result, it has duties and obligations to Indigenous Nations. Therefore, while the Crown and fee simple title holders have argued the duty to consult and accommodate simply does not apply on fee simple lands governed by the PMFLA,[208] courts and tribunals have specifically recognized the ongoing relationship of Indigenous Nations with private forest lands, including on Vancouver Island, and thus the application of the duty to consult.[209]

Indeed, the British Columbia Environmental Appeals Board explicitly upheld the Crown’s duty to consult Cowichan Tribes in the context of an application by TimberWest to apply pesticides on land owned in fee simple by virtue of the E&N grants.[210] As a constitutional duty, the duty to consult and accommodate exists upstream of legislation and administrative decisions. Therefore, the absence of Crown discretion in a statutory regime does not absolve the Crown of the duty.[211] Indeed, the absence of discretion may be the source of a section 35 breach.[212] As the Yukon Court of Appeal held in Ross River Dene v Government of Yukon, “[s]tatutory regimes that do not allow for consultation and fail to provide any other equally effective means to acknowledge and accommodate Aboriginal claims are defective and cannot be allowed to subsist.”[213] In other words, the removal of Crown decision-making power from land management decisions under the PMFLA does not relieve the Crown of the duty to consult and accommodate in the operation of the statutory regime. In Hupačasath First Nation v British Colombia, a Nuu-chah-nulth Nation whose territory sits at the northwest corner of the E&N lands in central Vancouver Island challenged the removal of their territory from the public forestry regime and its transfer to the PMFLA on the basis that the Crown had not undertaken proper consultation. The Court rejected the Crown and private owner’s arguments that the duty could not apply on private land.[214] Thus, while governments may choose to limit the exercise of their regulatory power over private land, they cannot legislate the duty away.

Further, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) requires free, prior, and informed consent for activities affecting ancestral lands, territories, and natural resources. British Columbia has committed to implementing the Declaration through the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA), including taking all measures necessary to ensure legislation is compliant.[215] Section 7 of the DRIPA provides for negotiated decision-making agreements that can authorize either or both a joint decision-making process and consent requirements for the exercise of statutory powers by Crown. There is no legal or policy basis for excluding private managed forest lands from the implementation of the obligations under UNDRIP, an issue we return to in the penultimate section of this paper. Indeed, 2021 amendments to the Interpretation Act require legislation and regulations be construed as “upholding and not abrogating or derogating from the aboriginal and treaty rights of Indigenous [P]eoples as recognized and affirmed by section 35” and as “being consistent with the Declaration.”[216]

The above discussion demonstrates the unsettled relationship between private property and Aboriginal title in Canadian law. As we discuss in the context of the PMFLA below, meaningfully addressing this requires serious and substantive engagement with Indigenous legal frameworks and new models for land use governance.[217]

2.     Redress in the Context of Private Forest Lands

Any re-envisioning of the PMFLA must be undertaken in concert with meaningful redress for the legacies of the E&N land grants. These lands comprise the majority of private forest lands in the province and represent one of the most egregious land grabs in Canadian history.[218] The granting of Hul’qumi’num traditional territory and property rights without any form of restitution and without any form of meaningful consultation has led to the wholesale destruction and spoliation of valuable forest lands, streams, and ecosystems. Many of these forests and streams are no longer usable by Hul’qumi’num communities. Accordingly, Hul’qumi’num Peoples have lost opportunities to practice, and prosper from, their traditional ways of life on their traditional lands. As Wayne Charlie, a Hul’qumi’num Elder, stated in his affidavit, “Our children don’t have the opportunity to hunt in our territory today. . . . Today we don’t have the opportunity to teach this because gates are locked and we’re only allowed in and out at certain times on the weekends.” This was echoed by Hul’qumi’num member Tim Kulchyski, who stated, “The private lands within our territory is one of the single largest impediments to our long term existence. Our ability to learn is being restricted because we can’t transfer knowledge from generation to generation, especially our place names and language because of our inability to access our territory” (See Figure 4). At a broader level, the First Nations Forestry Council explained in 2008 that the removal of private land from TFLs and the management of the land under the PMFLA has “resulted in dramatic increases in logging rates, with often little benefit to us, and a dramatic increase in sales of land for purposes of real estate development—an outcome that completely alienates such lands from their usage as forestlands and that further complicates resolution of outstanding rights and title issues.”[219]

Figure 4: Example of an Island Timberlands gate found on private forest land created out of the E&N land grants that prevents Indigenous access to land and territory. Image credit: Michael Ekers.

The UNDRIP, and international human rights law more generally, has recognized that the issues of land, territory, and access to natural resources remain central to observing the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous Peoples. The nature and importance of those relationships is fundamental for both the material subsistence and the cultural integrity of many Indigenous Peoples,[220] including the Hul’qumi’num Peoples, as evidenced by the statements above. The failure to deal with redress in the context of private forest lands is in direct violation of Canada’s obligations under the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.

On 21 June 2021, Canada formalized its intention to adopt and implement the Declaration when An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples[221] received Royal Assent. The purpose of the Act is to affirm the Declaration as an international human rights instrument that can help interpret and apply Canadian law. It also provides a framework to advance the implementation of the Declaration at the federal level. It requires the Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, to do the following: 1) take all measures necessary to ensure the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration; 2) prepare and implement an action plan to achieve the Declaration’s objectives; and 3) table an annual report on progress to align the laws of Canada on the action plan. Prior to the federal legislation coming into force, in November 2019, British Columbia passed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act into law. Similarly, the provincial legislation sets out a process to align British Columbia’s laws with the Declaration. It mandates that the government bring provincial laws into harmony with the Declaration and requires the development of an action plan to achieve this alignment over time — requiring transparency and accountability. Therefore, British Columbia is not only obligated to review the PMFLA for compliance with UNDRIP, but also required to address the right to redress for the harms caused by its application and for the underlying E&N land grants.

The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act provides broad recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples to land, territories, and natural resources, including: the right to strengthen their distinctive spiritual relations with lands and resources (article 25); the right to own, use, develop, and control the lands, territories, and resources that Indigenous Peoples possess by reason of traditional ownership (article 26); the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair, and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used, or damaged without their free, prior, and informed consent (article 28); the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources (article 29); and the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources (article 32). It also requires states to take measures to uphold and promote the rights of Indigenous Peoples relating to lands, territories, and resources.

Two of the primary constraints on the full and free enjoyment of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources relate to either the failure of states to recognize the existence of Indigenous use, occupancy, and ownership, or the failure of states to accord appropriate legal status, juridical capacity, and other legal rights in connection with Indigenous Peoples’ ownership of land.[222] These issues are further complicated where domestic law has developed without recognition or protection for Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and natural resources. Under the Declaration, the scope of the lands, resources, or territory of a particular Indigenous People will depend on the specific circumstances of the community in question. However, the Declaration clearly recognizes rights to those lands, territories, and resources traditionally held by Indigenous Peoples but now controlled by others as a matter of fact and law. Thus, private third party ownership does not exclude the application of UNDRIP from Indigenous territory.

Article 28 is of particular importance to the situation of the Hul’qumi’num Peoples. It details the rights of Indigenous Peoples for redress and compensation where their lands, territories, and resources have been taken, used, or damaged without consent. This right provides a remedy for Indigenous Peoples who no longer possess their lands and territories, such as the Hul’qumi’num communities. Where possible, lands, territories, and resources that Indigenous Peoples no longer possess should be returned; alternatively, fair compensation should be paid, which could include the provision of other lands, territories, and resources, monetary compensation, or development opportunities.[223] The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has held that restitution of lands and territories is to be the primary means of redress. Only when restitution is not possible should other forms of redress and compensation be explored.[224] These alternative forms of redress need to be considered in the context of the long history of unlawful land alienation of Hul’qumi’num lands and resources. For example, this could include meaningful revenue sharing, which the PMFLA currently does not contemplate, but should not be limited to such existing models. Alternatives must be appropriate to Hul’qumi’num people-place relations and the laws that uphold them.

E.   Transforming Governance: An Agenda for Interim Reform and Call for Long Term Change

The PMFLA is only the most recent manifestation of the intergenerational injustice of the E&N land grants. Yet, its entrenchment of the power of private ownership nonetheless requires specific and urgent attention. Reform of the statutory regime is thus necessary but not sufficient to address the concerns set out above and continually asserted by Hul’qumi’num and other Indigenous communities whose territory has been impacted by forestry operations on private land. Land unlawfully taken must be returned, jurisdiction must be recognized, and compensation must address the irreversible loss of ecosystems and species in the territory. As we work towards these broader goals, we recognize that a regulatory regime for private forest lands will likely be maintained in British Columbia. Therefore, in this final section we set out an agenda for strategic and interim reform to account for Indigenous law and jurisdiction and to ensure meaningful oversight and enforcement in the public interest.

While we anticipate that landowners will resist legislative reforms on the basis that they constitute an encroachment of “their” private property rights, fee simple holdings are always regulated for a variety of public purposes and in a diversity of ways.[225] As noted above, historically, private forest land has been regulated through the TFL system and/or the FLR. Thus, we see the following recommendations for changes to the PMFLA structure as consistent with the need to include fee simple lands in broader strategies to recognize Indigenous jurisdiction, rights, and title, and address the urgent and compounding crises of biodiversity loss and climate change. We offer these proposals as an interim and necessarily partial intervention in the longer-term path towards redress.

1.     Meaningful Collaborative Oversight & Reporting Requirements

Structural change requires a new approach to governance. We recommend the establishment of a new, collaborative oversight body for the management of private forest lands in accordance with the standards outlined in our further recommendations below. Given the historical context and the disproportionate impact on the territory of specific First Nations, particularly the HTG, the new body should be designed in full partnership with the Nations affected by private forest land within their territory. It should include guaranteed representation for the impacted First Nations, including direct decision-making power with respect to any delegated management and enforcement decisions. This is not only consistent with Canadian legal principles under section 35 and the requirements of UNDRIP, but is also, in the context of HTG territories, required by Coast Salish law. The principle of thu’it (trust) emphasizes the importance of effective leaders gaining the trust of those on whose behalf they make decisions in order for impacted individuals to recognize and respect the validity of the decision-making process itself.[226] The principle of si’emstuhw (respect) suggests that an important aspect of leadership within the Coast Salish world is the ability to cultivate respectful relationships with, and gain the respect of, those who are impacted by the leader’s decision-making.[227] These principles highlight how important it is for all parties who are significantly impacted by the governing body’s decisions to be represented in order for them to be able to recognize that it has any valid authority at all, and then to be able to respect its decisions.

Representation alone is not sufficient to ensure Coast Salish legal perspectives are heard and accounted for within private forest land management. Indigenous legal concepts and practices need to shape the form and conduct of governance. Within the Coast Salish world, the idea of nil ow’ sthuthi’ ni’ ‘utun shqualuwun (consensus) is considered a key aspect of dispute resolution because it embodies the principle of sts’lunuts’amat (kinship), promoting healthy relationships and fostering harmony within the community.[228] Parties involved in a dispute, along with respected individuals who have relevant knowledge on the subject matter, discuss a matter until they arrive at a resolution that is acceptable to everyone.[229] Those impacted by decisions, whether they be fee simple private land owners, Coast Salish community leadership, or specific Coast Salish families with connections to certain lands, could all participate in the process on an equal footing. Individuals with relevant knowledge, whether from a Coast Salish legal/cultural perspective or a Western science perspective, could also be invited to join in the process, to help inform everyone involved on particular issues. Incorporating the idea of nil ow’ sthuthi’ ni’ ‘utun shqualuwun (consensus) would not only uphold the principle of sts’lunuts’amat (kinship), but it would also promote thu’it (trust) and si’emstuhw (respect) for the overall decision-making process.

We recognize that consensus-building is not possible in all circumstances, and the governance framework would need to account for that. Within the Coast Salish world, individuals or groups in conflict may choose to call upon an arbitrator — Si’em, or respected leaders — when consensus cannot be reached. Si’em must be identified and approached through consensus of the parties involved.[230] In addition to consensus-seeking processes, the incorporation of Coast Salish Big House practices, such as the use of speakers and witnesses, could be considered in order to foster accountability for council members and promote trust and respect for their decision-making. Speakers are individuals who are highly trained in the background, history, language, and culture of the people they represent, and who are respected and trusted for their judgement in terms of the words they choose to use.[231] Witnesses are responsible for listening and observing what goes on and remembering it in the future to ensure that all parties are held to their word and that they can trust others will be as well.[232] Incorporating these practices alongside collaborative decision-making with Indigenous Peoples could help rebuild trust and respect between the parties so that they can manage the territories together, and in a good way.

The necessary structural changes would also require redrafting the section 4 objective to define “benefits” both more clearly and more holistically and to shift away from the weak discretionary language such as “encourage” and “taking into account.” From a Coast Salish perspective, the objective would be grounded in the principles of snuw’uyulh, with an understanding of how those guiding principles influence obligations owed to all beings, animate or inanimate, within the Coast Salish world. Thus, in line with the principles of sts’lunuts’amat (kinship) and sh-tiiwun (responsibility), building and maintaining good and respectful relations and fulfilling reciprocal obligations to kin, broader society, and the more-than-human world would be central.[233] The role of decision-makers would necessarily expand and shift to a stewardship role, requiring not only a conceptual understanding of what it means to be in relationship with particular places governed by the regime, but to also be on the land observing, communicating, and interacting with it. In this way, consensus-seeking processes would better incorporate the full network of kin-relations that decision-makers are responsible to uphold. For example, decision-making would need to consider how forestry practices might specifically impact the ability of Coast Salish Peoples to care for their ancestors and their resting places, as well as any future generations who will depend on those lands and resources. Rather than focusing on the needs of human actors and implementing blanket criteria for environmental sustainability or protection, the beings of the more-than-human world would be understood as actors with whom relationships must be fostered and nurtured on an ongoing basis in particular places. While economic benefits are generally associated with financial gain, from a Coast Salish perspective the overall net effect of decisions on relationships may be most important. Thus social, environmental, and economic benefits could be considered holistically in assessing overall effects.

Changes to the governance of private managed forest land also requires decision-makers and impacted communities to have access to information about forestry practices and impacts on the more-than-human world. Therefore, lands under the regime must be subject to at least the public reporting requirements applicable to Crown land. We recommend that information about location and size of harvesting areas, volume of timber being harvested, and monitoring of environmental, cultural, recreational, and social values on both private and Crown forest lands be publicly available, and in particular that it be reported directly to Indigenous governments whose territory private forest lands are located within. Further, reporting should be expanded to include the impacts of harvesting on a variety of social, economic, and ecological values.

The regime could also expressly require that section 17 management commitments by owners reflect an understanding of relevant Indigenous laws. Access to Coast Salish territories has generally been limited to people who understand the law, including the significance of principles of snuw’uyulh, such as sts’lunuts’amat (kinship), si’emstuhw (respect), and sh-tiiwun (responsibility).[234] Requiring a demonstrated and publicly available commitment to learning about, and adhering to, Coast Salish laws and practices within management commitments would promote thu’it (trust) and si’emstuhw (respect) between the parties involved in decisions and operations. A revised regime must also include adequate independent funding for this restructured governance body to uphold any monitoring and enforcement responsibilities. We recommend existing government authority and enforcement capacity be expanded to ensure accountability and transparency on private managed forest lands, also in full partnership with impacted Indigenous Nations.

2.     Improved Objectives and Mandatory Standards

A revised set of values and defined and enforceable standards must be developed in full collaboration with Indigenous Nations in order to expand and strengthen the objectives of the regime, including but not limited to the following areas: riparian, watershed and wildlife protections, biodiversity, sustainable harvesting limits, and protocols for cultural heritage access and protections for cultural and spiritual values. Clear, prescribed standards in relation to each of these objectives should be applied to private forest lands to ensure the protection of the land base and to facilitate enforcement of the collaboratively developed environmental, social, and cultural objectives. From a Coast Salish perspective, the onus should be on the supervisory body responsible for the management of private managed forest lands to actively manage owners, with the goal of avoiding ecological stress and promoting sustainable growth and prosperity. Thus, the revised regime would shift from a complaints driven, self-regulation model towards a framework based on the active relationship building and maintenance required to sustain good and harmonious relations. Resource management is, under Coast Salish law, “primarily the management of the users and not the resource.”[235] This conceptual shift echoes movements towards transformative environmental governance in other jurisdictions. For example, the introduction to Te Kawa o Te Urewera, the policy document for a former national park in Aotearoa New Zealand that is now a legal entity governed by a Maori-led co-management board, states, “Te Kawa is about the management of people for the benefit of the land — it is not about land management.”[236]

A central element of such a reorientation is the incorporation of meaningful biodiversity protections in all forest management. This would be developed as part of broader collaborative landscape level planning to ensure ecosystem resilience and connectivity and to respect Indigenous jurisdiction, rights, and title. As outlined above, we see movements towards this in the context of other forest lands in the province. In the context of private forest land, this work can build on existing work already being undertaken by HTG Nations and other impacted Indigenous communities. Biodiversity protections should incorporate the precautionary principle, Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and must consider cumulative effects.[237] They should also reflect relevant Indigenous legal principles for impacted territories, such as recognition of the interconnectedness of all beings and the idea that every action has a subsequent effect on those surrounding it in accordance with snuw’uyulh. Coast Salish people-place relations involved individuals being publicly recognized as authorities who were tasked with monitoring ecological stress by ensuring resources were not overharvested.[238] Thus, rather than simply identifying individual environmental concerns and responding in isolation, decisions about the actions of land owners in a revised regime would begin by proactively asking questions informed by the stewardship objective: How will this decision or action affect the soil, water, fish, and other beings and their relations and obligations? What is needed to respond to any concerns and to ensure all of these beings continue to thrive and are able to fulfill their own responsibilities and maintain good relations? The process of answering these questions would then be ongoing and collective in order to respond to the needs of the territory as it changes over time.

These kinds of guiding questions could inform the development of clear and publicly available mandatory standards for the protection of riparian zones and fisheries habitat, the protection of wildlife and wildlife habitat, including ungulates and grizzly bears, and the protection of cultural values and resources. Standards would be developed based on independent scientific and Indigenous expert advice and should be enforced at least to the standard applied on Crown land and in a manner developed with impacted First Nations. Harvesting that could result in placing species at risk, or further endangering them or their habitat, should not be permitted on private managed forest land. However, restrictions could be coupled with incentives and stewardship programs to address the challenges faced by landowners with species and habitat present on their land. In addition, water quality and flow issues should be given priority in forest management decisions on private land, with impacts beyond human needs expressly considered. Revised standards should expressly aim to prevent watershed impacts rather than mitigate them after the fact.

An annual allowable cut for private land is necessary to maintain economic, cultural, and environmental values. Harvesting limits should be developed jointly by the ministry and impacted First Nations, with Indigenous knowledge as a mandatory and equal consideration. The annual allowable cut on private land holdings must protect the ongoing exercise of Indigenous rights and the determination of outstanding title claims. The location, size, and shape of cut blocks, as well as their spatial distribution, should also be regulated in collaboration with First Nations with private forest land in their territory, in accordance with relevant principles of Indigenous law.

3.     Long-Term Protections for Forest Lands

Finally, we recommend a new Forest Land Reserve be created in partnership with Indigenous Nations within whose territory PMFLA land is situated. Private forest lands not returned to Nations as part of their redress should be independently assessed as managed forest lands and mandatorily included in a reinstated and collaboratively managed Forest Land Reserve. A collaborative governance structure with representation from First Nations with private forest lands within their territories would be essential to ensuring land designations respect Indigenous title and rights. This would mean land assessed as private forest land could be protected as forest land in perpetuity, subject to treaty and redress measures. If removals are allowed, there should be clear mandatory criteria for a limited set of circumstances. All removal decisions should be made jointly with relevant First Nations, with public and municipal consultation, and substantial penalties should apply for land withdrawals.

A new regime incorporating the changes outlined above should be proactively enforced by the province, in collaboration with impacted Indigenous Nations, to avoid the current conflict of interest at the heart of the council’s mandate. It will be crucial to ensure enforcement include monitoring rather than reliance on a complaint-based or industry self-reporting system. Further, penalties for non-compliance must be increased to at least the standard of FRPA and the former FLRA. Finally, the province should fund monitoring and enforcement at levels sufficient to ensure compliance and regular monitoring on private forest lands.

F.    Conclusion:

These changes will face strong resistance from owners of private forest lands. Those owners will undoubtedly say they are entitled to the enjoyment and benefit of their private property. In our view, such resistance only demonstrates how imbalanced the current PMFLA is. Owners, which primarily means three large public sector pension plans, have benefited enormously from the deregulated environment they have operated within since the enactment of the PMFLA.

Prior to being incorporated into the TFL regime, private forest lands were managed to a much lower standard than Crown land. The devastating effects informed the Sloan Report recommendation in 1945 that private land be folded into the public regime. Thus, rather than being unprecedented, the PMFLA reforms restore appropriate oversight suitable to an industrial extractive industry with widespread and potentially irreversible impacts on the landscape. In the contemporary context, it is essential that they also recognize and restore Indigenous jurisdiction and interests in private forest lands.

Indeed, Sloan went further in 1955, recommending the Crown purchase the E&N lands from then-owner Canadian Pacific Railway, seeing the importance of these lands to long term management of forestry on Vancouver Island. The NDP’s FLR was one of the few attempts since to try to ensure that private forest lands are managed sustainably and in a fashion that upholds Indigenous rights and title. Indeed, one of the drivers of its implementation was to ensure lands were available for treaty negotiations.[239] Those negotiations persist, in large part because of the obstacles the E&N lands continue to present to achieving a fair settlement.

As we’ve noted above, in aligning regulations pertaining to private land with legislation governing forestry operations on Crown land, these recommendations are only one interim measure in the road towards redress for the Indigenous Nations dispossessed by the E&N grants. The emphasis on collaboration and co-governance with affected Nations reflect recent amendments to the FA and FRPA, as well as ongoing UNDRIP alignment processes. Such strategic but interim interventions are crucial and urgent, if insufficient, to protect Indigenous rights and title on land held in fee simple title. For the HTG Nations, the necessary next stages of getting to 100 percent must include a combination of returning the land and the fulsome recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction rooted in collectively held title and place-based systems of law in relation to fee simple lands.


*    Sarah Morales (Su-taxwiye) is Coast Salish and a member of Cowichan Tribes. She is an Associate Professor at the University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, where she teaches torts, transsystemic torts, Coast Salish law and languages, legal research, and writing and field schools. Sarah’s research centres on Indigenous legal traditions, specifically the traditions of the Coast Salish People, Aboriginal law, and human rights.

** Professor Estair Van Wagner researches and teaches in the areas of natural resource law and property law at Osgoode Hall Law School and is co-director of Osgoode’s Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinic. Her work explores how law is used to structure relations with the environment.

*** Michael Ekers is an Associate Professor in the Department of Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Scarborough. He has been researching the BC forestry sector for more than fifteen years and, before that, worked in the reforestation sector for nearly a decade. His work is published mainly in geography and agrarian studies journals. He continues to be preoccupied with unpacking the legacies of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo land grants.

[1]    Darron Kloster, “Pacheedaht First Nation Says Old-Growth Activists ‘Not Welcome’ in Fairy Creek Area” Times Colonist (12 April 2021), online: www.timescolonist.com/local-news/pacheedaht-first-nation-says-old-growth-activists-not-welcome-in-fairy-creek-area-4688651.

[2]      Nicholas Blomley, “‘Shut the Province Down’: First Nations Blockades in British Columbia” (1996) BC Studies III 121–41.

[3]    Warren Magnusson & Karena Shaw, A Political Space: Reading the Global through Clayoquot Sound (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

[4]    Zoe Yunker, “A Judge Rebuked Illegal RCMP Tactics at Fairy Creek. They continue” The Tyee (16 August 2021),online: https://thetyee.ca/News/2021/08/16/Judge-Rebuked-Illegal-RCMP-Tactics/.

[5]    The BC Treaty Commission website states, “The BC treaty process has always been guided by the principle that private property (fee simple land) is not on the negotiation table, except on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis. . . . In most cases, it will be Crown lands and resources transferred under treaties.” See BC Treaty Commission, “Land and Resources” tab, online: https://bctreaty.ca/negotiations/why-treaties/.

[6]    SBC 2003, c 80 [PMFLA].

[7]    Ben Parfitt, Restoring the Public Good on Private Forestlands (Victoria: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2008), online: www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/BC%20Office/2018/01/CCPA-BC_RestoringForestry_web.pdf.

[8]    Bill 23 Forests Statutes Amendment Act, 2021, 2nd Session, 43rd Leg, British Columbia, 2021 (as passed third reading on 23 November 2021) [Bill 23]; Bill 28, Forest Amendment Act, 2021 (as passed third reading on 25 November 2021 [Bill 28]); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SBC 2019, c 44 [DRIPA]; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, UN GA A/Res/61/295 [UNDRIP].

[9]    See, generally, Yves Mayrand, “A Critical Overview of Bill 23 Amendments to the Forest Act and the Forest and Range Practices ActEvergreen Alliance (9 January 2022), online: www.evergreenalliance.ca/journalism-the-need-to-reform-bc-forest-legislation/7/; Zoë Yunker, “A New Bill Could Put BC ‘Back in the Driver’s Seat’ for Forestry” The Tyee (29 October 2021), online: https://thetyee.ca/News/2021/10/29/New-Bill-BC-Drivers-Seat-Forestry/.

[10] Parfitt, above note 7; Emilie Benoit, Lola Churchman & Calvin Sanborn, The Need to Reform BC’s Private Managed Forest Land Act (Victoria: Environmental Law Centre, 2019), online: https://elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Private-Managed-Forest-Land-Act-Reform.pdf.

[11] W Taylor, Crown Land Grants: A History of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Land Grants, the Railway Belt, and the Peace River Block (Victoria: BC Crown Registry Services), online (pdf) https://ltsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Crown-Land-Grants-A-History-of-the-E-and-N.pdf.

[12] Robert Morales, Brian Egan & Brian Thom, “The Great Land Grab: Colonialism and the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway Land Grant in Hul’qumi’num Territory” (Ladysmith: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2007), online: www.hulquminum.bc.ca/pubs/HTGRailwayBookSpreads.pdf?lbisphpreq=1.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Peter Cook et al, eds, To Share, Not Surrender: Indigenous and Settler Visions of Treaty Making in the Colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2021); Brian Thom, “Addressing the Challenge of Overlapping Claims in Implementing the Vancouver Island (Douglas) Treaties” (2020) 62:2 Anthropologica 295.

[15] Michael Ekers et al, “The Coloniality of Private Forest Lands: Harvesting Levels, Land Grants and Neoliberalism on Vancouver Island” (2021) 65:2 The Canadian Geographer 166 at 183.

[16] Sarah Morales & Brian Thom, “The Principle of Sharing and the Shadow of Canadian Property Law” in Angela Cameron et al, eds, Creating Indigenous Property: Power, Rights, and Relationships (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020) 120; Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II [HTG v Canada].

[17] Robert A Williams Jr et al, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted by the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group against Canada (Ladysmith, BC: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2007), online: law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Hul%E2%80%99qumi%E2%80%99num%20Treaty%20Group%20Petition.pdf [IACHR Petition].

[18] Bill 23 and Bill 28, above note 8.

[19] In 2019, the province passed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, above note 8,and committed to implementing the UNDRIP, including through legislative alignment.

[20] Morales & Thom, above note 16 at 108.

[21] Rachel Joyce Flowers, Xwnuts’aluwum: T’aat’ka’Kin Relations and the Apocryphal Slave (MA Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2014) [unpublished] at 4.

[22] Interview with Ernie Victor, cited in Jeanette Armstrong & Gerry William, eds, River of Salmon Peoples, (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 2015) at 117–18.

[23] Ibid at 113.

[24] Sarah Morales, Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal Tradition (PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2014) [unpublished] at 50 [Morales, Snuw’uyulh].

[25] The HTG is a formal partner in this research and Chief Negotiator Robert Morales is a co-applicant on the SSHRC grant funding our work.

[26] Snunemymuxw First Nation is negotiating independently. Snaw-naw-as First Nation is negotiating as part of the Te’mexw Treaty Association.

[27] Morales, Snuw’uyulh, above note 24 at 154; Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, Getting to 100% (Ladysmith, BC: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2007) [HTG,“Getting to 100%”].

[28] Morales, Snuw’uyulh, above note 24 at 221–22. While the HTG has been documenting Hul’qumi’num law through internal processes for decades, much of this research is undertaken as part of treaty negotiations and subject to confidentiality requirements or is not appropriate for publication according to community protocols. We are working directly with the HTG as part of this project; however, internal materials are not referenced to respect confidentiality and the sensitivity of ongoing legal and political processes.

[29] Brian Egan, “Sharing the Colonial Burden: Treaty-Making and Reconciliation in Hul’qumi’num Territory” (2012) 56:4 The Canadian Geographer 398 [Egan, “Sharing the Colonial Burden”]; Brian Egan, “Towards Shared Ownership: Property, Geography, and Treaty Making in British Columbia” (2013) 95:1 Geografiska Annaler: Series B 33; Brian Thom, “Reframing Indigenous Territories” (2014) 38:4 American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3; Morales, Egan & Thom, above note 12.

[30] British Columbia Terms of Union (UK) 1871, RSC 1985, App II, no 10, the original title being “Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union,” dated 16 May 1871, changed by the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 53, Schedule, item 4.

[31] Egan, “Sharing the Colonial Burden,” above note 29; Morales, Egan & Thom above note 12.

[32] Brian Egan, From Dispossession to Decolonization: Towards a Critical Indigenous Geography of Hul’qumi’num Territory (PhD Dissertation, Carleton University, 2008) [unpublished].

[33] HTG, “Getting to 100%,” above note 27.

[34] For an introduction to Hul’qumi’num systems of property relations, see Morales & Thom, above note 16.

[35] A third forestry company, Hancock Timber Resource Group, is a smaller player in terms of their holdings in HTG territory.

[36] HTG,“Getting to 100%,” above note 27; Chris Arnett, Terror of the Coast Land Alienation and Colonial War on Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands, 1849–1863 (Burnaby, BC: Talonbooks, 1999); Hamar Foster, “Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title In British Columbia, 1849–1927” in Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); John Sutton Lutz, “The Rutters Impasse and the End of Treaty Making on Vancouver Island” in Peter Cook et al, eds, To Share, Not Surrender: Indigenous and Settler Visions of Treaty Making in the Colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2021) 220; Brian Thom, “Leveraging International Power: Private Property and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada” in Irene Bellier & Jennifer Hays, eds, Scales of Governance and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routledge, 2019) [Thom, “Leveraging International Power”].

[37] Arnett, above note 36; Douglas C Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

[38] Hamar Foster, Benjamin L Berger & AR Buck, eds, The Grand Experiment: Law and Legal Culture in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).

[39] HTG, “Getting to 100%,” above note 27; Thom, “Leveraging International Power,” above note 36 at 187.

[40] Ibid at 186; Brian Thom, Coast Salish Senses of Place: Dwelling, Meaning, Power, Property and Territory in the Coast Salish World (PhD Dissertation, McGill University, 2005) [unpublished] [Thom, “Coast Salish Senses of Place”] at 229, noting one writ was filed by Cowichan Tribes and another by the other five nations who were members of the HTG at that time.

[41] While the wider title claims are in abeyance, the Cowichan Nation Alliance, made up of the Cowichan Tribes, Stz’uminus First Nation, Halalt First Nation and Penelakut Tribe, is pursuing a spot title claim for a village site on the lower Fraser River in an area the Crown has excluded from the treaty negotiations: see Cowichan Tribes v Canada (AG), 2016 BCSC 420; Tristan Hopper, “The Cowichan Nation’s Lost Salish Sea Empire” Capital Daily (15 October 2019), online: www.capitaldaily.ca/news/cowichan-lulu-island-claim-richmond-lawsuit.

[42] IACHR Petition, above note 17 at para 85; British Columbia Treaty Commission, Treaty Commission Annual Report (2004), online: https://bctreaty.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Annual_Report_04.pdf at 2.

[43] Thom, “Leveraging International Power,” above note 36.

[44] IACHR Petition, above note 17. The HTG Petition alleged violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, specifically Articles II (right to equality before the law), III (right to profess, manifest and practice a religious faith), XIII (right to culture), and XXII (right to property). While Canada has signed both the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Declaration, it has not bound itself to the Inter-American Court. Only the court can enforce decisions. Therefore, claims regarding Canada are limited to the Commission, which has advisory jurisdiction to make non-binding decisions. See Thom, “Leveraging International Power,” above note 36 for further discussion on the limitations of the international human rights regime for Indigenous Nations in Canada.

[45] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights YouTube channel hosts an online video of the merits hearing: www.youtube.com/@humanrightsHTG/videos.

[46] HTG v Canada, above note 16.

[47] Ibid at paras 38 and 42.

[48] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Joey Caro).

[49] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Tim Kulchyski) [Kulchyski Affadavit].

[50] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Martina Joe).

[51] IACHR Petition, above note 17 at para 27.

[52] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavits of Wesley Modeste, Richard Thomas, Lydia Hwitsum & Chad Harris). See also Karen Fediuk, Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Harvest Study 2001 (Ladysmith, BC: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2001). For a discussion of the arc of forestry regimes from initial land grant to the present moment, see Michael Ekers “Land Grabbing on the Edge of Empire: The Longue Durée of Fee-Simple Forest Lands and Indigenous Resistance in British Columbia” (2023) Journal of Peasant Studies 1; Michael Ekers, “Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island: On Fixes and Colonial Enclosures” (2019) 19:2 Journal of Agrarian Change 270.

[53] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavits of Edward Joe, Florence James, Lydia Hwitsum, Charles Seymour & Chad Harris).

[54] Skye Ryan, “Clean Water Starts Flowing from Cowichan Taps After 30 Year Wait” CHECK News (23 September 2018), online:  www.cheknews.ca/clean-water-starts-flowing-from-cowichan-taps-after-30-year-wait-491377/; Cowichan Tribes, “Water Act Modernization Initiative” Submission to the Ministry of Environment, Water Stewardship Division Government of British Columbia (27 May 2010).

[55] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Wesley Modeste) [Modeste Affidavit].

[56] Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Chad Harris); Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Affidavit of Arvid Charlie).

[57] IACHR Petition, above note 17; Morales, Snuw’uyulh,above note 24.

[58] Kulchyski Affadavit, above note 49.

[59] Morales, Snuw’uyulh, above note 24 at 108.

[60] Ibid at 107.

[61] Ibid at 233.

[62] Ibid at 130.

[63] Ibid at 98–99 and 113.

[64] Thom, “Coast Salish Senses of Place,” above note 40 at 136 and 146; Tim Ingold, “Hunting and Gathering as Ways of Perceiving the Environment, in Katsuyoshi Fukui and Roy Ellen, eds, Redefining Nature (London: Routledge, 1996) 177 at 131; Wayne Suttles, “Affinial Ties, Subsistence, and Prestige Among the Coast Salish” (1960) 62:2 American Anthropologist 296.

[65] Thom, “Coast Salish Senses of Place,” above note 40; Morales & Thom, above note 16.

[66] Trevor Barnes & Roger Hayter, eds, Trouble in the Rainforest: British Columbia’s Forest Economy in Transition (Victoria: Western Geographical Press, 1997); Bruce Braun, “Buried Epistemologies: The Politics of Nature in (Post)Colonial British Columbia” (1997) 87:1 Annals of the American Association of Geographers 3; Magnusson & Shaw, above note 3.

[67] RSBC 1996, c 158.

[68] Ibid, ss 19–24.

[69] Ministry of Forests, New Private Land Regulation Model to Books Investment Key Environmental Values, Property Rights Protected (Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 2001), online: https://archive.news.gov.bc.ca/releases/archive/pre2001/1999/1999nr/1999001.asp; Ministry of Forests, Forest Land Commission to Oversee Private Land Logging: New Rules will Balance Public Values with Private Property Rights (Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 1999), online: https://archive.news.gov.bc.ca/releases/archive/pre2001/1999/1999nr/1999066.asp.

[70] Hagen, as quoted in British Columbia, Debates of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 37th Parl, 4th Session, Vol 17, No 2 (20 October 2003) at 7746 (Hon S. Hagen).

[71] Stepan Wood et al, “What Ever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law” (2010) 37 Ecology Law Quarterly 981.

[72] Tree farm licences are currently set out in ss 33–39.1 of the Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157.

[73] RSBC 1996, c 159.

[74]  SBC 2002, c 69. See also Ministry of Forests, British Columbia Forest Service Briefing Note: Deletion of Weyerhaeuser’s Private Land from Tree Farm Licenses 39 and 46 (Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 2004), online: www.elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Appendix-C1.pdf. While we refer above and below to the Crown land regime set out in the Forest Act and Forest and Range Practices Act as setting higher standards, we note that there are nonetheless serious concerns about the adequacy of the Crown land forestry regime to protect Indigenous rights and interests and ecological integrity.

[75] Hupačasath First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2005 BCSC 1712 at para 223 [Hupačasath].

[76]  RSBC 1996, c 20 [Assessment Act].

[77] PMFLA, above note 6, s 5.

[78] Ibid, ss 4 and 6(1) & (2).

[79] Ibid, s 6(4). Notably, there is currently a municipal councillor and member of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities sitting in one of the government-appointed positions.

[80] The council’s Governance Policy includes additional criteria for the Chair and members, one of which is “familiarity with forestry, First Nation, and other stakeholder issues.” However, experience working with First Nations is not one of the listed areas of experience in the Policy. See the Managed Forest Council, Governance Policy (February 2016), online: www.mfcouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Governance-Policy-February-2016.pdf at 13.

[81] The council’s object according to the PMFLA is “to encourage forest management practices on private managed forest land, taking into account the social, environmental and economic benefits of those practices.” See PMFLA, above note 6, s 5.

[82] Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 45.

[83]  PMFLA, above note 6, s 9(2).

[84] Jon Davies, Private Managed Forest Land Council Five Year Review (November 2009) at 9.

[85] PMFLA, above note 6, s 17(1).

[86] BC Reg 182/2007, s 9(1)(b) [Reg 182].

[87] PMFLA, above note 6, s 20; Reg 182, s 12(a) & (b).

[88] BC Reg 280/2018, s 3.

[89] Forest and Range Practices Act, SBC 2002, c 69, s 3(1) [FRPA].

[90] Bill 23, above note 8, cl 33, amendments to FRPA, ibid, s 2.22.

[91] Ibid, cl 33, amendments to Forest and Range Practices Act, s 2.31(1).

[92] Ibid, cl 33, amendments to Forest and Range Practices Act, ss 2.32 and 2.46(1).

[93] Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157, ss 35.2 and 35.1(5)(c).

[94] Bill 28, above note 8, cl 46, amendments to Forest Act, Part 6.1, ss 244, 260, and 267.

[95] Ibid, cl 46, amendments to Forest Act, s 102.5.

[96] Ibid, cl 46, amendments to Forest Act, s 102.9.

[97] Forest and Range Practices Act, above note 89, ss 10–11.

[98] Bill 23, above note 8, cl 33, amendments to FRPA, ss 2.37(1) and 2.38(1).

[99] BC Reg 280/2009, s 5(d) & (e).

[100] Forest Act, above note 93, s 9(2).

[101] Syd Cannings et al, Our Home and Native Land: Canadian Species of Global Conservation Concern (Ottawa: NatureServe Canada, 2005); Matt Austin, eds, Taking Nature’s Pulse: The Status of Biodiversity in British Columbia (Victoria: Biodiversity BC, 2008); John Doyle, An Audit of Biodiversity in BC: Assessing the Effectiveness of Key Tools (Victoria: Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia, 2013). For an inventory of species at risk see, BC Conservation Data Centre (2018), Red and Blue List, online: 100.gov.bc.ca/pub/eswp/.

[102] Ontario Biodiversity Council, Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy 2011: Protecting What Sustains Us (Peterborough: Ontario Biodiversity Council, 2011), online: http://ontariobiodiversitycouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/Ontarios-Biodiversity-Strategy-2011-accessible.pdf at 1–3.

[103] IACHR Petition, above note 17; Frank Brown & Y Kathy Brown, Staying the Course, Staying Alive: Biodiversity, Stewardship and Sustainability (Victoria: Biodiversity BC, 2009).

[104] Eduardo Brondizio, Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, 2019), online: https://ipbes.net/global-assessment at 3.

[105] Morales & Thom, above note 16 at 90.

[106] PMFLA, above note 6, s 12.

[107] Ibid, s 13(1).

[108] Ibid, s 14(1).

[109] Ibid, s 15.

[110] Ibid, s 16.

[111] BC Reg 14/2004, ss 8 & 9–9.1 [Reg 14].

[112] Ibid, s 64.

[113] Ibid, s 66.

[114] Ibid, s 68.

[115] Ibid, Sched 1, s 3(2).

[116] Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993, ratification by Canada 4 December 1992).

[117] Water Sustainability Act, SBC 2014, c 15, s 1(1). The Water Act and its successor, the Water Users’ Communities Act, RSBC 1996, c 483, defined “stream” slightly more narrowly. The latter has been amended to use the Water Sustainability Act definitions.

[118] Davies, above note 84 at 9.

[119] Reg 182, above note 86, ss 14 and 16.

[120] Ibid, ss 15 and 17.

[121] For detailed requirements, see ibid, ss 27–30.

[122] Private Managed Forest Land Council, Managed Forest Program: Effectiveness of the Council Regulation in Achieving the Forest Management Objectives of the Private Managed Forest Land Act (2013), online:  https://mfcouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/pmflc_audit_report_2013_final_web.pdf at 16.

[123] Reg 14, above note 111, ss 8 and 47–58, respectively.

[124] Ibid, ss 47–49.

[125] Ibid, ss 50–52.

[126] Ibid, s 52(2).

[127] Bill 28, above note 8, cl 46, amendments to Forest Act, s 102.2(1).

[128] PMFLA, above note 6, s 15(b).

[129] BC Reg 371/2004, s 5(1) [Reg 371].

[130] Ibid, s 5(2).

[131] PMFLA, above note 6, s 24(3).

[132] Reg 371, above note 129, s 7(2).

[133] BC Reg 582/2004, ss 9–10.

[134] Ibid, s 10(1). “Regionally important wildlife” is defined at s 13(2).

[135] Bill 28, above note 8, cl 46, amendments to Forest Act, s 102.2(1)(d).

[136] Wayne Suttles, “Central Coast Salish” in Wayne Suttles, ed, Handbook of North American Indians Volume 7, Northwest Coast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990) at 458–59; Martha Douglas Harris, History and Folklore of the Cowichan Indians (Victoria: The Colonist Printing and Publishing Co, 1901) at 33–40.

[137] TimberWest v Deputy Administrator, Pesticide Control Act, Environmental Appeal Board, Appeal No 2002-PES-008(a) at 5 [TimberWest].

[138] Karen Fediuk, Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Harvest Study (Ladysmith, BC: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2001).

[139] Elk Valley Cumulative Effects Management Framework Working Group, Elk Valley Cumulative Effects Assessment and Management Report (2018), online: www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/cumulative-effects/draft_elk_valley_ceam_12122018.pdf; Mary Desmond, “Clearcut Logging Diminishes Shawnigan Lake Watershed” Watershed Sentinel (2012), online: https://watershedsentinel.ca/articles/clearcut-logging-deminishes-shawnigan-lake-watershed/; Quentin Dodd, “New War in Woods? Battle Front Shifts” The Tyee (2006), online: https://thetyee.ca/News/2006/08/16/NewWar/print.html; Andrew Findlay, “Private Forests: One Town’s Clearcut Dilemma” The Tyee (2005), online:https://thetyee.ca/News/2005/01/10/PrivateForestDilemma/print.html.

[140] Cowichan Valley Regional District, Climate Projections for the Cowichan Valley Regional District (2017), online: www.cvrd.bc.ca/DocumentCenter/View/81884/Climate-Projections-Report. Cowichan News Staff, “Cowichan Moves to Most Extreme Water Restrictions Ever” (19 October 2022) Vancouver Island Free Press.

[141] Cowichan Valley Regional District, “Record Low Water Levels Increase Drought Level Across Cowichan Valley” (2019), online: www.cvrd.bc.ca/DocumentCenter/View/93326/News-Release—Drought-Level-Update.

[142] Ken Rothbauer, “Cowichan Tribes Opens Flood Support Centre” (17 November 2021) Cowichan Valley Citizen, online: www.cowichanvalleycitizen.com/news/cowichan-tribes-opens-flood-support-centre/.

[143] Don Bodger, “Rain Finally Subsides, but Flood Damage Extensive in Cowichan” (15 November 2021) Nanaimo News Bulletin, online: www.nanaimobulletin.com/news/rain-finally-subsides-but-flood-damage-extensive-in-cowichan-region/; Cowichan News Staff, “Cowichan Moves to Most Extreme Water Restrictions Ever” (19 October 2022) Vancouver Island Free Press, online: www.vancouverislandfreedaily.com/news/cowichan-moves-to-most-extreme-water-restrictions-ever/.

[144] PMFLA, above note 6, s 13(1).

[145] Reg 182, above note 86, ss 15–24.

[146] Ibid, ss 16 and 20(2), respectively.

[147] Ibid, s 25.

[148] Ibid, s 18(1).

[149] BC Reg 372/2004, s 2.

[150] Health Canada, “Drinking Water Quality in Canada” (12 March 2019), online: www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/environmental-workplace-health/water-quality/drinking-water.html; World Health Organization, Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality, 4th ed (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2022).

[151] PMFLA, above note 6, s 5, which mentions “social benefits.”

[152] Reg 14, above note 111, s 10.

[153] Thom, “Coast Salish Senses of Place,” above note 40 at 68.

[154] TimberWest, above note 137 at 158.

[155] Kulchyski Affadavit, above note 49 at para 34; Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/Doc 51 (Affidavit of Martina Joe) at para 12; Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/Doc 51 (Affidavit of Wayne Charlie) at paras 15–16; Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v Canada (2009), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 105/09, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission: 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/Doc 51 (Affidavit of Chad Harris) at para 7.

[156] Modeste Affidavit, above note 55 at para 27.

[157] Heritage Conservation Act, RSBC 1996, c 187, s 9 [HCA].

[158] Michael A Klassen, “First Nations, the Heritage Conservation Act, and the Ethics of Heritage Stewardship” (2008) 40:4 The Midden 8 at 11; Mackay v British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 945.

[159] The Environmental Law Centre Society, “Protecting Cultural Heritage Resources on Private Land: Potential Strategies and Tools for Nations, Recommendations for Provincial and Local Government Reform” (Victoria: Environmental Law Centre Society, 2023), online: https://elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Protecting-Indigenous-Cultural-Heritage-Resources-on-Private-Land.pdf.

[160] Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157, ss 8(1) and 8(3.1)(a).

[161] Ibid, s 8(8)(a)(i).

[162] Ibid, s 8(8)(a)(v).

[163] Ibid, ss 8(1)(a) and 8(8)(d).

[164] Monique Passelac-Ross & Peggy Smith, Accommodation of Aboriginal Rights: The Need for Aboriginal Forest Tenure (Edmonton: Sustainable Forest Management Network, 2002); DB Tindall, Ronald Trosper & Pamela Perreault, Aboriginal Peoples and Forest Lands in Canada (UBC Press, 2013).

[165] Collaboration Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and Nadleh Whuten, Nak’azdli, Saik’uz First Nation, Stellat’en First Nation, Takla Lake First Nation, Tl’azt’en Nation, and Ts’il Kaz Koh First Nation, and Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (2 April 2015), online: www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/british-columbians-our-governments/indigenous-people/aboriginal-peoples-documents/cstc_-_collaboration_agreement_-_signed_april_2015.pdf.

[166] Diane Nicholls, Prince George Rationale for Allowable Annual Cut (AAC) Determination (Victoria, BC: Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural Resource Operations and Rural Development, effective 11 October 2017); Natasha Caverley et al, “Articulating Indigenous Rights Within the Inclusive Development Framework: An Assessment of Forest Stewardship Policies and Practices in British Columbia, Canada” (2020) 33:1 Society and Natural Resources 25.

[167] Bill 28, above note 8, cl 62 amending s 182. Special purposes designation can be up to six years.

[168] Ibid, cl 203–7.

[169] FRPA, above note 89, s 10(1), (2) & (3).

[170] Ibid, s 160(a), (b) & (c).

[171] Forest Land Reserve Act, RSBC 1996, c 158, ss 13 and 16.

[172] Ibid, s 4.

[173] Ibid, s 19(1).

[174] Reg 371, above note 129, s 2(3).

[175] Ibid, Sched B.

[176] Ibid, s 2(5).

[177] John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Deborah McGregor, “Honouring our Relations: An Anishnaabe Perspective on Environmental Justice” in Julian Agyeman et al, eds, Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 27.

[178] Bryan Evans, Julia Gardner & Brian Thom, Shxunutun’s Tu Suleluxwtst: In the Footsteps of our Ancestors (Ladysmith, BC: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, 2005); Morales & Thom, above note 16.

[179] Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, 2014 CSC 44 [Tsilhqot’in].

[180] R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289.

[181] John Borrows, “Aboriginal Title and Private Property” (2015) 68 Supreme Court Law Review 91.

[182] Skeetchestn Indian Band and Secwepemc Aboriginal Nation v Registrar of Land Titles, Kamloops, 2000 BCCA 525.

[183] William v Riverside Forest Products Limited, 2002 BCSC 1199 at para 16.

[184] See Giesbrecht v British Columbia (Attorney General), [2020] BCSC 174 at para 31. This includes a spot title claim made by some of the HTG Nations to a fishing village site at the mouth of the Fraser River. Notably, this site is held in fee simple by the Crown, and therefore it does not present the same challenges as the E&N lands. See Cowichan Tribes v The Attorney General of Canada and Island Corridor Foundation (21 October 2016), BCSC (Notice of Civil Claim) and Cowichan Tribes v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 BCSC 2199. In New Brunswick, see Wolastoqey Nation v The Province of New Brunswick (30 November 2021), Fredericton, NBQB (Notice of Action).

[185] Estair Van Wagner, “The Legal Relations of ‘Private’ Forests: Making and Unmaking Private Forest Lands on Vancouver Island” (2021) 53:1 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 103. See Foster, Berger & Buck, above note 38; TimberWest above note 137; IACHR Petition, above note 17.

[186] Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001) 33:1 Ottawa Law Review 301 at 315.

[187] Act Respecting the Vancouver Island Railway, the Esquimalt Graving Dock, and certain Railway Lands of the Province of British Columbia, granted to the Dominion CB 1884, c 6, s 7(5).

[188] Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at paras 145 and 113 [Delgamuukw].

[189] Thom, “Reframing Indigenous Territories,” above note 29.

[190] Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, 2019 Crown-Indigenous Relations Ministerial Transition Binder (Ottawa: CIRNAC, 2019) online: rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca; IACHR Petition, above note 17. We note that the spot title claim mentioned above is outside the area the Crown has recognized for the HTG treaty table and thus does not impact the negotiations.

[191] Delgamuukw, above note 188.

[192] Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 1373.

[193] Delgamuukw, above note 188; see also Tsilhqot’in, above note 178 at para 74. Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government Since Calder” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, Jeremy Webber, eds, Let Right be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 41.

[194] Tsilhqot’in, above note 178; John Borrows et al, eds., Braiding Legal Orders: Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019); Campbell et al v British Columbia (AG) & Canada (AG) & Nisga’a Nation et al, 2000 BCSC 1123.

[195] Tsilhqot’in, above note 178at para 76.

[196] Ibid at para 74.

[197] Ibid at para 86.

[198] McNeil, above note 193 at 141.

[199] Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 35 [Haida].

[200] Ibid at para 27; Tsilhqotin, above note 178 at para 78; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia [Project Assessment Director], 2004 SCC 74 at para 24.

[201] Haida, above note 199 at para 37.

[202] Ibid at para 47; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 SCR 650.

[203] Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous Self-Determination: A Naturalist Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019) at 197.

[204] Joshua Nichols & Robert Hamilton, “In Search of Honourable Crowns and Legitimate Constitutions: Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada and the Colonial Constitution” (2020) 70:3 University of Toronto Law Journal 341; Robert Hamilton & Joshua Nichols, “The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult” (2019) 56:3 Alberta Law Review 729; Estair Van Wagner, “Extracting Indigenous Jurisdiction on Private Land: The Duty to Consult and Indigenous Relations with Place in Canadian Law” in Robyn Bartel & Jennifer Carter, eds, Handbook on Space, Place and Law (2021); Chris Sanderson, Keith Buergner & Michelle Jones, “The Crown’s Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: Towards an Understanding of the Source, Purpose, and Limits of the Duty Administrative and Regulatory Law” (2011) 49:4 Alberta Law Review 821.

[205] Haida, above note 199 at para 53.

[206] Ibid at para 55.

[207] Hupačasath, above note 75 at para 199; Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v British Columbia (Minister of Forests),2008 BCSC 1505 at paras 246–49 [Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs]; Saugeen First Nation v Ontario (MNRF), 2017 ONSC 3456 at para 22 [Saugeen]. But see Paul First Nation v Parkland (County), 2006 ABCA 128 [Paul] where the Alberta Court of Appeal accepted without authority or detailed reasons that the duty did not apply to fee simple lands.

[208] Hupačasath, above note 75 at para 165; Saugeen, above note 205 at paras 30 and 63; Chartrand v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2015 BCCA 345 [Chartrand].

[209] Hupačasath, above note 75; Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, above note 205; TimberWest, above note 136; Saugeen, above note 205 at paras 30 and 63; Chartrand, above note 208.

[210] TimberWest, above note 137.

[211] West Moberly First Nations v British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines), 2011 BCCA 247 at para 49.

[212] Ross River Dena Council v Government of Yukon, 2012 YKCA 14 at paras 36–38, leave to appeal to SCC refused 2013 CanLII 59890 (SCC); Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada, 2018 SCC 40 at para 46, per Karakatsanis J.

[213] Ross River Dena Council v Government of Yukon, 2012 YKCA 14 at para 37.

[214] Hupačasath, above note 75 at paras 199–200.

[215] DRIPA, above note 8, s 3.

[216] Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 8.1(2)–(3).

[217] Sarah Morales, “‘A ‘lha‘tham: The Re-Transformation of s. 35 through a Coast Salish Legal Methodology” (2017) 37 National Journal of Constitutional Law 145.

[218] Morales, Egan & Thom, above note 12.

[219] First Nations Forestry Council, Land Privatization: The Potential Impacts on First Nations Rights and Title in BC (Nanaimo: First Nations Forestry Council, 2008).

[220] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 2009 at para 56.

[221] DRIPA, above note 8.

[222] E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 at para 34.

[223] Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, “The Inter-American System and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual Reinforcement” in Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (London: Hart Publishing, 2011) 457 at 467.

[224] See also Jérémie Gilbert & Cathal Doyle, “A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent” in Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (London: Hart Publishing, 2011) 289 at 299.

[225] Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, “Introduction” in Public Interest, Private Property: Law and Planning Policy in Canada, ed by Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 1; Malcolm Lavoie, “Subsidiarity and the Structure of Property Law” 74:2 University of Toronto Law Journal, online: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4430459 [forthcoming].

[226] Morales, Snuw’uyulh, above note 24 at 237.

[227] Ibid at 228–29.

[228] Ibid at 270.

[229] Ibid at 305.

[230] Ibid at 305 and 308.

[231] Sarah Morales, “Speakers, Witnesses and Blanketing: The Need to Look Beyond the Courts to Achieve Reconciliation” (2017) 78 Supreme Court Law Review 139 at 155 [Morales, “Speakers, Witnesses and Blanketing”].

[232] Ibid at 156–57.

[233] Ibid at 49.

[234] Morales, Snuw’uyulh, above note 24 at 284.

[235] Dorothy Irene Kennedy, Threads to the Past: The Construction and Transformation of Kinship in the Coast Salish Social Network (PhD Dissertation, University of Oxford, 2000) [unpublished] at 228.

[236] Te Urewara Board, “Te Kawa o Te Urewara” (accessed 11 July 2023), online: ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera at 7.

[237] Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1982, 1760 UNTS 79; Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287; Riki Thérivel, Jill Blakley & Jo Treweek, “Mitigating Cumulative Biodiversity Impacts” in Jill Blakley, Daniel Franks, eds, Handbook of Cumulative Impact Assessment (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021); Jose Felix Pinto-Bazurco, The Precautionary Principle (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020).

[238] Kennedy, above note 235 at 223–24.

[239] George West, Discussion Paper on Privately Owned Managed Forest Land in BC (1992) [unpublished]. 

A Saltwater People: Water, Jurisdiction, and Dispossession: Protecting the Salish Sea

Robert YELḰATŦE Clifford*

1. Introduction

As a Saltwater People,[1] the W̱SÁNEĆ peoples have a vital relationship with the ocean and the beings who call it home. Regarding the dispossession of land, we might demand #LandBack or make the enduring claim against the state that our lands have been stolen. But what of the equally pervasive dispossession of saltwater territory and our ability and authority to relate to those waters in accordance with our own Indigenous legal orders? “What do we call a process of colonization where the effect of dispossession is not removal but the perpetuation of a set of exhaustive administrative regimes that undermine, erase, and choke out the exercise of Indigenous jurisdiction, rendering Indigenous people peripheral to effective participation in land [and water] governance?”[2] What about when these same administrative regimes function to propel climate crisis and other harms?

In order to understand dispossession in this sense, I will draw more directly on the concept of jurisdiction. I will also examine what tools might be available in W̱SÁNEĆ to reverse this trend of jurisdictional dispossession. Specifically, I will look at the National Marine Conservation Area Reserve (NMCAR) regime, the Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas (IPCA) concept, and, more briefly, the rights of nature movement, including a survey of what these tools are, how they function, and what possibilities they might present. Might any of these tools help locally in upholding W̱SÁNEĆ laws and responsibilities to the ocean and other beings who call it home, while also fostering the revitalization W̱SÁNEĆ law and the reclamation of W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction? In doing so, might they also cohere into some form of action that aims at mitigating climate crisis and the powers, structures, and ideologies that continue to propel it? Conversely, in what ways do they fall short, or even function to adhere to the very types of structures and orientations that have brought us to this point of climate crisis? In setting out to offer some type of assessment on these questions, we must first understand how W̱SÁNEĆ law and jurisdiction has been displaced over this marine area, in order to develop a background context from which to judge any potential benefit (or upholding of the status quo). Much is at stake in all of this — something the following example makes clear.

2. The Trans Mountain Pipeline: A Jurisdictional Conflict[3]

On November 28, 2018, I testified in front of the National Energy Board (NEB) in continued opposition to the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project (TMX), alongside a handful of others from the Tsawout First Nation.[4] We opened with drumming and a prayer song about the thirteen W̱SÁNEĆ Moons; a song that ties us to the lands, waters, and more-than-human world within our homelands. The W̱SÁNEĆ year is divided into thirteen Moons that represent not calendar months but social, cultural, economic, spiritual, and legal practices that correspond with the weather and cycle of seasons. As a Saltwater People, much of our traditional homelands span the southern Gulf Islands (Canadian side) and the San Juan Islands (American side). Our jurisdiction respecting these places has been organized in many ways around our NEHIYMET, or ancestral lines, which grant family groups certain privileges and responsibilities to various locations, including our SX̱OLE (reef-net fishing stations). Speaking at the NEB was one way for us to assert W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction in relation to these places, and was an enactment of our laws.

In addition to inherent rights and responsibilities in W̱SÁNEĆ, as Douglas Treaty signatories we also have an established agreement with the Crown regarding jurisdiction and living together, which among other things protects our rights and responsibilities to “carry on our fisheries as formerly.”[5] Concerns relating to the significant harm that would result from an oil spill, as well as the damage caused by increased tanker traffic, including continued erosion of the foreshore, damage to eel grass beds, and harm to endangered species such as the Southern Resident killer whales (SRKW), are at the forefront in W̱SÁNEĆ. In addition to obvious concerns relating to the specific project and its potential approval, for Tsawout there was also something larger at stake. Opening with a prayer, as we did at the NEB, is meant to shape the way we relate to each other, to open hearts and minds, and to honour and respect the relationships that are all around us. We wanted the NEB panel to understand our laws, including their standards of judgment, the obligations they create, the worldview from which they flow, and their relevance and legitimacy in relation to these lands and waters. Also at stake, of course, is the climate crisis and the vast harms that follow.

To many, the NEB ruling[6] to approve the project and deem it in the public interest of Canadians might appear to settle the issue, but rather, it represents only one of the more recent conflicts of jurisdiction; that is, as Shiri Pasternak frames it, the conflict “over the authority to have authority.”[7] Stated differently, it was a conflict “over whose laws of belonging will apply on those lands — and on what grounds.”[8] As W̱SÁNEĆ, we stood in front of the NEB because we are obligated to act, and speaking to these institutions is one of the ways in which we do so. We act in other ways as well. W̱SÁNEĆ law requires that we act to protect our homelands and other beings within them, including islands, salmon, whales, water, and others. This is a positive obligation within our law.

Faced with large and pressing problems such as the TMX and the global climate crisis more generally, we also need more people to listen and to act. Not long before the NEB rehearing, a Southern Resident killer whale named J35, who carried the body of her dead calf for seventeen days for all to see, was telling us the same thing.[9] For those who were listening, she was telling us that we have responsibilities we are not meeting. There are signs all around us that we need to stop recklessly burning through fossil fuels, depleting salmon stocks, and carrying out other destructive behaviours. These are the larger issues that are at stake, and the fundamental changes that must be made. An analysis of the climate crisis, which I cannot reproduce here, tells us that a fundamental reimagining of our relationships within the world, and thus the social, legal, political, and economic structures those relational understandings condition, is required. I assert that wisdom and practices housed within respective Indigenous legal orders can help us in this re-imagining, if we take that as our goal. Yet, our obligations to act sometimes also pull us in front of bodies like the NEB. As such, there is a tension and balance between pursuing various resurgence and reconciliation-leaning approaches, and we must particularly question their potential advantages and disadvantages within the context of climate crisis.

3. Theorizing Dispossession Through Jurisdiction

On land, assertions of sovereignty and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples is actualized and continually reinforced largely through regimes of private property, the right of exclusion, and the power of the state to uphold those structures. Over tidal waters, other jurisdictional techniques do much of the work.[10] What is apparent, though, in foregrounding jurisdictional borders and the struggles they produce is the ongoing and unfinished nature of colonialism. As Pasternak, in her work with the Algonquins of Barriere Lake, invites us, we can imagine a map of place entangled with jurisdictional lines, each of which presents a potential limit in that it represents jurisdiction, or in other words, the power to speak some aspect of the law that applies to that area. As such, the “thickening heap of lines” and resulting “jurisdictional commotion” act as barriers to the exercise of Indigenous jurisdiction.[11] Across W̱SÁNEĆ, these layers of jurisdictional commotion include provincial parks, conservation areas, municipalities, different jurisdictional roles within federal powers, such as between Parks Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and even other authorities, such as Islands Trust, who have authority delegated from the Crown, to name but a few.

Layering of jurisdiction in Indigenous dispossession is a “slow violence” that builds over time.[12] It also is a form of dispossession that need “not result in the removal of the community” but, rather, is a process whereby Indigenous territory is “alienated and reterritorialized through competing use and jurisdictional claims.”[13] Importantly, this superimposition of jurisdiction relies not only on a strategy to erase and choke out Indigenous jurisdictional authority, but also on an ability “to replace and undermine inherent Indigenous jurisdiction with a state-delegated form of authority.”[14] Given the importance of this last observation, it is worth flagging now that approved co-management agreements, such as those under the National Marine Conservation Area regime, which I will discuss below, do not simply recognize and make space for inherent Indigenous jurisdictions, but, rather, create a new form of state delegated authority, and, as such, have to be approached with at least some level of skepticism from the outset.[15] It is also critical to note that these jurisdictional lines facilitate not only Indigenous dispossession, but climate crisis and the dispossession of other beings within these territories, creating space for pipelines, capital, and ongoing exploitation and accumulation of various kinds.

The extent to which we can see and act through this superimposed mass of jurisdictional lines, and through to underlying and inherent Indigenous jurisdiction, varies. Certain regions may be more opaque than others. Yet, enactments of Indigenous jurisdiction and self-determining authority resists those jurisdictional lines of dispossession, creating “barriers to penetration by capitalism” and bringing forth new possibilities.[16] Combating climate crisis is vital because climate crisis is, in itself, also a form of dispossession in the sense we have been discussing — “the slow violence of losing the capacity to exercise care” for our homelands.[17] That is, it is a “theft of the ability to act and govern when [our] homelands are damaged” [18] by such diffuse (spatial and temporal) sources that propel climate crisis. As such, resistance to colonialism and climate crisis need to go hand-in-hand. Although jurisdiction is an important factor in this resistance, we cannot forget our responsibilities that go along with that.[19] It matters not only that we speak, but also how we speak and how we act. Indigenous jurisdiction need not (and I would argue should not) be tied to colonial conceptions of sovereignty. Rather, reciprocity and mutual relations of care within and between humans and the more-than-human world moves to the forefront.

 The theoretical orientation I am describing around Indigenous jurisdiction and alternative ways of being in the world are best analyzed in practice, in specific places and contexts. It is that level of specificity that I aim to broadly outline in the following section.

4. Dispossession and the Reterritorialization of the Salish Sea

Despite an 1852 Treaty promise to protect our right to “fish as formerly,” there has been a steady and persistent eroding of W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction within our ocean territory, harm to those waters and the beings who call them home, and a dispossession of our ability to uphold care for these places and beings. It was the eventual competition over fisheries that provided the initial impetus for the assertion of settler jurisdiction over W̱SÁNEĆ waters.[20] A complete analysis of this unfolding of settler jurisdiction is not possible here, but the process and nature of this dispossession, as well as the harms it creates, is important to understand as part of colonialism, the climate crisis, and the contemporary contexts in which we find ourselves. It is, therefore, the point from which we must judge the creation of change.

4.1. W̱SÁNEĆ Jurisdiction

While I cannot relate the full nature of W̱SÁNEĆ law here, a few points about how W̱SÁNEĆ law and jurisdiction go about organizing relationships with territory is necessary. In some instances, W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction traces back to stories of creation and the responsibilities and obligations they relate. The principle of mutual care between W̱SÁNEĆ and ṮEṮÁĆES (Relatives of the Deep, or islands) is one such example. In other instances, W̱SÁNEĆ law and jurisdiction is centered around a tenure system, so to speak, where families and kinship units have particular rights and responsibilities to fishing sites, hunting grounds, or other particular places. In W̱SÁNEĆ, access to and care for these locations, such as SX̱OLE, or reef-net fishing sites, is inheritable through our NEHIYMET (ancestral line). In addition to inheritance, intermarriage has also been a component of buttressing this system of borders and jurisdiction, creating opportunities to open sites to broader kinship groups.

It is important to note that the W̱SÁNEĆ tenure system is not strictly anthropocentric. The thirteen W̱SÁNEĆ Moons, for example, place the cycle of seasons at the root of W̱SÁNEĆ laws, governance, economy, spirituality, and sociality.[21] Not all of W̱SÁNEĆ territory is organized around NEHIYMET. There are also areas throughout W̱SÁNEĆ that are “commons.” Yet, the “tragedy” that is thought to necessarily accompany such a “commons” need not be present, because when functioning fully, W̱SÁNEĆ law creates subjectivities and communities with felt obligations of mutual care and respect, as well as a mechanism for maintaining and correcting behaviours that depart from these standards. These have been effective and strong systems of law and jurisdiction asserted in connection with these territories, and it has been for precisely this reason that they “have been relentlessly attacked by colonial authorities” throughout colonial history.[22]

4.2. Sovereignty Claims, Jurisdiction, and Disposession

The broader context for early settler-colonialism in what is now British Columbia can be found elsewhere.[23] A general outline is relevant though. Early fur trade developed absent any colonial control,[24] and no attempt to regulate the fishery, for example, was made.[25] As settlement began, the focus was principally on land. In terms of assertions of sovereignty, prior to the Oregon Treaty of 1846 between the United Kingdom and the United States, W̱SÁNEĆ was within what was considered “disputed territory.” With the signing of the Oregon Treaty, Vancouver Island and the mainland north of the 49th parallel fell under the sovereignty of the British Imperial Crown.[26] On land, the creation of property regimes and Indian reserves soon followed. Many of these reserves did, however, have an intimate link with Indigenous fisheries. For example, post-Confederation reserves in W̱SÁNEĆ, which are very small in land mass, are principally fishing stations. As Doug Harris has framed it, “Land followed fish.”[27]

The so-called Douglas Treaties that W̱SÁNEĆ signed, through which the Crown envisioned freeing up land for settlement, were also tied to fisheries in that they offered a more narrow protection of land rights while contemplating broader promises “to carry on our fisheries as formerly”[28] with the same freedom as when we were the sole occupants.[29] That the fishery was perceived as unlimited at the time, and could be secured with little impact on land, was likely a factor.[30] It was later that non-Native fisheries became more important and dispossession of Indigenous fisheries and jurisdictional authority over water became a colonial imperative. Even the Oregon Treaty left the boundary in tidal waters ambiguous, an issue that was not settled until 1872.[31] The border through these waters became one “determined by international politics and understandings of latitude and longitude, not family status, lineage, or salmon availability, or other ecological factors.”[32] The border also dissects W̱SÁNEĆ marine territory and is a significant part of the unfolding and imposition of settler jurisdictional orders over that of W̱SÁNEĆ. While “the 1794 Jay’s Treaty guaranteed Native peoples’ freedom of movement across the border,”[33] this movement was not desired nor unrestricted, even if those restrictions were not always obeyed by Indigenous peoples in the Salish Sea.

 Multiple jurisdictional lines, in addition to the international border, also take shape through reception of the common law. When the colony of British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871, a further jurisdictional shift occurred, with British Columbia “ceding jurisdiction over ‘Seacoast and Inland Fisheries’ and ‘Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians’ to the Dominion government.”[34] Federal laws and regulations of fisheries proliferated, in most cases seeking to erase or at least subjugate W̱SÁNEĆ and other Indigenous laws and jurisdictional authority over those lands and waters. As Harris frames it, the creation of Indian reserves and the creation of the Indian food fishery “were two of the principle instruments of state power and colonial control in British Columbia. Although nested in two quite different legal regimes — one governing land use and structured around notions of private property, the other governing fisheries and premised primarily on the resource as common property — the reserve and the food fishery served the same purpose.”[35] Dispossession. The dispossession we are speaking of is not only in the sense of attempted erasure, but also the replacement of broad inherent rights and authority to land and waters with severely truncated and state-delegated rights to the much narrower Indian reserves and Indian food fishery.

With respect to the Douglas Treaty, the promise to fish “as formerly” and as though we were the sole occupants was similarly “forgotten or ignored” as the “creation of the industrial commercial fishery” expanded alongside the creation of canning technology.[36] Licenses for non-native seine-net fisheries and other fishing methods “physically displaced important” W̱SÁNEĆ “reef-net fishing grounds.”[37] W̱SÁNEĆ reef-net fishing sites were strategically located, but regulated through W̱SÁNEĆ law and jurisdiction such that they were cared for and not overfished. As a result, salmon were abundant.[38] “Recognizing the fecundity of these Native fishing places, however, industry players with capital sought to take over the sites for their own exclusive use,” for which they were offered licenses by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.[39] With that dispossession also came the displacement of an ethic of care and responsibility. The canneries that owned the fish traps imposed in these areas overfished and were incredibly wasteful.[40]

More generally, the international border between Canada and the United States also functioned to create a regulatory race to the bottom in favour of competition over conservation, even as fish stocks plummeted — something blamed on the Indian fishery.[41] Any type of Indigenous selling or bartering of fish was prohibited,[42] the issuance of permits as a form of regulatory control over the Indigenous fishery was introduced,[43] and the method and timing of the Indian food fishery was established and regulated.[44] Fish stocks and Indigenous peoples suffered as a result, with little opportunity for recourse.[45] As is often the case, the interests of the colonial state and settler community come to trump those of Indigenous peoples, and these types of regulations ensured that could happen.

Declining salmon stocks remain a central concern to date, including in relation to endangered Southern Resident killer whales, for which they are a main food source. Conservation also remains a jurisdictional issue in that different regulatory regimes, enforcement levels, and priorities exist across settler jurisdictional boundaries in the Salish Sea. We can see that the entanglements of Indigenous jurisdictional dispossession, the reach of capital and imperatives of accumulation, and environmental harms have tended to go together. This has been the case even from the introduction of canning technology, which extended the reach of the market and opened the opportunity to create more capital, which in turn triggered the extraction of more salmon as resource in service of that accumulation of capital. In terms of the fishery, what might look like a granting or privilege of a food, social, and ceremonial fishery right, or the establishment of various “harvesting agreements” or delegated fishing rights, is actually a process through which inherent Indigenous jurisdiction over fisheries and all that surrounds it has been stripped away and replaced with truncated access to those fisheries along the lines of a cultural accommodation.[46] Through that process, the remainder is opened to the colonial state and settler society. Even where the Douglas Treaty protects the right to fish, it has not extended to a right to governance or a protection of the fishery.

It is from this backdrop that W̱SÁNEĆ struggles to reclaim jurisdictional authority and to uphold responsibilities of care with W̱SÁNEĆ territory and the other beings who also call it home.

5. NMCAR, IPCA, and Legal Personhood: Potential Jurisdictional Tools?

As an ocean people, W̱SÁNEĆ have strong interests and responsibilities under W̱SÁNEĆ laws to uphold healthy relationships within the marine environment. Salmon, herring, SRKWs, clam beds, and more have all been threatened by a myriad of harmful actions and detriments to their living environments locally, but also internationally and at a global level through rising temperatures and the acidification of oceans, to name only two. Within W̱SÁNEĆ politics and governance, there is a constant struggle to navigate possible tools, approaches, and actions that can function to uphold W̱SÁNEĆ responsibilities to these relatives in the sea. To reiterate, these responsibilities relate not only to actions internal to W̱SÁNEĆ, but also to harmful actions of others. The difficulties that arise in this regard are immense. As W̱SÁNEĆ are entangled in a web of colonial and global relationships and impacts, difficult choices and paradoxes constantly arise.

We have our own laws and responsibilities that we will continue to assert and enforce, and which require much broader and foundational change than settler law and jurisdiction is structured to permit. Such a commitment points us toward the need to continue to re-build and emphasize W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction and ways of being, or what Aaron Mills would call lifeways, in their full complexity.[47] At the same time, as part of meeting our responsibilities within W̱SÁNEĆ law, we may choose, or be compelled, to draw upon various tools of the state as a means to seek tangible benefits and protections for our relatives in the sea. The risk inherent in that strategy, however, is becoming caught up in “regulatory capture” and power dynamics that end up co-opting what was initially a strategic and more peripheral intervention within settler jurisdictional frameworks, thereby shifting focus, energy, and ability away from enacting the broader and deeper changes required in restoring W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction and combating climate crisis.

Remaining confined to state structures will not alter the colonial relationship, nor create the degree of change necessary to respond to climate crisis. Far more foundational change is required. Yet in the present moment, how do we act to give immediate care and to reduce harm to the ocean and our more-than-human relatives who call it home? What remains, then, is actually an impossible political decision: is the net harm of reinscribing much of the logic that brought on these harms in the first place better or worse than foregoing the use of a tool that could create conservation measures that are undoubtedly better than what currently exist? It is difficult to say for certain. The real problem is being forced to choose between these two strategies. There is, of course, no straightforward answer to this predicament, and a layering of approaches may be our best approach.

In this section I will examine W̱SÁNEĆ efforts to protect the marine environment with the help of three potential tools: a National Marine Conservation Area Reserve (NMCAR), an Indigenous Protected and Conserved Area (IPCA), and Legal Personhood of the environment. These tools have been chosen based on W̱SÁNEĆ being presented with, or otherwise having some level of interest in, the possibility of utilizing these tools within our territory. Understanding these tools and the implications they have regarding jurisdiction requires significant attention to the frameworks through which these mechanisms operate and come into being. For example, regarding the NMCAR, considering not only enabling legislation and policy orientations within Parks Canada, but also the nature of various potential co-management agreements that an NMCAR would give rise to, is necessary. The complexity and uncertainties of such an analysis, including the broader structure of federalism in which it is embedded, speaks, in and of itself, to the type of jurisdictional commotion to which I have already referred.

We should therefore, from the outset, be clear that an NMCAR, in itself, and as will be discussed in more detail, does not fundamentally depart from the model of dispossession of marine territory that we saw above in relation to fisheries, in which dispossession occurred through an erasure of W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction, the imposition of foreign jurisdictions, and a reinscribing of more limited rights and truncated forms of delegated jurisdiction to Indigenous Nations. That is, there is no return to, nor even recognition of, the right to “fish as formerly” and to the jurisdiction in relation to fisheries that should flow from that, let alone any serious questioning of how it is that Canada has come to have any legitimate jurisdictional authority over these waters whatsoever. In that regard, while these types of agreements are often spoken of as a compromise between settler and Indigenous peoples and jurisdictions, rarely do they seem to consider from what starting point. So, while I will now examine the NMCAR framework, along with potential co-management or Indigenous management board models and the processes they may entail, including a brief look at innovative international examples, specifically recognition of the “legal personhood” of nature, this broader concern should be kept in mind throughout. Following my discussion of the NMCAR, I will also examine the concept of an IPCA and how the possibility of layering initiatives may help mitigate various shortcomings and limitations of each approach.  

5.1. National Marine Conservation Areas

Despite a large network of terrestrial National Parks within Canada, including among coastal areas, “few of these terrestrial parks provide any direct measure of protection for the adjacent marine resources.”[48] Beginning in the late 1980s, Canada began to address this gap with the National Marine Parks Policy[49] in 1986, and development of the first NMCA in 1987 — Fathom Five National Marine Park.[50] Since then, Parks Canada has been tasked with establishing a system of NMCAs that, as a whole, represent the full range of marine ecosystems within Canada. Parks Canada has identified and divided the marine areas within Canada — the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific oceans, and the Great Lakes — into twenty-nine distinctive regions, with the goal of establishing marine conservation areas within each region.[51] These NMCAs are created and managed with the “purpose of protecting and conserving representative marine areas for the benefit, education and enjoyment of the people of Canada and the world.”[52] Currently, there are three established NMCAs and one NMCAR.[53] An NMCAR is identical to an NMCA, with the same protections, but the additional “Reserve” designation signifies that all, or part of, the conservation (or proposed conservation) area is “subject to a claim in respect of aboriginal rights that has been accepted for negotiation by the Government of Canada.”[54]

NMCAs are principally about conservation and managing marine areas for sustainable use and enjoyment.[55] NMCARs have the same purpose, though they are generally understood to also honour Aboriginal and treaty rights.[56] Since each NMCA or NMCAR is unique, the creation of an individual “management plan” is intended to be done “on a partnership basis.”[57] Existing agencies, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (fisheries and ocean management) and Transport Canada (marine navigation and shipping management), will continue in their own management roles, but within an NMCA or NMCAR those agencies must co-operate with Parks Canada to create management plans.[58] Once those agencies sign-off on a management plan, they also have a responsibility to uphold conservation objectives. In Canada’s view, “First Nations and local government may also have roles in managing NMCAs,” with those roles being laid out in the NMCAR “management plan.”[59] Jurisdictionally, NMCAs “include the seabed, its subsoil and overlying water column and may encompass wetlands, river estuaries, islands and other coastal lands.”[60] As national conservation areas, jurisdiction needs to be transferred to the federal government to be “owned and managed by the Government of Canada.”[61] Only a small degree of flexibility seems to currently exist in this requirement.

With broad and far-reaching conservation goals, NMCAs are meant to be large and to work in conjunction with neighbouring parks. Parks Canada continues to work on updating policy objectives and implementing regulatory frameworks, but the development of marine conservation areas continue at a slow pace. An absence of updated policies and the creation of enforceable regulations certainly contribute to a lack of clarity in what exact protection measures an NMCAR might offer W̱SÁNEĆ. What we can glean from the proposed policy updates is a greater attention to climate crisis and Indigenous peoples’ long-standing connection with the lands and waters within NMCAs, even if those remain inadequate — as are Canada’s actions as a state, more broadly. The guiding question will be: Does this tool open enough jurisdictional space to meaningfully uphold and protect W̱SÁNEĆ laws and interest? And does it orient our jurisdictional trajectory in a positive direction? Or, conversely, does it risk reinscribing too much of the jurisdictional framework that has fostered dispossession and inhibited structural responses to climate crisis?

Parks Canada’s re-cast policy framework focusses on several overarching objectives for managing NMCAs.[62] To briefly summarize a few relevant points, these policies do contemplate actively pursuing a range of cooperative management agreements with Indigenous Nations, which are meant to respect Indigenous knowledge systems. They are also intended, at least in word, to respect “the spirit and intent of treaties” and to recognize “the social, cultural and economic well-being of Indigenous peoples” tied to these waters.[63]  In short, within this proposed policy framework, reconciliation[64] is seen as manifesting through Indigenous cultural heritage protection, Indigenous monitoring and co-management agreements, and “opportunities for Indigenous peoples to present and share their heritage and culture with visitors.”[65] Since a management plan “is a key document that helps guide decision-making,”[66] there is potentially an opening for increased W̱SÁNEĆ decision-making powers, depending on the management model negotiated.

In terms of actual management of NMCAs, a great deal of focus is given to zoning. All lands and waters within an NMCA are legislatively required to be zoned.[67] In order to implement and enforce zoning within NMCAs, Parks Canada has drafted regulations. Proposed are four different zones with varying levels of protections and permitting requirements.[68] While legislation requires one “fully protected zone” and one “ecologically sustainable zone,”[69] the rest is open to negotiation. While the zoning framework has a focus on preventing extraction, there is less regulation of marine travel.[70]

While some ecological restoration activities are contemplated within NMCAs, it is fair to say that a lack of specific focus on restoration, and exclusion of already developed or ecologically damaged areas, is a significant weakness. While prohibition of extractive infrastructure in favour of renewable infrastructure is positive, the primacy of an NMCAs conservation purposes and objectives also remains secondary to “any activity undertaken in the interests of Canadian sovereignty or security.”[71]

5.2. Establishing a Proposed Southern Strait of Georgia NMCAR

Broadly speaking, there are five steps in establishing an NMCA or NMCAR. Step one involves the preliminary identification of representative marine areas within a given region that are “in a natural state, or . . . capable of being restored to a natural condition.”[72] Step 2 involves additional studies and consultations in narrowing in on a specific site. In Pacific Region 5, this has become the Southern Strait of Georgia location. While the federal and provincial governments signed a memorandum of understanding in 2003,[73] Step 2 appears to have been done with little to no consultation with W̱SÁNEĆ.[74]

Step Three is the “most complex and time-consuming step” of the process, requiring a more detailed feasibility and consultation process.[75] Determining whether an NMCAR in this location is “both practical and desirable”[76] has been underway since 2004 and prioritized since 2016. It remains in the feasibility stage to date. A proposed boundary for the NMCAR has been developed during this stage.[77] Jurisdictional commotion relating to existing tenures, shipping lanes, and otherwise developed or ecologically harmed areas has shaped not only this proposed boundary but also a series of “exclusions” within it.

Based on this proposed boundary, Parks Canada understands itself to have a responsibility to consult with nineteen different First Nations regarding the feasibility of an NMCAR in this location.[78] For W̱SÁNEĆ, consultation is currently channeled through the W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council Society (WLC) and the Paquachin First Nation.[79] A significant achievement shaping this process is the recently signed IEȽȻIȽTEL or Nutśa matt kws ‘í shul’ hwilasmut tu Skwul ‘í kwthe’ Accord (IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord), in which many of the Nations being consulted on issues such as NMCAR have agreed to work together.[80] Should these Nations agree to the feasibility of an NMCAR in the Southern Strait of Georgia, then Step Four proceeds to the negotiation of a marine conservation area agreement. These agreements, “setting out the terms and conditions under which the NMCA will be established and managed,” are complex.[81] Once agreed upon, the final step is to bring the NMCA into force through legislation of the Parliament of Canada.[82] In the case of an NMCAR, the CNMCA Act will still apply, “but the status of the area would be subject to the final resolution of the aboriginal claim.”[83] The fact that an NMCAR provides legislated protection measures over an area can be seen as a distinct advantage of the process, at least to the extent that it creates greater enforcement and funding opportunities than might otherwise be available.

5.3. NMCAR Themes and Considerations

In order to assess the feasibility of the proposed NMCAR, the WLC has had to consider issues relating to conservation potential, boundaries, tenures, ownership, areas of exclusions, zoning analysis, potential economic benefits, potential co-management structures, Douglas Treaty Rights/Responsibilities, W̱SÁNEĆ Laws, and more. Some of the challenges, or weaknesses, can be grouped into broader themes. For our purposes, we can group those into exclusions, boundaries, and zoning.

5.3.1. Exclusions

The Southern Strait of Georgia NMCAR is complicated by heavy marine use and close urban centres in the area. Current exclusions within the proposed boundary relate primarily to areas with high tenure concentration, or the incompatibility of specific tenures in the area, which can include issues of jurisdictional complexity.[84] In large part, these are jurisdictional issues relevant within Canadian law, but they represent little more than a self-imposed bureaucratic barrier in W̱SÁNEĆ thought. Referencing the map of the proposed boundary,[85] exclusion of most harbours in the proposed NMCAR occur not only due to high tenure concentration, but also for ease of navigation. The trouble with moving from one jurisdictional area to another is that you need to have some reasonable idea of when you are, or are not, within an NMCAR area. The trouble with the presumptive exclusion of various harbours is that those areas are incredibly important both culturally and ecologically.

Herring, for example, are keystone species essential to the marine foodweb. Not only have herring been depleted from drastic overfishing, but spawning grounds within harbours have been heavily impacted, and several important spawning grounds would be excluded from the NMCAR boundary for these reasons.[86] Ganges Harbour, a traditional W̱SÁNEĆ village site, which W̱SÁNEĆ pushed to have included as a Reserve specifically because of the herring fishery and its importance, as well as Tod Inlet, where our first ancestor came to the Earth as rain and which is the location of the first W̱SÁNEĆ village site, are two examples.[87] Harbours are home to seagrass beds and different types of kelp. The fact they are heavily used or more challenging to navigate does not change that. From a W̱SÁNEĆ perspective, that these are the areas most vulnerable to the impacts of cumulative effects does not contribute to a rationale for exclusion, but rather an increased rationale for “care” — that is, restoration and protection.

A similar tension between a rationale for exclusion and a rationale for increased care can be seen in regards to the presumptive exclusion of sewage lines and outfalls. The cumulative effects of pollution in the Salish Sea has resulted in near constant sanitary closures of most clam beds. In W̱SÁNEĆ we have a saying — “when the tide is out, the table is set.” Clams beds have been a central aspect of W̱SÁNEĆ economy and culture, which the cumulative effects of pollution has taken from us. This remains an issue over which we have little decision-making authority. How can an NMCAR help the health of these clam beds and foster a better relationships with clams? Excluding effluent outfalls from the NMCAR boundary, as though they are not really there, seems misguided. Climate crisis makes it abundantly clear that rationalizing pollution as “away,” or “out of sight, out of mind,” is inappropriate and dangerous. A better approach, and one more consistent with ecological integrity and sustainability, would be to use an NMCAR as a tool to regulate effluent treatment levels and bilge pump dumping to help restore the health of clam beds.

Ultimately, since NMCAs prohibit activities that are inconsistent with sustainable use and require the rehabilitation of areas previously degraded or polluted, there is hesitancy to include heavily used harbours, industrialized areas, or previously degraded areas. These types of considerations play far too great a role, and within the jurisdictional realm of Canadian law, they continue to pose huge challenges and limit the possibility of meaningful ecological rehabilitation. The very notion of exclusions and compartmentalization is difficult to grasp within W̱SÁNEĆ thought. To make exclusions is to ask us to leave behind part of our culture, beliefs, and laws; to fetter our jurisdiction to care for our relatives within the sea and future generations. To quote my uncle John Elliott on this point: “We can’t let that go. We can’t put it aside. It is a part of who we are.”[88] Seen through the lens of relational ontology, Elliott does not mean this as hyperbole, but quite literally.

5.3.2. Boundary

Similar difficulties arise in regard to creating an NMCAR boundary. Rather than focusing on responsibilities and an assessment of what it would actually take to protect, for example, Southern Resident killer whales, the NMCAR framework is sidetracked by jurisdictional complexities from the outset. The NMCAR boundary avoids extending around the southern tip of Vancouver Island and up the Strait of Juan de Fuca based on the complex infrastructure and jurisdictional issues around the city of Victoria. A similar rationale results in excluding the mouth of the Fraser River from the NMCAR boundary. The Fraser River is the largest river in British Columbia and one of the largest salmon spawning rivers in the world, and it brings millions of migrant birds every year. Seemingly more important, however, is the river’s importance for industrial activities and port access to metro Vancouver. Jurisdictional complexity, heavy use of the marine area, and potential interaction with the Tsawassen Treaty[89] make it incompatible with an NMCAR.[90]

The international border between Canada and the United States, which intersects W̱SÁNEĆ territory, the Strait of Georgia, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca and which functions as the boundary of the proposed NMCAR, is another example — perhaps the most obvious — of how jurisdiction precedes conservation. What do our relatives, KELȽELMEĆEN (Orca), know of these boundaries? It takes only one look at the critical habitat of SRKWs to see the inconsistencies with the NMCAR boundaries.[91] Is this inability to work cooperatively and across the international border not the same issue we saw in depletion of salmon stocks, the primary food source of KELȽELMEĆEN, in the first place? I do not claim that the NMCAR would not benefit KELȽELMEĆEN. However, as opposed to asking what it would actually take to save the endangered SRKW, the logic of the NMCAR boundaries, and the jurisdiction that enables it, seemingly works backward to ask what are we able to do given what we already have in place — even despite the fact that what is currently in place is exactly what is doing the central harm.

5.3.3. Zoning

In establishing an NMCA, a series of studies and mapping is done as a way to determine areas of high importance based on a variety of different considerations and interests. These maps are created by using a “spatial decision-support tool” called Marxan. A Marxan analysis breaks down the area of study into a large number of planning units as a way to “identify areas of high conservation value that would fully represent the species and habitats found within the study area.”[92] A Marxan analysis is a long and expansive process shaped by particular values and the data inputs provided.

What would a map projecting a loss of fishery and changes in marine life over time, the historical trends of degradation and contaminated sites, or the cacophony of jurisdictional lines imposed over W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction look like? How would that recast the actual challenges being faced? A map available through Trailmark Systems shows what vessel traffic in the region looks like for the year 2017, and that is only from vessels required to carry an Automatic Identification System (AIS).[93] It is striking just to consider the noise alone generated from these ships, which impacts SRKW echolocation abilities, let alone analysing where these ships are heading and what they are carrying.

W̱SÁNEĆ cannot conduct our own Marxan analysis and Parks Canada is reluctant to conduct another Marxan analysis prior to a decision on feasibility. As such, two paradoxes arise. First, W̱SÁNEĆ is asked to put the cart before the horse; that is, to proclaim an NMCAR feasible in our territory (a significant commitment) prior to fully understanding if a Marxan analysis can capture our most significant concerns, or what a management framework would actually entail. Second, we are asked to identify and utilize ecological protections within an NMCAR framework, meaning that the way in which we speak of our relationships with territory and the beings within it necessarily becomes shaped by a very technical and bureaucratic process. Much of how this all plays out, and how decision-making is structured, ultimately depends on the type of co-management agreement negotiated after the feasibility stage. While any final co-management agreement will be context dependent, some sense of the possibilities is necessary.

5.4. Cooperative Management

The term Cooperative Management is used by Parks Canada to describe any number of models in which Indigenous peoples are involved in the planning and management of national parks, but which do not limit the authority of the Minister under the Canada National Parks Act.[94] To be clear, these agreements, therefore, do not necessarily envision a transition to Indigenous management as a stand-alone option. While many of these examples are terrestrial parks, they remain relevant in considering the spectrum of potential management models. To be fair, Parks Canada does explicitly consider this spectrum of co-management report, and thus the options and analysis of “legal context” it presents, to be outdated given an increased emphasis on being guided by the “spirit and intent” of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).[95] While future co-management agreements may go beyond these examples, we do not yet have a clear picture of what those agreements might look like, or the extent to which they might move beyond these frameworks. Additionally, the same section 35 caselaw remains in the background. As such, I think legitimate concerns remain, and the following examples remain relevant for our purposes. I should also note that Parks Canada is mandated and granted a certain scope of power and jurisdiction, and thus is also confined in its ability to alter what may be agreed to, in certain respects. As such, while I am speaking of Parks Canada, I am primarily speaking of a structural and jurisdictional limitation more generally.

5.4.1. Parks Canada Co-Management Spectrum and “Legal Context”

As of 2017, there were thirty-five heritage places in regard to which Parks Canada has entered into cooperative management structures in Canada.[96] Each cooperative management agreement is necessarily unique and context dependent. Parks Canada does, however, identify three broad models for agreements to follow: 1) Relationship Building Body; 2) Cooperative Management Board; and 3) Consensus Management Body. Internally, Parks Canada has identified the need to understand the “legal context” in determining which model is most appropriate.[97] The structure of a negotiated agreement therefore seems to flow, at least in part, from an interpretation of this legal context. Understanding the “legal context” makes sense in terms of establishing a bare minimum in engaging Indigenous groups. However, presuming that Canadian Aboriginal law is the starting point is problematic. Indigenous laws, norms, and decision-making mechanisms, which pre-exist Canada, are a more appropriate reference point, as opposed to a secondary consideration.[98] If Parks Canada is truly “working towards a new model of collaborative conservation” and seeking “innovative approaches to Reconciliation” that “honour the spirit and intent of treaties,”[99] then taking Canadian Aboriginal law as a structural limitation is backward looking. In addition, this “legal context” is also framed such that, thus far, only the Haida Nation have been able to achieve a consensus management agreement. A significant factor in that regard is that the “legal context” guiding the development of a consensus management body requires that there be “no overlapping claims” as well as “one body to represent all nations.”[100]

From a relational ontology lens, “overlapping” relationships with place and other beings is not a problem, but a fact of life; one which our own legal orders have regulated for millennia. We can see in the requirement of “one body to represent all nations” that, rather than recognizing existing form of Indigenous governance, these co-management agreements are processes through which governance structures and the polities they represent are brought into being. Squeezing a decentralized kinship governance structure, such as W̱SÁNEĆ NEHIYMET, into a single decision-making body is no straightforward task. When coupled with the notion that place and the more-than-human world have being and agency, it is difficult to see how a management board can meaningfully represent that form of W̱SÁNEĆ governance. Again, Parks Canada (at least) may be willing to begin to move beyond these limitations, but the legal landscape and limited jurisdictional authority of Parks Canada, as but one branch of the federal government, means these concerns will not simply disappear.

I return now to the three cooperative management models identified above. The first type are Relationship Building Bodies. These bodies produce recommendations that are not necessarily legally binding, that focus on the process of sharing knowledge, and that do not provide Indigenous groups with decision-making authority.[101] These models are not relevant to our context. The second type are Cooperative Management Boards (CMBs) aimed at facilitating long-term relationships. A CMB is a potential model within the context of an NMCA, and Parks Canada’s “legal context” may also suggest this model with respect to W̱SÁNEĆ.[102] The exact structure of a CMB can vary, but they generally involve representation on the management board from Parks Canada and the Indigenous group(s), with the chair of the board being appointed jointly or by the Minister.[103] Consensus is not required and final decisions rest with the relevant Minister.[104] CMBs may also be purposefully limited in scope. Two examples using the CMB model are Tongait KakKasuangita SilakKijapvinga/Torngat Mountains National Park, on the Labrador Peninsula of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Kluane National Park and Reserve, in the Yukon Territory. This model of co-management can offer significant powers to their Indigenous signatories, but they are also riddled with complexities, trade-offs, and tensions. While the same critiques may apply to the next option — consensus management (or co-governance) — that model does have the additional incentive of creating more decision-making authority for Indigenous partners.

With its roots in a Haida Heritage Site, and later a National Park Reserve,[105] the Gwaii Haanas Agreement has become the sole example of an Indigenous group negotiating a consensus management agreement, thus far.[106] An often noted strength of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement is that both parties continued to assert “sovereignty, title or ownership” over Gwaii Haanas/the Archipelago[107] while agreeing to work toward “long-term protective measures” “without prejudice” to those claims.[108] The Archipelago Management Board (AMP) is the mechanism through which the parties “share and co-operate in the planning, operation and management of the Archipelago,”[109] based on consensus,[110] and flowing from their own jurisdictional authority. The 2003 Management Plan for the terrestrial area[111] was followed in 2010 by the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement.[112] The Marine Agreement required adding the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to the AMB, for jurisdictional reasons, and resulted in the first real dispute between the parties, which revolved around a roe herring fishery.[113] In the eyes of the court the dual assertion of sovereignty within the Gwaii Haanas Agreement gave DFO “a heightened duty” [114] regarding accommodation, but “did not give the Haida any veto” regarding the roe herring fishery, and balancing commercial rights and public interests were still a factor.[115] Ultimately, in the ruling of the court, “there is no question the Minister enjoys deference in governing the roe herring fishery.”[116]

Through the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, the Haida Nation is able to assert a form of “nested sovereignty”[117] and exercise of jurisdiction, although the presumed supremacy of Canadian sovereignty remains a concern. There is also no escaping the fact that Canadian sovereignty is territorially broader and thus can impact Haida jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Council of the Haida Nation continues to push jurisdictional boundaries in merging their terrestrial and marine agreements into a holistic and comprehensive management plan, the Gwaii Haanas Gina ‘Waadlux̱an Kilguhlga Land-Sea-People Management Plan, again a first of its kind.[118] The management plan is a first for an NMCAR and approaches Gwaii Haanas management “from mountaintop to seafloor as a single, interconnected ecosystem.”[119]

As a final note, while the Council of the Haida Nation (CHN) acts as the unified body representing Haida interests as party to the Agreement, significant internal governance occurs in the background of that structure.[120] The CHN remains accountable to the hereditary chiefs of the Haida Nation, who have all come together through signing the Haida Accord.[121] While the CHN is vested with governing power for the Haida Nation, it “shall uphold the principles embodied in the Haida Accord.”[122] Internal disputes therefore continue to be addressed through traditional governance structures, which then inform the CHN body.

5.5. IEȽȻIȽTEL or Nuts’a maat kws ‘i’ shul’ hwilasmut tu Skwul ‘i’ kwthe’ Accord

To recap, a significant reason Haida has thus far been the only Indigenous group able to negotiate a consensus management agreement, aside from the constant political pressure they have applied, is the lack of “overlap” within the boundaries of their traditional territory. The “legal context” identified by Parks Canada in establishing a consensus management body has tended to require “no overlapping claims” and “one body to represent all nations.”[123] On the face of it, the complexity and “legal context” around the proposed Southern Strait of Georgia NMCAR would preclude a consensus body model, such as that used by Haida. Again, Parks Canada has more recently indicated that UNDRIP is a more relevant guide post, and thus expressed a willingness to potentially move beyond the Haida model. Nonetheless, the fact that the Southern Strait of Georgia NMCAR is in close proximity to an urban centre, and that Parks Canada identifies nineteen different First Nations as having interests within the proposed NMCAR boundary, creates certain challenges within the NMCAR framework.

W̱SÁNEĆ, along with our relatives and neighbours, have taken this “overlap” issue into our own hands. In November of 2019, south island First Nations, from Nanaimo to Saanich, signed the IEȽȻIȽTEL or Nuts’a maat kws ‘i’ shul’ hwilasmut tu Skwul ‘i’ kwthe’ Accord to work together on issues relating to Parks Canada within our territories. In SENĆOŦEN, IEȽȻEȽTEL means “to paddle together.” In taking this step, we relied on our own legal traditions and protocols.[124] I consider the IEȽȻEȽTEL Accord to be a central aspect of moving forward, and while I will return to it below, it is here a reminder that we can consider the benefits offered by tools such as an NMCAR while also refusing to be limited by those frameworks.

6. Legal Personhood and Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas

The NMCAR framework can present opportunities for increased conservation efforts and protections within the Salish Sea. Depending on the negotiated agreement reached, W̱SÁNEĆ might find access to greater decision-making powers, which could have a positive impact on the Salish Sea and the more-than-human beings who also call it home. Yet, ultimately, an NMCAR does not result in a full restoration of W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction, and in order to actually grapple with the reality of climate crisis, we need more than a patchwork approach to environmental conservation. As such, we should be clear that the NMCAR framework, and corresponding co-management agreements, remain firmly rooted in, and thus limited by, the idiom of sovereignty and its associated and complex entailments, power relations, and structures.[125] The most striking example in this regard is the way these structures seem to foreclose the very possibility of place and the more-than-human world as subjects, as opposed to objects, of law and politics.

The gap between the epistemic locality and relational ontology described by Brian Burkhart, which I give greater attention to elsewhere,[126] and the liberal and rights-oriented framework of Canadian law, is vast. It is in no way clear that a middle-ground between the two orientations is possible, and the attempt to exercise one jurisdiction (W̱SÁNEĆ law and responsibilities) through the other (NMCAR framework) may be misguided. At the same time, given the constant harms felt by our relatives in the marine environment and to ŚW̱OMETs TŦE SELSELI ȻSI ŚĆENNE (“ancestral beds of the lives within the sea”), we cannot afford shirking the need to take responsible action to help them, even if it may not be our most ideal scenario. If we choose to strategically participate in the NMCAR framework, as a tool of Canadian law, we should be keenly aware of the dynamics at play and maintain our principal focus on the fact that participating in the NMCAR should not negate or distract us from implementing our ongoing Indigenous laws and jurisdiction. In moving away from a perceived either/or choice, in the following section I will turn my attention to other innovative tools we might consider, as well as exploring the possibility of layering multiple tools and strategies.

6.1. Legal Personhood

Internationally, there have been a number of legal advances in terms of environmental protection and the rights of nature around the globe.[127] In some cases these are embedded in the constitutions of nation-states. They are often framed as human rights, though some examples move beyond human rights to protecting the rights of Nature, including the examples of Ecuador and Bolivia.[128] Contradictions, lack of enforcement, and empty promises certainly remain. As David Boyd indicates, “neither constitution nor human rights can magically solve deep-rooted societal problems related to capitalism, globalization, and the growing gap between rich and poor.”[129] Yet, some sense of optimism may also be gleaned from these advances in law. One international innovation receiving a great deal of attention is the granting of legal personhood to the environment. The two most prominent examples, Te Urewera and the Whanganui River in Aotearoa New Zealand, are interesting developments occurring in somewhat similar contexts to those in W̱SÁNEĆ.[130]

Te Awa Tupua is the legal person created through the Whanganui River Claims Settlement and “has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person,”[131] which are exercised and upheld by Te Pou Tupua (“the human face of Te Awa Tupua”)[132] in speaking and acting “on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Awa Tupua.”[133] As the settlement sets out, “Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and meta-physical elements.”[134] Stated from a Maori perspective, Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au (“I am the river, and the river is me”).[135] Upon its recognition of legal personhood, the Aotearoa New Zealand Crown transferred ownership of the river bed to Te Awa Tupua itself. As such, “[o]ngoing management of the surface water is collaborative[136] and “must consult Te Pou Tupua, as appropriate,”[137] although existing property rights are grandfathered in.[138]

Much like the Whanganui River, Te Urewera, once an Aotearoa New Zealand national park, also became its own legal person.[139] Te Urewera is established in much the same way as Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River). Fee simple ownership now vests with Te Urewera itself,[140] with the Tu Urewera Board acting on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera.[141] In undertaking its duties, the Te Urewera Board has developed the Te Kawa o Te Urewera Management Plan (Te Kawa).[142] Principally, “Te Kawa is about the management of people for the benefit of the land — it is not about land management.”[143]  It is “a series of protocols established to promote the human–nature relationship. In doing so, it also establishes a way of life for those who have a relationship with Te Urewera.”[144] Te Kawa recognizes that “Nature speaks all the time and is understood only by the sincere observer and heedful mind and heart.”[145] To read Te Kawa it is to be inspired. As a “management plan” it is the best that I have seen, and W̱SÁNEĆ would do well to follow a similar vision in terms of commitment to centering W̱SÁNEĆ belief and worldview with the objective of fundamentally shifting human behaviour in these lands.

Legal personhood, however, is not without its challenges. First, Te Urewera was nearly returned directly to the Ngai Tuhoe, a Maori iwi (tribe), through a claims settlement. On the eve of finalizing the agreement, Prime Minister John Key backed out of the deal, indicating that returning the national park to the iwi was “a bridge too far.”[146] Instead, the national park was recognized as its own person. How is it that giving back undeniably stolen land to compensate for historical and ongoing injustices was more difficult than conceptualizing a legal arrangement unlike anything else that existed in the world? How is it that having a former national park own itself is a shorter bridge to cross than returning those lands to the Maori iwi? This should be striking. Giving the land back to the Maori could be seen as highly uncertain. It therefore seems to me that the only way to answer such a question is for a Board structure that acts for, and on behalf of, Te Urewera to allow the Aotearoa New Zealand government or people it trusts to have representation on the Board, and thus to speak for the river, to some extent. It also allows grandfathering in existing agreements, expectations, and uses. Potentially, then, such an approach more centrally aligns with continued capitalist and neoliberal agendas and ideologies around land, despite the hugely innovative step of recognizing Maori cosmology and the legal personhood of nature.

The second consideration is whether legal personhood is an appropriate concept in regard to Indigenous cosmologies. Underlying legal personhood is a broader moral claim about “personhood” more generally. Personhood has clearly been a gendered, racialized, and hierarchical concept throughout. Expanding what counts as a legal person, on its own, will not solve deep-seated societal issues, nor should it be expected to. The concept itself, however, may also have its own limitations. Western law and philosophy has spent significant effort to pin down what sets humans apart from the rest of nature (language, culture, rationality, sentience, agency, etc.).[147] As a result, personhood becomes an oppositional binary, meaning that to have “personhood” something else necessarily does not have personhood, nor the associated rights of that personhood status. To be a “subject” in this sense necessitates the existence of some (or many) other “objects.” In that sense, legal personhood is still a valuation of one thing over another, and it is reserved for the privileged few. Thus, while the category of “personhood” expands, is it not actually falling quite short of what Indigenous worldviews and cosmology envision? From within a relational ontology, no subject can exist in isolation. “Being alive is not dependent on any particular property that a thing might have but on having relationality or interconnectedness itself.” [148] In that sense, everything is alive and related through kinship. “Personifying” the environment, then, may in fact be backward in a certain sense. As Aaron Mills might frame it, regarding Anishinaabe law, the Earthway is premised on kinship and relationality, while “legal personhood,” as a component of a rights framework, is premised principally on autonomy.[149]

Granting legal personhood to the environment is a movement that hopes to stretch the rights framework. Within the rights framework, granting legal personhood to KELȽELMEĆEN (Orcas), or ṮEṮÁĆES (islands, or “Relatives of the Deep”), may provide some advantages and seem to more closely align with understandings of W̱SÁNEC laws and jurisdiction. Yet we have seen how legal personhood, like an NMCAR, is a tool within a colonial state and does not fully depart from all the structural limitations that are compatible with extractivism. While it may be a tool worth exploring, it should not be expected to be the only solution.

6.2. Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas

In addition to layering the colonial legal tools of an NMCAR and legal personhood, there is also space for asserting W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction by declaring Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas (IPCAs).

The Indigenous Circle of Experts (ICE) define the term IPCA broadly, indicating they are “lands and waters where Indigenous governments have the primary role in protecting and conserving ecosystems through Indigenous laws, governance, and knowledge systems.”[150] ICE was one of the bodies created by the federal government to provide recommendations on how to meet previously agreed upon targets in protecting biodiversity, which we can generally refer to as the Aichi Targets.[151] Both bodies created, the National Advisory Panel and ICE, issued extensive reports on how to meet these targets, with ICE, in particular, promoting the use of IPCAs.[152] Increased attention to IPCAs has resulted, including from Parks Canada.[153] The political climate is (at least currently) more receptive to the role of IPCAs, with high-profile non-profits taking notice as well.[154] Particularly relevant is Parks Canada foreseeing the layering of IPCAs and NMCARs, although what exactly that would look like remains unclear.

Whether the Aichi Targets are adequate or enforceable is beyond my scope. Relevant, however, is that the ICE Report is both aspirational and critical of the status quo regarding “parks” and Eurocentric understandings of “nature.” ICE takes the position that these approaches and conceptions are “no longer viable from an Indigenous rights and UNDRIP perspective.”[155] Rather, Indigenous approaches must be recognized as valid and more effective, given the increasing worldwide evidence showing “better results in conservation outcomes for areas under Indigenous tenure when compared with government-managed protected areas.”[156]

The structure and establishment of IPCAs varies significantly. Regardless of structure, IPCAs face four main barriers: jurisdiction, financial solutions, capacity development, and cultural keystone species.[157] As has been my focus through much of this paper, settler colonialism has sought to choke out Indigenous jurisdiction and decision-making authority. Establishing an IPCA necessarily confronts this reality. Currently, there is no distinct national legislation for recognizing or implementing IPCAs in Canada. Unsurprisingly, this also means accessing stable and substantial funding for new IPCAs is a challenge, as is building the capacity to operate IPCAs. Ultimately, while Canada has considered IPCAs principally in relation to the Aichi Targets, Indigenous groups are more concerned with exercising jurisdiction in relation to land, watersheds, and cultural keystone species, as opposed to rigid boundaries or specific targets not of our making. Additionally, IPCAs do also tend to have a stronger focus on restoration initiatives, as compared to the NMCAR framework, for example.

IPCAs also centre Indigenous jurisdictions: “Indigenous governments are responsible for setting the conservation standards for IPCAs. As such, they must have full scope to design their IPCAs to meet their individual and diverse needs.”[158] ICE suggests that “Indigenous governments have the primary role in determining the objectives, boundaries, management plans and governance structures for IPCAs as part of their exercise of self-determination.”[159] As such, even if W̱SÁNEĆ adopts an NMCAR, we need not be constrained by Canadian law, and an IPCA could declare a broader boundary. The Tsilhqot’in Nation and their establishment of the Dasiquox Tribal Park (or Nexwagwezʔan), which reaches beyond their Aboriginal title lands, is a great example of refusing to be confined by rigid boundaries. Similarly, an IPCA can also refuse to be bound by pre-existing parks and conservation areas previously established without Indigenous consent. Rather, an IPCA can lay a “blanket” over these existing structures, thereby creating a “connective tissue” that links together an interconnected network of protected and conserved areas.[160] Such an approach may be particularly advantageous in areas such as W̱SÁNEĆ, where a variety of parks and protected areas already exist and where there is impetus to re-declare W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction over those existing structures. From this perspective, the proposed NMCAR would simply be one layer underneath this blanket. In that regard, a W̱SÁNEĆ IPCA would extend beyond the NMCAR boundary and include all areas excluded within the NMCAR boundary. The W̱SÁNEĆ IPCA would also span both terrestrial and marine components of the territory. I will return to this possibility in more detail in the concluding section of this paper.

Ultimately, IPCAs may be undertaken cooperatively with governments, through unilateral declaration, or through a combination of both. While unilateral declarations of Tribal Parks support strong self-determination, they are not necessarily recognized by Canada and may experience additional challenges regarding enforcement and implementation. Where not recognized by Canadian law or the state, IPCAs remain valid assertions and reclamations of Indigenous jurisdiction. In such a context, an IPCA takes initiative in implementing and enforcing Indigenous laws and jurisdiction, leaving the onus on the state to intervene where any enforcement disputes arise. Limiting ourselves to working within state processes has meant that the creation of full Indigenous governance within Canada remains rare. In fact, even co-governance (distinct from co-management), where authority rests equally between both governing parties, represents about only 3.9 percent of lands and waters within Canada.[161] Perhaps, then, there is some benefit to avoiding thinking of the choice between and NMACR and an IPCA as an either/or scenario.

7. W̱SÁNEĆ IST (Moving W̱SÁNEĆ Forward)

An NMCAR, IPCA, and legal personhood offer their own unique advantages and disadvantages. It would be a mistake to think of choosing between these options as necessarily an either/or scenario. If W̱SÁNEĆ is intent on protecting the Salish Sea and the beings who call it home, perhaps, in our current context, a layering of different initiatives and mechanisms is appropriate, at least in the interim. Given the political nature of this decision, I can only offer one potential vision for balancing these difficult decisions.

The need to protect the marine area is clear and unavoidable, and W̱SÁNEĆ law requires it. It is also clear that conservation areas in the marine environment are most effective when they are large enough to effect change. “Small [marine protected areas (MPAs)] may be vulnerable to external threats and unable to effectively protect the species or habitats they were designed to conserve. Conversely, larger MPAs have been shown to optimize conservation benefits.”[162] However, simply designating a marine protected area does not necessarily mean it will meet its objectives. The larger the conservation area, the more funds and capacity required to implement and enforce it. Were all the funding and enforcement requirements of a large conservation area to fall upon W̱SÁNEĆ alone, it would be extremely difficult to uphold and enforce. Additionally, once significant levels of alienation have already occurred, particularly around areas of “critical infrastructure” that states will diligently work to protect,[163] grasping jurisdiction back becomes challenging. While land and jurisdiction back remains the ultimate goal, building partnerships with various bodies may help address the most immediate weaknesses in establishing an IPCA — the lack of funding and enforcement mechanisms inherent in such a declaration. However, much will come down to whether an NMCAR does enough to “mitigate the destructive effects . . . facilitated by a dense web of federal and provincial regulatory regimes.”[164]

An NMCAR leaves much intact in terms of jurisdiction and harms. For example, jurisdiction of fisheries remains with DFO, even if certain zoning requirements limit commercial and/or sports fisheries. A Native fishery remains possible within an NMCAR, as does the extent to which it is currently regulated by DFO or recognized by courts. What does not occur within an NMCAR is a recognition of the W̱SÁNEĆ right to “fish as formerly” in its full jurisdictional sense, which includes not simply a method of fishery, but a right and responsibility to fully regulate fisheries themselves within these waters. On a similar note, an NMCAR also does not have the jurisdiction to alter tanker traffic carrying bitumen and other products directly outside its boundary. “In terms of transportation, the circulation of goods, resources, and energy through territory is the very essence of capitalism today,” and current Canadian constitutionalism means an NMCAR must leave this basically intact.[165] In short, the NMCAR is simply not a tool that will fully honour and reinscribe W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction. This is not to say that building partnerships has no benefits, but that negotiating such a tool with governments requires vigilance and can’t be seen as a final solution to jurisdictional tensions. In fact, we must remain wary of the risk that doing so reinscribes relations that end up prolonging the same struggle. Any negotiated agreement that fails to account for Indigenous governance will inevitably result in continued frictions:

Land-use clashes are inevitable and widespread throughout the country precisely because Indigenous landholding systems are subject to imposed incursion, and outright denial, violating Indigenous laws and trampling on invisiblized turfs of Indigenous responsibility and belonging.[166]

In terms of long-term goals, the IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord serves as a solid foundation for moving W̱SÁNEĆ and our Indigenous neighbours collectively forward. The IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord is a product of our own laws and protocols for allying together out of common necessity. Canadian law and the modern treaty apparatus has too often used notions of “overlap” to restrict the advancement of Indigenous rights and governance. Reclaiming space outside the Canadian legal system by revitalizing long-existing mechanisms and protocols both within and between Indigenous traditions is a clear strength and in line with IPCA best practices. Continuing to assert Indigenous jurisdiction in this manner “undermines the sovereignty of the Canadian state” in a way that an NMCAR cannot.[167]

With the IEȽȻEȽTEL Accord in place, it is possible to assert an IPCA over a broad section of our collective traditional territories. The “boundary” of this declared area should flow directly from our shared understandings of these lands, waters, and beings who call them home, as well as an understanding of what it would actually take to effect environmental stewardship of this area. In other words, the main strength of an IPCA is that it can refuse to be bound by any imposed jurisdictional limitations within Canadian law. An IPCA can flow from Indigenous jurisdiction, not Canadian. In fact, given the arbitrary and imposed nature of the international border dissecting the Southern Gulf Islands (Canada) and the San Juan Islands (US), there is equal opportunity to partner with our relatives, including the Lummi, on the US side in declaring IPCAs. The movement of KELȽELMEĆEN is not limited by this invisible boundary in the same way humans are, nor was this arbitrary line relevant to our traditional relationships and governance with our Indigenous relatives. As W̱SÁNEĆ, we have place-names and creation stories, and thus responsibilities, to what are now the San Juan Islands, just as much as we do to the Southern Gulf Islands. While the international border does present material implications for our way of life, we need not take it for granted. There is no reason an IPCA could not span the international border.

The central advantage of an IPCA is the flexibility to design and structure it around our own laws, processes, and priorities, which is possible in that an IPCA need not be formally recognized by Canada. That strength, however, is also a weakness to the extent that absent a partnership agreement with Canada there is significantly less potential for funding, enforcement, capacity, and general public recognition, along with an increased potential for litigation raised against the IPCA and its enforcement. The establishment and long-term success of a large IPCA may therefore in part (particularly initially) hinge on developing relationships and using other tools outside that framework. The proposed NMCAR, for example, offers the potential of a marine conservation zone that is far larger than many other mechanisms available within Canadian law. Through that framework also comes funding and enforcement mechanisms, along with the possibility to build capacity in Indigenous Guardianship programs and the like. It also risks, however, leading to deals and unwanted compromises with industry and government and increasingly committing W̱SÁNEĆ to a bureaucratic framework that exerts structural and subjective power.

While an NMCAR may present its own list of weaknesses and trade-offs, its conservation potential necessitates careful consideration. This consideration should include acknowledgement that our relatives, KELȽELMEĆEN (Orca), are calling upon us to help, which is what J35 was doing as she carried her dead calf for seventeen days for all to see. We have to take that call seriously, not simply put our own interests as W̱SÁNEĆ peoples first. At the same time, how we enter into and agree to use the NMCAR framework matters, as does the need to not lose touch with the long-term goals and cultural groundings of the IPCA.

I would favour viewing an NMCAR as a tool of Canadian law, not detracting in any way from the fact that the IPCA and W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction exists completely outside and independently of that framework. With that said, we may choose to help Canada develop and implement that tool and to develop more respectful relationships with the Salish Sea and the beings who call it home. We should, however, based on past harms and injustices, and the assimilative powers of these types of agreements, choose this strategy cautiously and in limited instances, as well as on the condition that we negotiate a strong co-governance agreement based on at least a consensus model, similar to that of Gwaii Haanas. Like the Haida model, our negotiated agreement should disagree on the question of who has sovereignty, but from my perspective, it should go farther and also disagree on the legitimacy of the sovereignty paradigm, period. As W̱SÁNEĆ, we are but one of the interdependent and interconnected beings who call these lands and waters home. In other words, while we may carve out jurisdictional space, we must not forget to have that jurisdiction informed by an “ontology of care.”[168] We do not want the assimilative power of these types of agreements to displace our understandings and responsibilities of care within our own laws and jurisdiction.

In terms of a governance structure, NMCARs do require the development of a co-management agreement and management board. These types of structures do present Indigenous groups with a range of powers and authorities and the opportunity to bring other agencies (such as DFO) to the table, even while remaining limited and firmly rooted in a sovereignty and rights-based paradigm that is problematic. Even with an overarching IPCA in place, how we conceptualize and negotiate these structures matters. The IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord has created an Indigenous management board as part of its structure. Through protocol and ceremony, the IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord sets out how the Nations will work together, and a structure through which relationships with Parks Canada, for example, will take place. The IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord incorporates a mechanism which fosters collaboration between Indigenous Nations, while also balancing the independence of those member Nations. My main hesitance, generally speaking, with these types of management boards and structures is how they work.

If a management board becomes a decontextualized and bureaucratic body, re-entrenching the cultural and legal assumptions we initially aimed to escape, then it is simply not worthwhile. As for the IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord, as Justin Fritz states,

While it remains important to make decisions on behalf of our Nations, the Indigenous Management Board was created with a recognition of our interconnectedness with each other and with all our non-human relatives — including Salmon people, ṮEṮÁĆES, SȽEMEW̱ — who call these lands home. According to our snu’’uyulh / SKÁLs, our non-human relatives have their own rights and responsibilities to fulfill as autonomous beings. They are their own “legal persons.” While acting on behalf of, and in the name of, our homelands and those beings within it, the Indigenous Management Board will strive to honour this without prioritizing the interests of our individual Nations.[169]

The way in which Te Pou Tupua has strived to be “the human face” of Te Awa Tupa (the Whanganui River), and how Te Kawa o Te Urewera has strived to manage people for the benefit of the land, as opposed to managing the land for the benefit of people, are insightful examples. Since relationships are lived and embodied, attention to these commitments must remain at the forefront in order to avoid the risk of “regulatory capture.”

Ultimately, an IPCA and an NMCAR need not be seen as incompatible. In fact, an NMCAR might be a tool to help build the capacity and efficacy of an IPCA. For example, there is nothing stopping us from taking the funding, enforcement, and capacity building (for example, a Guardian program) provided through an NMCAR and co-governance agreement and repurposing them to apply throughout the entire IPCA area (not just the boundaries of the NMCAR and Gulf Islands National Park Reserve (GINPR)). While Parks Canada’s jurisdiction might stop at the NMCAR boundary, or any excluded area within it, W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction does not. In fact, I see an IPCA as a “blanket” that overlays not just an NMCAR, but all other bodies and existing protected areas. It may also serve as an impetus for creating additional protected areas, or smaller Tribal Parks, within the broader IPCA boundary.

Within W̱SÁNEĆ territory there are federal parks, provincial BC Parks, conservancies, municipalities, the Islands Trust, non-government conservation organizations, and any number of ecological reserves and nature sanctuaries. By declaring an IPCA over a broad territory, we also assert that all the operations and existing bodies within the area fall within our IPCA and are therefore subject to our laws and jurisdiction. As such, we call on all these different levels of government and other bodies to work with us and to help build capacity for the greater protection, care, and responsibilities to these areas. In other words, we use the IPCA as pressure to insert W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction where it was previously ignored and choked out.

In terms of using new tools within the “blanket” of an IPCA, the legal personhood of nature is one possibility. While legislation creating legal personhood in the environment reinforces significant jurisdictional authority for the state, the Te Urewera Act, for example, does provide a dent in the overwhelming arrogance of claiming an almost “universal assertion of human ownership” over the entire planet.[170] To dent that arrogance and to manage people for the benefit of place, as the Maori have done in line with their cosmology, is an important act of Indigenous law revitalization. With respect to W̱SÁNEĆ, what benefits might flow from recognizing KELȽELMEĆEN (Orca) as a legal person with rights? In W̱SÁNEĆ we already see KELȽELMEĆEN as relatives, but might it create a shift in the broader public’s conceptions that could prove beneficial? Or, in cases where land is returned to W̱SÁNEĆ, though under the condition of being held under certain restrictive environmental covenants, such as SISȻENEM,[171] is there a possibility that the island owning itself presents a more suitable alternative? I suspect the answer is context dependent, but the point is that an IPCA still leaves room for incorporating such tools under its umbrella, should it be desirable to do so.

In the end, an IPCA is an opportunity to assert and reclaim our place-names within W̱SÁNEĆ territory, to emphasize the creation stories attached to them, and the laws and relationships that follow. It is a mechanism for cultural regeneration, healing, connecting with the land, and building economies of reciprocity. It is also a mechanism to declare local, national, and global actions and structures that create harms within those lands as a direct violation of our laws in that they prevent us from upholding the responsibilities we have to our relatives within our homelands, even if our ability of enforcement is currently restricted to those available through a tool such an NMCAR. The strategy is to reclaim and assert W̱SÁNEĆ jurisdiction, as opposed to seeking permission from the state. The ultimate goal remains the same: to re-create ȻEȻEÁT SELI (“a life of dignity”) for all those within these lands and waters.


*      Robert is WSÁNEĆ and a member of the Tsawout First Nation, his home community; he carries the name YELKATŦE, which was passed to him by his late grandfather, Earl Claxton Sr. He is an Assistant Professor at the Allard School of Law, and his publications cover a range of aspects relating to Indigenous law and Indigenous legal theory, including a focus on legal pluralism, Indigenous language revitalization, and Indigenous spirituality. 

[1]      Janet Poth, ed, Saltwater People: As Told by Dave Elliott Sr. (Saanich: School District 63, 1990).

[2]      Shiri Pasternak, Grounded Authority: The Algonquins of Barriere Lake Against the State (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017) at 55.

[3]      Aspects of this section have been previously published as an essay on the Centre for International Governance Innovation website. See Robert YELḰÁTŦE Clifford, “Saanich Law and the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion” in Centre for International Governance Innovation, Digital Essay Series, Environmental Challenges on Indigenous Lands (4 July 2019).

[4]      Tsawout presented at both the original NEB hearings as well as the reconsideration hearings. The Tsartlip First Nation also participated in reconsideration hearings on this date, and it was also in opposition to the project. I also acknowledge that the project impacts a significant number of Indigenous groups along the pipeline and tanker route. I approach my thoughts in this section from a W̱SÁNEĆ perspective, as opposed to offering a pan-Indigenous response.

[5]      Government of Canada, “Saanich Tribe – South Saanich” Treaty Texts – Douglas Treaties (1852), online: www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100029052/1581515763202 [Douglas Treaty]. Note that the South Saanich and North Saanich Treaties have identical wording, except for the description of lands which they cover. See also Nicholas Xumthoult Claxton, “ISTÁ SĆIÁNEW, ISTÁ SXOLE ‘To Fish as Formerly’: The Douglas Treaties and the W̱SÁNEĆ Reef-Net Fisheries” in Leanne Simpson, ed, Lighting the Eighth Fire: The Liberation, Resurgence, and Protection of Indigenous Nations (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2008).

[6]      National Energy Board, Trans Mountain Expansion Project Reconsideration Report (MH-052-2018, February 2019), online: https://apps.cer-rec.gc.ca/REGDOCS/Item/Filing/A98021 at 1.

[7]      Pasternak, above note 2 at 2.

[8]      Ibid.

[9]      See Lori Cuthbert & Douglas Main, “Orca Mother Drops Calf, After Unprecedented 17 Days of Mourning” National Geographic (13 August 2018), online: www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/orca-mourning-calf-killer-whale-northwest-news.

[10]     For an excellent analysis of how fisheries as common property and the corresponding right not to be excluded do the work of dispossession, see Doug Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves & Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849–1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).

[11]     Pasternak, above note 2 at 18.

[12]     Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[13]     Pasternak, above note 2 at 55.

[14]     Ibid at 5.

[15]     Paul Nadasdy, who has worked extensively on analysing the impacts that these types of co-management agreements have on inherent Indigenous governance structures, makes this point and has been influential in my thinking. See Paul Nadasdy, Sovereignty’s Entailments: First Nation State Formation in the Yukon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) and Paul Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the Southwest Yukon (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).

[16]     Pasternak, above note 2 at 55.

[17]     Ibid at 71.

[18]     Ibid at 123.

[19]     Robert YELḰATŦE Clifford, “W̱SÁNEĆ Legal Theory and the Fuel Spill at SELE₭TEȽ (Goldstream River)” (2016) 61:4 McGill Law Journal 755 [Clifford, “W̱SÁNEĆ Legal Theory”].

[20]     Harris, Doug, above note 10.

[21]     Earl Claxton & John Elliott, The Saanich Year (Brentwood Bay: Saanich School Board and Saanich School District #63, 1993).

[22]     Pasternak, above note 2 at 115.

[23]     See Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). I also summarize this in my dissertation, Robert YELḰÁTŦE Clifford, The Old People are the Song, and We are Their Echo: Resurgence of W̱SÁNEĆ Law and Legal Theory (PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2022) [unpublished].

[24]     Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) at 17.

[25]     Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 26.

[26]     The Oregon Treaty, United States and United Kingdom, 15 June 1846.

[27]     Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 8.

[28]     Douglas Treaty, above note 5. See also Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 187.

[29]     Ibid at 29, quoting Barclay to Douglas, 16 December 1850, in Bowsfield, ed, Fort Victoria Letters, 96. While Douglas is speaking to the Treaties created just prior to those created with W̱SÁNEĆ in 1852, the correspondence does speak to Douglas’s intentions regarding the promise to protect the right to “fish as formerly.”

[30]     Harris, Cole, above note at 23. We should note that there were various dynamics at play. There was a goal of assimilation of Indigenous peoples, which having Indigenous people take up farming would have fostered. At the same time, there was limited farming land, which needed to be opened up to settlers. Additionally, local officials were conscious of preventing too much unrest from Indigenous populations, and allowing for fisheries did much to quell unrest.

[31]     Lissa K. Wadewitz, The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012) at 68.

[32]     Ibid.

[33]     Ibid at 72. See also Great Britain & United States, John Jay’s Treaty, 19 November 1794 (Senate Ratified June 1795).

[34]     Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 31.

[35]     Ibid at 4.

[36]     Ibid at 25. See also 35 for more on canning technology. Without canning technology, it was not possible to ship fish any significant distance without them spoiling.

[37]     Ibid.

[38]     Abundance was not the result of an inability to capture large numbers of fish. In fact, the reef-net fishery was later banned based on the stated rationale that it functioned too well.

[39]     Wadewitz, above note 31 at 75.

[40]     Wadewitz, ibid, notes how “For years many canners instructed their workers to use only the prime bellies of the fish and throw out the rest” (at 138). Additionally, “[i]n 1901 the B.C. commissioner of fisheries found that canneries on both sides of the international border not only filled every can available, but they threw away more salmon than they used” (at 139).

[41]     Ibid at 145 and 165.

[42]     Ibid at 109.

[43]     See Fisheries Regulations for the Province of British Columbia, ss 1 and 6, Order-in-Council, 3 March 1894, Canada Gazette, vol 27 at 1579.

[44]     Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 113.

[45]     For example, in 1927 the Dominion government modified the Indian Act to make it illegal to raise funds for Native land claims or title cases without the permission of Indian Affairs. See Indian Act, RSC 1927, c 98, s 141.

[46]     Harris, Doug, above note 10 at 188.

[47]     Aaron James Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), “Miinigowiziwin: All That Has Been Given for Living Well Together – One Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism”(PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, 2019) [unpublished].

[48]     Francine Mercier & Claude Mondor, Sea to Sea to Sea: Canada’s National Marine Conservation Areas System Plan (1995) Parks Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, online: parkscanadahistory.com/publications/sea-to-sea-to-sea.pdf [CNMCA System Plan] at 7.

[49]     Jon Lien & Robert Graham, eds, Marine Parks and Conservation: Challenge and Promise, vols 1 & 2, The National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada, NPPAC Henderson Park Book Series No 10, 1985. The National Marine Parks Policy was revised in 1994. See Parks Canada, Parks Canada Guiding Principles and Operational Policies, Part II – Activity Policies: National Marine Conservation Areas Policy, 1994 [National Marine Conservation Areas Policy].

[50]     Fathom Five National Marine Park is on the tip of the Bruce Peninsula on Georgian Bay of Lake Huron.

[51]     See CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 10–11 for more details.

[52]     Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, SC 2002, c18, assented to 2002-06-13 [CNMCA Act], s 4(1).

[53]     The three established NMCAs are Saguenay-St. Lawrence Marine Park (established under the Saguenay-St. Lawrence Marine Park Act, SC 1997, c 37), Lake Superior National Marine Conservation Area (established under the Lake Superior National Marine Conservation Area Act, SC 2015, c 38), and Fathom Five National Marine Park (Government of Canada/Government of Ontario, 1987, Federal/Provincial Agreement for the Establishment of the proposed National Park in the Township of St. Edmunds, Environment Canada, Ottawa, Ontario). The lone NMCAR is Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve and Haida Heritage Site (established as an NMCAR under the CNMCA Act, Schedule 2).

[54]     CNMCA Act, ss 2(4) and 4(2).

[55]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 8 and CNMCA Act, s 4(3).

[56]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 8 and CNMCA Act, s 2(2). Aboriginal rights are, of course, constitutionally protected rights, which legislation such as the CNMCA Act could not infringe without justification.

[57]     CNMCA Act, s 9(1). Each management plan is accessible online.

[58]     See ibid, ss 9(1) and 9(4) for more on these points.

[59]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 8. The Preamble to the CNMCA Act also specifically identifies the need to “consider traditional ecological knowledge in the planning and management of marine conservation areas.”

[60]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 8.

[61]     Ibid and CNMCA Act, s 5(2). Also note that, in the Gwaii Haanas agreement, the preamble to the management agreement does state that the parties agree to disagree on the point of sovereignty, and thus who “owns” the lands and waters in question.

[62]     See Parks Canada, Parks Canada’s Policy Framework: For the management of national marine conservation areas, Backgrounder (May 2019) [Parks Canada, Backgrounder] at 11 for more details.

[63]     Ibid at 19 & 20. For W̱SÁNEĆ, respecting the spirit and intent of the treaties would imply not just the written text of the Douglas Treaty but the oral version of the Douglas Treaty. While the policy indicated here speaks to the spirit and intent of treaties, the legislation (CNMCA Act) makes no specific mention of this approach. This is noteworthy given that policy holds less sway than legislation.

[64]     Parks Canada explicitly views an NMCAR as a process and tool toward reconciliation (ibid at 19).

[65]     Ibid.

[66]     Ibid at 12.

[67]     Parks Canada, Protecting Canada’s Marine Heritage: Proposed policy and regulations for Canada’s national marine conservation areas, Discussion Paper (2019) [Parks Canada, Discussion Paper] at 9.

[68]     Ibid. See 10–11 for a description of the purposes of each of those four zones.

[69]     CNMCA Act, s 4(4).

[70]     The Saguenay-St. Lawrence Marine Park, a location of heavy ship traffic and a critical beluga habitat, is, however, an interesting example of regulating marine travel and speed within an NMCA (Parks Canada, Backgrounder, above note 62 at 17). For a study on the impact of vessel speed, see Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, “ECHO Program Slowdown Trial — Interim Findings” (1 March 2018), online: www.portvancouver.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Interim-Findings-of-the-Vessel-Slowdown-Trial-Updated-March-1-2018.pdf.

[71]     Parks Canada, Backgrounder, above note 62 at 16n4.

[72]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 12.

[73]     See Parks Canada, “Southern Strait of Georgia Feasibility Study – Introduction” National Marine Conservation Areas, online: www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-cnnmca/dgs-ssg/intro.

[74]     The decision to focus in on the Southern Gulf Islands location for a potential NMCA has seemed to go somewhat hand-in-hand with the decision to establish the Gulf Islands National Park Reserve (GINPR), which was established without consultation with W̱SÁNEĆ, despite clear Douglas Treaty and Aboriginal rights in the area. In other words, the role of parks in dispossession is not new.

[75]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 12.

[76]     Parks Canada, National Marine Conservation Areas, “What is a Feasibility Study?” online: www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-cnnmca/dgs-ssg/contexte-background/quoi-what.

[77]     Parks Canada, National Marine Conservation Areas, Study Area, online: https://parks.canada.ca/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-cnnmca/dgs-ssg/region-area [Parks Canada, Study Area].

[78]     Parks Canada, Proposed National Marine Conservation Area Reserve Southern Strait of Georgia: Project Update, Spring 2012 [Parks Canada, Southern Strait of Georgia 2012 Update] at 3.

[79]     The W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council Society promotes the interests and enhances recognition of the rights of W̱SÁNEĆ First Nations. While the Paquachin First Nation has not yet signed on to become part of the WLC, the possibility remains open and coordination between the WLC and the Paquachin First Nation remains a priority. The Tsawout First Nation, while initially part of the WLC, has recently withdrawn for now as well.

[80]     The IEȽȻIȽTEL or Nutśa matt kws ‘í shul’ hwilasmut tu Skwul ‘í kwthe’ Accord was signed on 27 November 2019. The parties are the member First Nations of the W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council, the member Bands of the Cowichan Nation (Cowichan Tribes, Halalt First Nation, Lyackson First Nation, Penelakut Tribem, and Stz’uminus First Nation), the Malahat Nation, Snuneymuxw First Nation, and the Paquachin First Nation [IEȽȻIȽTEL Accord].

[81]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 13.

[82]     This is done through the CNMCA Act, s 4(1). See also s 7 for the process by which this occurs.

[83]     CNMCA System Plan, above note 48 at 13.

[84]     Parks Canada, Southern Strait of Georgia 2012 Update, above note 78 at 4–5.

[85]     Parks Canada, Study Area, above note 77. Note that excluded areas within the proposed boundary are not coloured.

[86]     See Parks Canada, Proposed Southern Strait of Georgia National Marine Conservation Area Reserve Atlas (2009) [Parks Canada, Atlas] at 78 for a map illustrating “Pacific Herring Spawning Areas” within the proposed NMCAR boundary.

[87]     The exclusion of SNIDȻEȽ (Tod Inlet) is particularly troubling and ironic given that this area was where the first W̱SÁNEĆ ancestor, SȽEMEW̱, came to the earth in the form of rain and helped form the ocean, lakes, and rivers, as well as shape the land, and where the first W̱SÁNEĆ village site was located. It is in that sense that water is sacred and has spiritual power, and why past harms and damage done to that site is particularly troubling.

[88]     Teaching of John Elliott (27 February 2019), W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council Office.

[89]     Tsawassen First Nation & The Governments of Canada and British Columbia, Tsawassen First Nation Final Agreement (2010), online: https://rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100022706/1617737111330.

[90]     Also note that the W̱SÁNEĆ, as part of the SENĆOŦEN Alliance, intervened in the development of this treaty in that the Tsawassen First Nation Final Agreement, ibid, incorporates areas we consider also within W̱SÁNEĆ territory and overlooks the fact that W̱SÁNEĆ had seasonal fishing rights at the mouth of the Fraser River. Diamon Jenness, for example, recorded that “The Saanich had an immemorial claim to the fishing off Point Roberts, near the mouth of the Fraser River”: Richling, ed, The W̱SÁNEĆ and Their Neighbours: Diamond Jenness of the Coast Salish of Vancouver Island, 1935 (Oakville: Rock Mills Press, 2016) at 18.

[91]     See Parks Canada, Atlas, above note 86 at 91 for a map of “Critical Killer Whale Habitat.”

[92]     Ibid at 61.

[93]     Trailmark Systems, All Vessel Traffic 2017, map (November 2018). Requirements to carry an AIS are based on certain factors such as vessel size.

[94]     Parks Canada, Spectrum of Cooperative Management Agreements at Parks Canada (23 June 2017), online: https://parks-parcs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Spectrum_of_Cooperative_Management_Agreements_at_PCA_23.June_.2017.pdf [Parks Canada, Spectrum Report] at 3.

[95]     Personal communication, 4 March 2022, W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council and Parks Canada representatives.

[96]     Parks Canada, Spectrum Report, above note 94 at 29–30.

[97]     Ibid at 8 for more on this legal context.

[98]     In the context of W̱SÁNEĆ and the Douglas Treaty, it is the difference between beginning with the written text of the Treaty and subsequent court cases as the “legal context,” and beginning with an understanding of our oral history, legal tradition, and ontological grounding, which takes a completely different starting point on core principles of the relationships being addressed, including the ability to sell or own land in a property law sense.

[99]     Parks Canada, Spectrum Report, above note 94 at 1.

[100]    Ibid at 11T1.

[101]    Ibid.

[102]    Ibid.  See the heading “Legal Context” for Model 2: Cooperative Management Board.

[103]    Ibid at 14.

[104]    Ibid.

[105]    In 1985, the Haida Nation declared the creation of a Haida Heritage Site in direct response to logging and set up a blockade on Lyell Island. In response to the anti-logging protests, the governments of Canada and British Columbia worked to designate Gwaii Haanas as a National Park Reserve. This was done through the South Moresby Memorandum of Understanding and then the South Moresby Agreement; see Province of British Columbia, Order of the Lieutenant Governor In Council, Order in Council No 1350, approved and ordered 12 July 1988, with Appendix A To O/C /88 being “Memorandum of Agreement Between Federal/Provincial Governments – South Moresby National Park (May 1988), online: www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/oic/arc_oic/1350_1988.

[106]    The Government of Canada & the Council of the Haida Nation, Gwaii Haanas Agreement (1993), online: www.haidanation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GwaiiHaanasAgreement.pdf.

[107]    Ibid, s 1.1.

[108]    Ibid, ss 1.2 and 1.3.

[109]    Ibid, s 3.4. See ibid, s 4.0 for more on the Archipelago Management Board.

[110]    Ibid, s 5.0. In the event of “clear and final disagreement,” decisions and actions are “held in abeyance” while being referred back to both the Government of Canada and the Council of the Haida Nation in the hopes of reaching an agreement, with the potential of going to a neutral third party (s 5.3).

[111]    Archipelago Management Board, Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site: Management Plan for the Terrestrial Area (2003), online: www.pc.gc.ca/en/pn-np/bc/gwaiihaanas/info/coop/plans.

[112]    Government of Canada & Council of the Haida Nation, Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement (2010), online: www.pc.gc.ca/en/pn-np/bc/gwaiihaanas/info/coop/plans.

[113]    See Haida Nation v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2015 FC 290 [Haida Nation 2015].

[114]    Ibid at paras 53 and 55.

[115]    Ibid at para 54. Ultimately, the court found a failure to consult and a finding of irreparable harm and granted the injunction.

[116]    Ibid at para 62.

[117]    Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014) at 11.

[118]    Haida Nation & Parks Canada, Gwaii Haanas Gina ‘Waadlux̱an Kilguhlga Land-Sea-People Management Plan (2018), online: www.pc.gc.ca/en/pn-np/bc/gwaiihaanas/info/consultations/gestion-management-2018).

[119]    Ibid at 2. The plan uses six guiding principles (at 7) and seven goals, each with their own particular objectives and targets (at 13–27). These goals are supported through zoning processes for both terrestrial and marine components, and Haida’s role in actively implementing zoning restrictions relies on the Haida Watchmen Program. See 28 for more.

[120]    The Council of the Haida Nation is comprised of fourteen elected representatives.

[121]    The Haida people are a matrilineal society consisting of a number of different clans, each with its own chief. Each of the hereditary chiefs have come together through signing the Haida Accord (13 May 2013), online: www.haidanation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/the_haida_accord.pdf. They agreed to work collectively as a Nation for the well-being of Haida Gwaii. The Haida Accord is also constantly renewed according to Haida protocols.

[122]    Haida Nation, Constitution of the Haida Nation (adopted by the House of Assembly on 19 October 2018), online: www.haidanation.ca/haida-constitution/, art 5, s 2.

[123]    Parks Canada, Spectrum Report, above note 94 at 11T1.

[124]    Historically, for example, W̱SÁNEĆ and Cowichan warriors have allied together to protect ourselves and areas important to us when facing raiders from the north. We were also brought together by ceremonial protocol in reinvigorating our unity in this regard.

[125]    See Nadasdy, Sovereignty’s Entailments, above note 15 for more.

[126]    Clifford, above note 19.

[127]    See David R. Boyd, The Rights of Nature: A Legal Revolution That Could Save The World (Toronto: ECW Press, 2017) [Boyd, The Rights of Nature].

[128]    Ecuador explicitly provided constitutional right to Nature in 2008, and Bolivia followed suit in 2009. Bolivia strengthened these rights in 2010 and again in 2012 with added legislation. See David R. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) for more details.

[129]    Ibid at 249.

[130]    The Maori are signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi, which has both an English and a Maori version. The two versions differ on what was being agreed to. See Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi, 6 February 1840. Both Maori and W̱SÁNEĆ worldview maintain that nature cannot be seen as a property interest. The Douglas Treaties were based on the then recent Waitangi Treaty between the Maori and New Zealand government. See Jacinta Arianna Ruru, Settling Indigenous Place: Reconciling Legal Fictions in Governing Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand’s National Parks (PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, 2012) for more on this topic. Ruru is a leading scholar with many publications relating to the granting of legal personhood to nature.

[131]    Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, 2017 No 17, 20 March 2017, s 14(1).

[132]    Ibid, s 18(2).

[133]    Ibid, s 14(2).

[134]    Ibid, s 12.

[135]    Ibid, s 13.

[136]    Ibid, s 64.

[137]    Ibid, s 64(4)(a). A fisheries coordination group must be created in the similar manner (s 66).

[138]    Ibid, s 16.

[139]    Te Urewera Act 2014, 2014 No 51, 27 July 2014 [Te Urewera Act]. No meaningful consultation was done in creating this national park, nor were any Maori interests expressly provided for. See Boyd, The Rights of Nature, above note 127 at 150.

[140]    Te Urewera Act, above note 139 at 12.

[141]    Ibid, ss 11(2)(a) & 11(2)(a)(i).

[142]    Te Urewera Board, Te Kawa o Te Urewera Management Plan, online: www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera.

[143]    Ibid.

[144]    Maiora Clarke Puketapu-Dentice, He Mauri to Te Turewera: Understanding Legal Entities: The Transition from Resource Management to Human Management with Te Urewera (Master of Planning thesis, University of Otago, 2018) at 55–56.

[145]    Ibid at 11.

[146]    Boyd, The Rights of Nature, above note 127 at 144–46.

[147]    Such debates can be found in the works of Aristotle, Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and others.

[148]    Brian Burkhart, Indigenizing Philosophy Through the Land: A Trickster Methodology for Decolonizing Environmental Ethics and Indigenous Futures (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2019) at 200.

[149]    Mills, above note 47. Note that this is my own interpretation, framed through language used by Mills.

[150]    We Rise Together: Achieving Pathway to Canada Target 1 through the creation of Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas in the spirit and practice of reconciliation, the Indigenous Circle of Experts’ Report and Recommendations (March 2018), online: www.changingtheconversation.ca/sites/all/images/Biodiversity%20Library/WeRiseTogetherReport.pdf [ICE, We Rise Together] at 35. The term IPCA is inclusive of “Tribal Parks, Indigenous Cultural Landscapes, Indigenous Protected Areas, and Indigenous conserved areas” (at 5).

[151]    In October 2010, in Japan, the Conference of the Parties for the United Nations’ Convention on Biological Diversity adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, which has become known as the Aichi Targets. The Aichi Targets set out a range of objectives relating to protecting biodiversity, to be met by 2020. For its part, in 2015, Canada adopted four goals and nineteen targets in an effort to meet its Aichi Targets commitment (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020 Biodiversity Goals and Targets for Canada (2016), online: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/613fb778a76e244eef08775d/t/619a942bd9d01b27f1cf83c3/1637520474350/2020_Biodiversity_Goals_Targets_for_Canada.pdf.

[152]    See ICE, We Rise Together, above note 150.

[153]    I was part of a two-part international dialogue organized by Parks Canada on this topic. See Parks Canada, “Indigenous-Crown Protected Area Partnerships Dialogues” (December 2020 & April 2021).

[154]    David Suzuki Foundation, Tribal Parks and Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas: Lessons Learned From B.C. Examples (August 2018), online: https://davidsuzuki.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/tribal-parks-indigenous-protected-conserved-areas-lessons-b-c-examples.pdf [Suzuki Foundation, Tribal Parks].

[155]    ICE, We Rise Together, above note 150 at 19.

[156]    Ibid at 33.

[157]    Ibid at 11.

[158]    Ibid at 6.

[159]    Ibid at 36.

[160]    Ibid at 24.

[161]    Ibid at 77.

[162]    Carolyn K. Robb, Karin M. Bodtker & Kim Wright, “Marine Protected Areas in the Canadian Pacific: Do They Fulfill Network Criteria?” (2015) 43:3 Coastal Management 253 at 263.

[163]    Pasternak defines critical infrastructure as “a vague designation for fixed capital that forms the object of international security collaboration between states and industry to protect global supply chains” (above note 2 at 223).

[164]    Ibid at 64.

[165]    Ibid at 242.

[166]    Ibid at 121.

[167]    Ibid at 270.

[168]    Ibid at 6.

[169]    Justin Fritz is the former policy-analyst at the W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council, and we have worked together to try to capture a descriptive orientation for the board that is rooted in W̱SÁNEĆ worldview. Justin Fritz, W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council internal document in author’s possession.

[170]    Boyd, The Rights of Nature, above note 127 at xxvi. There are a few small exceptions — Marie Byrd Land, Bir Tawil, and the high seas (which are viewed as a global commons for exploitation) — deemed such for reasons “linked to their remoteness and utter inhospitality to humans.”

[171]    Halibut Island, or SISȻENEM, was recently returned to W̱SÁNEĆ with similar conditions attached. See W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council, “TLC To Transfer SISȻENEM (Halibut Island) to W̱SÁNEĆ Leadership Council,” online: https://wsanec.com/tlc-to-transfer-sis%C8%BCenem-halibut-island-to-w%CC%B1sanec-leadership-council/.

Ecological Vulnerability and Socioecological Justice: A Vulnerability Approach to Ecological Law in Canada

Erin Dobbelsteyn*

A. Introduction

Over the last decade, ecological law has emerged as a legal paradigm designed to respond to the apparent inability of environmental law and other areas of contemporary law to avert or address the global socioecological crisis.[1] Rooted in a recognition of the interconnection and interdependence of all beings and systems on Earth, ecological law has as its main objectives: restoring and preserving the health and integrity of ecosystems; substituting the Western anthropocentric legal system with a holistic, systems-based approach to law; promoting human socioeconomic development in “harmony with nature” (i.e., within ecological limits); and fostering an ecologically just society.[2] Given the relative infancy of ecological law as a distinct framework for law and governance, discussions persist among its scholars and proponents regarding the identification and meaning of its foundational principles and key features, as well as the mechanisms for achieving its goals.

This article adds a relational feminist perspective to this conversation by examining emerging concepts of ecological law through the heuristic of vulnerability theory, a critical theoretical approach established by American feminist legal theorist Martha Albertson Fineman.[3] Specifically, I explore what vulnerability theory contributes to the following two discussions: (1) whether the ecological approach to law should be grounded in ecocentrism, as an alternative to anthropocentrism; and (2) the role that responsibilities (or obligations) to care for the Earth and other beings should occupy in ecological law. To date, the burgeoning ecological law scholarship has paid relatively little attention to the role of vulnerability theory and the related concept of ecological vulnerability. I argue that when expanded to the more-than-human world, vulnerability theory has the potential to advance socioecological justice by incorporating considerations of power, hierarchies, social and political inequities, and the values, interests, and ways of knowing of marginalized individuals and communities into the development of ecological law’s foundational principles and features. This article also contributes to the broader discussion about the way in which relational[4] and feminist-inspired[5] analysis, politics, and ethics can enrich the intellectual foundations and prescriptive proposals of the paradigm of ecological law, both globally and in Canada.

It is commonly asserted within ecological law scholarship that Western law’s adoption of anthropocentrism (i.e., the view that human beings are separate from, superior to, and dominant over the rest of the non-human world) is a main driver of the ecological crisis and should be abandoned.[6] Whether ecological law should be alternatively rooted in ecocentrism, or some modification of it, is an ongoing scholarly discussion.[7] I argue that vulnerability theory, with its emphasis on interdependence, embodiment, and socio-material context, provides support for the move away from traditional anthropocentrism and liberal legal subjectivity, and simultaneously helps to overcome the traditional dichotomy between anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches.

Another emerging feature of ecological law is its emphasis on the responsibilities human beings owe to one another and to the more-than-human world.[8] There is considerable debate, however, regarding the extent to which rights discourse (including arguments for human rights and the extension of rights to nature) should be abandoned in the name of legal and normative responsibilities in furtherance of ecological law.[9] I argue that ecological vulnerability exposes the limitations of rights and emphasizes the importance of specifying and prioritizing responsibilities of care for one another and the rest of the living world in confronting the innumerable injustices of the socioecological crisis.

This article proceeds in three parts. Part B contains an introduction to vulnerability theory. In this part, I discuss critical revisions and pertinent expansions of Fineman’s theory of vulnerability and explain their relevance to my analysis. A summary of the development of the paradigm of ecological law and its emerging features, concepts, and principles follows in Part C. In Part D, I apply vulnerability theory to the ongoing scholarly discussions about an ecocentric approach to ecological law and the role of ecological responsibilities. I argue that vulnerability theory provides support for transcending the anthropocentrism/ecocentrism binary within ecological law and adopting an alternative form of legal subjectivity that better embraces the interdependence and complexities of ecological vulnerability. It also encourages a focus on responsibilities as a mechanism for restraining human activity within ecological limits, protecting current and future generations of life on Earth, and building an ecologically just society. In this section, I consider some ways in which Canadian environmental law currently embraces these key features of ecological law by highlighting existing scholarship, laws, policies, and movements that reflect these approaches. Furthermore, I identify some implications of vulnerability theory’s contributions to ecological law for environmental law and environmental law scholars in Canada.

B. Vulnerability Theory

1. Fineman’s Theory of Vulnerability

The notion of vulnerability has become an increasingly common object of inquiry in the fields of political theory, sociology, bioethics, disability studies, climate science, and disaster management, among others. Scholarship on vulnerability and the law most frequently invokes vulnerability theory, a critical legal paradigm developed by legal theorist Martha Albertson Fineman in the early 2000s.[10] Initially designed as a tool to assist in uncovering and challenging the problematic aspects of equal protection law (formal equality) in the United States, vulnerability theory’s reach has expanded significantly since that time to diverse areas of public policy.[11] Fineman deployed the term “vulnerable” — which has historically been used in social and political discourse to connote (and lament) a group’s or an individual’s perceived fragility, passivity, incapacity, or disadvantage — to describe “a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition.”[12] In this way, all human beings are understood to be fundamentally and ineliminably vulnerable throughout their lifetime, given that they inhabit fragile, porous, material bodies from birth until death.[13] This universality and constancy, along with complexity and particularity, make up the four characteristics of the concept of vulnerability as Fineman first articulated it.

For Fineman, vulnerability emerges from the empirical reality of embodiment, which makes humans “inevitably and constantly susceptible to changes—both positive and negative, developmental and episodic—over the course of life.”[14] Vulnerability manifests in profoundly complex degrees and forms, due to human embodiment as well as human embeddedness in social, political, cultural, and natural environments. Human beings are exposed to biological (e.g., illness, disease, epidemics, viruses), physical (e.g., injury, fire, flood, drought), and social (e.g., economics, politics) forces, all of which impact physical, psychological, and social well-being. While the risks that attend embodiment can be minimized and their impacts can be diminished, they cannot be entirely eradicated. Embodiment and embeddedness, therefore, makes humans vulnerable and fundamentally dependent on others (i.e., through material, social, and emotional relationships), as well as on the functions of society and its institutions,[15] to varying degrees in order to survive and flourish.[16] Furthermore, interaction among different forms of risk and harm, and the reality that relationships and societal institutions are themselves vulnerable, marks and shapes the experience and complexity of vulnerability.[17]

Finally, although everyone is vulnerable, Fineman’s theory recognizes that vulnerability is also particular in that it is experienced differently by each individual at various stages throughout life.[18] As Fineman explains, human beings “have different forms of embodiment and also are differently situated within webs of economic and institutional relationships.”[19] Individual variations in vulnerability are greatly influenced by the distribution of power and material resources in society, which is mediated through societal programs, institutions, and structures, including laws and policies.[20] As such, a vulnerability analysis considers both embodied (physical/psychological) and embedded (social/material/political/cultural) sources of vulnerability, including “the ways in which power and privilege are conferred through the operation of societal institutions, relationships and the creation of social identities, sometimes inequitably.”[21]

The main implications of Fineman’s conception of vulnerability are twofold: (1) significant reconstruction, if not complete rejection, of existing liberal theories of political and legal subjectivity; and (2) a critical assessment and reimagination of state responsibility.[22] With its emphasis on human embodiment, embeddedness, and dependency, vulnerability theory challenges the autonomous, independent, self-sufficient liberal legal subject and argues that it must be replaced with a “vulnerable subject” who better reflects the socio-material, relational experience of human beings.[23] According to Fineman, the dominant vision of political and legal subjectivity, rooted in an impoverished understanding of autonomy and independence, is not only incomplete and incorrect but also drives the hegemonic ideals of personal responsibility and individual liberty that have for so long structured the relationship between individuals and the state, as well as dictated public policy, jurisprudence, and legal practice.[24] By emphasizing the realities of vulnerability and dependency that arise due to the socio-material existence of human beings, vulnerability theory instead prioritizes the values of relationality and interdependence.[25] Furthermore, once shared vulnerability is recognized and accepted, “it becomes apparent that human beings need each other, and that we must structure our institutions in response to this fundamental human reality.”[26]

In addition to critiquing and promoting a reconceptualization of human subjectivity, Fineman argues that vulnerability must be the foundation of our notion of state responsibility towards individuals and institutions.[27] Specifically, a vulnerability analysis grounds the normative argument that “the state must be more responsive to, and responsible for, vulnerability,”[28] where the state is understood broadly to include both government institutions and actors, as well as the legal and administrative systems that structure these institutions, empower government actors, and regulate their activities. Here, Fineman deploys the notion of “resilience” to vulnerability, arguing that it must, as a product of relationships and societal institutions, rather than a natural characteristic of any individual, be fostered by the state. There are at least five types of assets or resources that jointly enhance resilience to vulnerability, including “physical assets, human assets, social assets, ecological or environmental assets, and existential assets.”[29] Given its socio-material production, resilience (like vulnerability) is asymmetrically allocated and accumulated. According to Fineman, the state has a responsibility not only to create, monitor, and ameliorate the institutions and relationships necessary for distributing resilience-conferring resources, but also to ensure that the dissolution of these assets is carried out in a just and equitable manner.[30] Under vulnerability theory’s approach to addressing injustice and inequality, focus extends beyond identity-based discrimination of individuals and groups to include consideration of how institutions structure and respond to vulnerabilities, leading Fineman to label it as a “post-identity” analysis with potential for achieving a substantive vision of equality.[31]

2. Critiques and Refinements of Vulnerability Theory: Humility and Privilege

Fineman’s theory has been exceedingly influential but also contested. Scholarly engagement with the vulnerability approach over the last decade, including criticism of its post-identity inquiry, justification for government expansion, and prescriptive value (to name a few examples), has generated valuable theoretical revisions and refinements.[32] Below, I address some key critiques and their resulting modifications of vulnerability theory that are of particular relevance in the context of ecological law. All of these critiques raise concerns about the essentializing, universalizing, and paternalizing elements of Fineman’s argumentation.

Several scholars have criticized vulnerability theory’s post-identity approach and its failure to account for the role that identity and intersectionality play in both the creation and imposition of structural and systemic injustices.[33] For Angela Harris, one of vulnerability theory’s main flaws is its “susceptibility to universalizing language and policies that ignore social injustice and thereby perpetuate it.”[34] Harris argues that even though Fineman asserts that vulnerability theory necessitates attention to the institutional drivers of vulnerability, there remains a significant risk that vulnerability will continue to be understood in a manner that pathologizes the identities and/or circumstances of the population or individual in question, and that such an understanding will continue to be used in policy-making.[35] To correct for this weakness, Harris recommends the incorporation of an anti-subordination principle (which she says could simply be called “humility”), a lens developed and used frequently by critical legal scholars, into the vulnerability analysis, in order to minimize vulnerability’s potential to mask power relations and the social and political roots of injustice.[36]

Frank Rudy Cooper has similarly argued that “vulnerability theory is wrong when it implicitly suggests that the constructedness of identities makes them unimportant in relation to our shared human condition of being vulnerable.”[37] While he agrees with vulnerability theory’s embrace of interdependence, critique of autonomy, and demand for a state that is responsive to substantive inequality, Cooper argues that vulnerability theory’s potential will be undermined if it fails to account for the effects of identities.[38] He suggests that the incorporation of an analysis of privilege, which is aligned with Harris’ anti-subordination principle, into vulnerability theory will “explain how systems of power both benefit some identities and make others more vulnerable.”[39] Although Fineman includes the concept of privilege in her work on vulnerability, her focus is on the way that privilege is mediated through societal institutions. Cooper instead advocates for a notion of relative privilege that is constructed based on intersecting identities, such as race and gender, that inform both social norms and institutional practices.[40] In turn, he argues that vulnerability theory should include an analysis of the context-dependent nature of how identities are privileged in different ways.

Anna Grear does not raise explicit concerns with Fineman’s post-identity approach, though she infuses Fineman’s analysis with a new materialist ontology before arguing that vulnerability theory’s inclusion of biophysical and social-material context allows it to “be extremely sensitive to the power relations intrinsic to the discursive construction of socio-materiality”[41] and necessitates continuous attention to systemic injustices and other forces that shape individual vulnerability.[42] In my view, Grear’s work best captures the fact that vulnerability theory’s main ambition, once the full implications of embodied vulnerability are fleshed out, is to emphasize, account for, and respond to the lived experiences of vulnerability in its varying forms and degrees. This includes the way vulnerability is constructed by power relations, socioeconomic injustices, historical and ongoing systemic oppressions and colonial violence, social marginalization, political disenfranchisement, and intersecting identities, as has been thoroughly demonstrated by queer theorists, women of colour feminists, Indigenous scholars, critical race theorists, environmental justice scholars, and others.[43]

With that said, folding in Cooper and Harris’ refinements to include humility and privilege explicitly in the vulnerability analysis, though not absolutely necessary, can help to focus attention on these existing elements, particularly once vulnerability theory is extended to the more-than-human (as will be explained below). On this account, Fineman’s vulnerability theory has particular relevance for ecological law, given that patterned distributions of inequity and injustice among human beings are endemic and constitutive characteristics of the socioecological crisis.[44] Colonialism and racial capitalism have rendered countries in the Global South and marginalized populations, such as Indigenous peoples, particularly vulnerable to the impacts of a socioecological crisis they did not create, while enriching and empowering the Global North, multinational corporations, and a small number of privileged humans who bear the greatest responsibility for ecological destruction and continue to engage in violent practices of extraction, exploitation, and dispossession.[45]

3. Extensions of Vulnerability Theory to the More-Than-Human: Ecological Vulnerability

Fineman’s vulnerability theory does not explicitly recognize the ecological embeddedness of human beings and their interdependence with the more-than-human world, nor discuss the vulnerability of non-human entities and its implications for the concept of human vulnerability. Despite this deficiency, several scholars have applied and extended the vulnerability analysis in the context of environmental issues and the complex array of non-human and trans-human beings, systems, and processes.[46] Under what I call an “ecological vulnerability frame,” there is a focus on the material embodiment of human beings and the interconnectedness of humans in a web of complex, interdependent relationships. These considerations are critically important for exploring what valuable theoretical insights vulnerability theory may contribute to the development and refinement of the foundational concepts and principles of ecological law. Below, I explore a few key expansions of vulnerability theory, all of which embrace more-than-human vulnerability and human embeddedness in the Earth’s living systems.

The first extension of Fineman’s vulnerability theory that is particularly relevant in the context of ecological law is Anna Grear’s “vulnerability of the living order.”[47] Grear argues that vulnerability, as an incident of physical embodiment and materiality, is shared not only with other humans but also with the rest of the more-than-human world (i.e., the living order).[48] This intertwinement of humanity and the rest of the more-than-human world demands reformulation of Western laws and ethics to respond to this universal condition of vulnerability.[49]

There are two scholars whose work on vulnerability theory share a great deal with Grear’s vulnerability of the living order. Katie Woolaston proposes a concept of “ecological vulnerability” to account for both human vulnerability to ecological degradation, as well as the shared vulnerability of all living beings and of the life systems on Earth.[50] With his concept of “earth system vulnerability,” Louis J Kotzé similarly captures the ontological entanglement of human and more-than-human vulnerability.[51] One of the strengths of Kotzé’s approach is the emphasis on the inequitable allocation and experience of human vulnerability and resilience and its ethical and legal implications.[52] Furthermore, the concept of earth system vulnerability extends these profound patterns of differently distributed vulnerability to more-than-human beings and systems.[53] These systems include nation states, which may themselves be considered ecologically vulnerable systems, but differentially so, given the historical and ongoing influence and violence of forces such as colonialism, racial capitalism, and globalization.[54]

Another relevant extension of Fineman’s theory for ecological law is Angela Harris’s concept of ecological vulnerability.[55] Harris argues that Fineman’s theory of vulnerability can assist in bridging a gap between critical legal theory and environmental law scholarship, with some slight modifications.[56] Similar to Grear, Harris extends Fineman’s concept of vulnerability to include both the relationship between, and the indivisibility of, humans and the non-human world — in other words, she conceives of the embodied vulnerable subject as inseparable from nature and nature itself as equally vulnerable.[57] Vulnerability, therefore, is “produced not only by human interdependency, but also the interdependency of the human body with a complex array of nonhuman and trans-human systems.”[58] Harris labels this extension of Fineman’s theory “ecological vulnerability” and argues that it requires a corresponding extension of state responsibility to the natural world (including both non-human entities and processes) upon which human survival and flourishing depend.[59]

I propose gathering these related extensions of Fineman’s vulnerability theory to all the more-than-human species, ecosystems, and organisms on Earth under the heading of “ecological vulnerability.” As a distinct frame, ecological vulnerability highlights ecological embeddedness and human-nature interdependencies. In Section D, I will apply the ecological vulnerability lens to ecological law and discuss some of its implications for legal reform, practice, and pedagogy in Canada. Before engaging in that analysis, however, Section C summarizes the emerging framework of ecological law and its key features, concepts, and principles, including its commitment to socioecological justice.

C. The Emerging Paradigm of Ecological Law

Ecological law is an alternative legal paradigm that aims to better protect the foundations of life on Earth in the face of the global socioecological crisis. As studies demonstrating the catastrophic impacts and future risks of runaway climate change, biodiversity loss, and environmental pollution continue to mount, it has become clear that contemporary environmental law has failed to prevent or respond to some of the most consequential challenges facing humanity.[60] As this awareness grows, scholars around the world have responded with new approaches to law that recognize the need for an Earth-centered legal paradigm and the importance of respecting the ecological limits of the planet.[61] As a term to describe a distinct framework for law and governance, ecological law began to appear within the past decade, driven in large part by the work of the Ecological Law and Governance Association (ELGA).[62] Ecological law resonates with, and can be understood as an umbrella term capturing, a number of different ecological approaches to law, including Earth jurisprudence/Wild Law,[63] Earth System law,[64] the rights of nature movement,[65] ecological constitutionalism,[66] critical environmental law,[67] Klaus Bosselmann’s “principle of sustainability,”[68] and David Boyd’s concept of “sustainability law.”[69]

In 2016, the Ethics Specialist Group of the World Commission on Environmental Law of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature created the Oslo Manifesto for Ecological Law and Governance (the “Oslo Manifesto”) to “harness the ideas to date on ecological approaches to law, give ecological law a higher profile among legal scholars and practitioners and establish a process for ongoing refinement of ecological law.”[70] The Oslo Manifesto is the founding document for ELGA, which was launched a year later by a multi-disciplinary group of practitioners, scholars, and advocates convening in Siena, Italy. In addition to acknowledging the inability of existing legal systems to prevent degradation of the ecological conditions necessary for sustaining life, the Oslo Manifesto provides the following definition of ecological law:

The ecological approach to law is based on ecocentrism, holism, and intra-/intergenerational and interspecies justice. From this perspective, or worldview, the law will recognise ecological interdependencies and no longer favour humans over nature and individual rights over collective responsibilities. Essentially, ecological law internalizes the natural living conditions of human existence and makes them the basis of all law, including constitutions, human rights, property rights, corporate rights and state sovereignty.[71]

Ecological law is seen, therefore, not as a new specialty area or field of law, but rather as a novel paradigm that permeates all other areas of law, as well as social and economic infrastructure.[72]

One of the core functions of ecological law is to challenge traditional Western liberal ontoepistemologies upon which contemporary environmental law is based, including unlimited economic growth, philosophical individualism, utilitarianism, human-nature dualism, and anthropocentrism.[73] In place of these concepts, ecological law favours “ecocentrism, holism, systems-thinking, human-nature interdependencies and human-inclusive ecological integrity.”[74] Among its main objectives, ecological law aims to restrain economic activity within the ecological limits of the planet, restore and preserve the health and integrity of ecosystems, and create an ecologically just society.[75] The philosophical and theoretical foundations of ecological law are complex, wide-ranging, and subject to ongoing debate. Although I review a few of these key underpinnings in this section, I will not attempt to engage in a comprehensive exploration in the limited scope of this article. It is important to note, however, that ethics, and ethical engagement, are considered critical components of ecological law and governance.[76]

A leading scholar and advocate of ecological law in Canada, Geoffrey Garver, recently articulated a vision of ecological law that is premised on a primary goal of fostering “a mutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.”[77] Garver defines this as a relationship “in which humans collectively see themselves as members, not masters, of the entire community of life on Earth and interact with Earth and the life it supports respectfully and ‘for the benefit of the larger community as well as ourselves.’”[78] In order to foster a mutually enhancing human-Earth relationship, primacy is granted to global ecological limits over economic considerations, and human activity is required to operate within these boundaries.[79] This is labelled a “limits-insistent narrative” and is one of the eleven key features of ecological law articulated by Garver as the necessary minimum requirements for facilitating the transition from environmental to ecological law.[80]

As the concept of ecological limits suggests, ecological law has been significantly influenced by the science of ecology.[81] Ecological law is “grounded in the science of how the Earth works and of complex systemic thresholds in the global ecosystem, and therefore combines legal principles with scientific laws of ecology as expressed, for example, in planetary boundaries.”[82] In 2009, a group of international researchers led by Johan Rockström published a report outlining nine planetary boundaries that define a “safe operating space for humanity” and beyond which there is a risk of abrupt changes to the Earth System that could be “catastrophic to human well-being.”[83] Ecological law aims to align human behaviour and activity such that these biophysical limits are respected by establishing rules rooted in scientific knowledge of ecological sustainability, as well as normative choices about how to structure human society in order to best foster flourishing of the entire Earth community.[84]

Ecological law scholars acknowledge that its concepts, values, and principles are not entirely new. Rather, many ecological values and principles have been around and practised within other legal systems and cultures, notably many Indigenous legal traditions, for centuries.[85] There are synergies and rich connections between ecological law and the features of some Indigenous legal traditions, where the land is a source of both law and reciprocal relationships of responsibility.[86] The underlying principles, values, and concepts of ecological law as its own distinct legal framework, however, are still in their infancy and in need of further debate, analysis, and improvement.[87] In the section that follows, I apply an ecological vulnerability frame to analyze two key debates within the emerging scholarship on ecological law in the hopes of contributing a valuable perspective to this discussion and providing guidance for ecological approaches to law in Canada.

D. Intersubjectivity and Responsibilities: Application of Vulnerability Theory to Ecological Law

Ecological vulnerability is a powerful tool for critically exploring key concepts of ecological law and their ability to contribute to ecological law’s goals of restoring and preserving the health and integrity of Earth’s life-sustaining systems and securing an ecologically just society. Given that the foundational principles, values, and features of ecological law are still in the process of being co-developed and co-defined, the time is ripe for raising new questions and exploring complex issues of power and injustice through the lens of ecological vulnerability. At the heart of ecological law is a concern for socioecological justice, including both inter-species and intra-species justice (comprising intergenerational justice, climate justice, environmental justice, and others), an objective that vulnerability theory can assist in critically exploring and addressing.[88]

In this section, I apply ecological vulnerability to ongoing discussions within ecological law regarding two key concepts: (1) the adoption of an ecocentric approach to law; and (2) the role of responsibilities to care for the Earth. This analysis involves both ethical and practical considerations. In many ways, the ontological stance and approach to legal subjectivity adopted by ecological law influences the way in which the question about responsibilities is addressed. I will highlight this relationship between subjectivity and responsibilities below.

1. Legal Subjectivity and the Human-Earth Relationship

Many ecological law scholars argue that Western law’s adoption of anthropocentrism is a main cause of the socioecological crisis and that it should be abandoned.[89] Anthropocentrism is understood by this dominant strand of ecological law as a human-centered perspective that perceives humans as separate from, superior to, and in control of nature. This conception of the relationship between human beings and the natural world is one of exploitation and domination, which serves to:

justify and promote ecological ravaging; aggravate the enclosure of the commons; justify and increase the dispossession of indigenous peoples and other marginalised groups; perpetuate corporate neo-colonialism; and intensify the asymmetrically distributed patterns of advantage and disadvantage that prevail in society, while deepening inter- and intra-species hierarchies.[90]

In other words, as the philosophical foundation of the relationship between human beings and the rest of the non-human world, anthropocentrism creates social and political inequities, power imbalances, unjust hierarchies, and harmful othering.[91] Consequently, it is argued that legal anthropocentrism is “a radical failure of justice for human beings as well as for animals and the environment,” and it must be critically examined and replaced.[92]

Ecological law scholars appear to be united in their criticism of contemporary law’s anthropocentrism, but the perspectives on what narrative or onto-epistemology should replace it are less cohesive. One of the most commonly proposed alternatives is that ecological law should embrace ecocentrism.[93] As explained by De Lucia:

This narrative, which operates in accordance with a binary and linear logic, is sometimes expressed in normative terms (ecocentrism ought to replace anthropocentrism) and sometimes in descriptive terms (ecocentrism is replacing anthropocentrism) — albeit in most cases the two perspectives overlap.[94]

This mirrors the shift from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism that has been advocated by many environmental philosophers.[95] In this context, ecocentrism is generally understood to reflect a recognition of nature as having intrinsic value and as a holistic and relational system that includes humans as only one element.[96] 

Other scholars, however, argue for a “blended anthropocentric/ecocentric approach” or a “human-inclusive ecocentric approach” within ecological law.[97] These approaches recognize humans as an integral part of ecosystems, but also as having a unique responsibility for protecting the ecosystems.[98] Garver, for example, proposes an ecocentric orientation to law and governance that explicitly recognizes the inclusion of concern for human life and human-nature integration.[99] Ecocentric by name, but more of a blended approach in theory, this ontological stance “is not indifferent to human survival and flourishing but is based on the search of a dynamic equilibrium between the various interests at stake in the context of the functioning of each single ecosystem.”[100]

There are also scholars who caution against abandonment of an anthropocentric approach to law, given the reality of the current era — often termed the Anthropocene — in which humans have become a geological force.[101] Burdon has pointed out that ecological law scholars appear to be primarily concerned about the harms of normative anthropocentrism, which he describes as a paradigm that both privileges human beings in its inquiries and develops normative prescriptions on the basis of assumptions of the superiority of human beings, their capacities, and their values.[102] In his view, descriptive anthropocentrism — paradigms that emerge from, centre upon, or are ordered around human beings — has become an objective fact of the Anthropocene.[103] Burdon argues that instead of expending energy arguing for a blanket rejection of anthropocentrism, “we need to come to terms with descriptive anthropocentrism so that we can grapple with its normative implications.”[104] He calls for ecological law to embrace an environmental ethics and law based on descriptive anthropocentrism.[105] One of the most significant normative implications that appears to stem from this proposal is the corresponding human responsibilities towards the Earth that come along with the immense power humans have amassed in the Anthropocene.

So, what can vulnerability theory contribute to this ongoing debate? First, it opens new avenues for critically and creatively engaging with the concept of anthropocentrism, especially the relationship between human beings and the more-than-human world that is at its heart. In particular, vulnerability theory, by advocating for replacement of the liberal subject with a vulnerable subject based on social and material realities, opens the space for critical discussions about legal subjectivity and the law’s role in both causing and addressing vulnerabilities and the socioecological crisis, including through responsibilities.

Although normative anthropocentrism has been a cause of significant injustice for human beings, animals, and the environment, vulnerability theory reveals that it is not human centrality per se that is the biggest concern. It is, rather, the fact that the “human” at the core of anthropocentrism is white, male, disembodied, and separate from his surrounding context, both social and natural.[106] This results in an othering and marginalization of all who don’t fit this mold, including the vast majority of human beings and all of nature. To put it differently, the exclusions and closures of this conception of the human unite “innumerable human beings, non-human animals and the entire living order in a set of linked oppressions.”[107] The gendered aspect of the nature/culture, objects/subjects, and mind/body binaries that define anthropocentrism have been identified and critiqued by feminists for decades.[108] As explained by Grear, the view of nature and the body as external and separate from the rational mind of “man” underpins the Western worldview of nature as “an exploitable object to be consumed, used and turned into profit.”[109]

The second important insight revealed through the lens of vulnerability is that a pure ecocentric approach is not a valid alternative to anthropocentrism. In particular, it does not account for the implications of ecological vulnerability, including the relational and interdependent connection between human beings and non-human entities and processes. Ecocentrism still places something in the centre (i.e., ecosystems/nature) and thus maintains a form of othering, hierarchical relationships, and binaries between humans and nature. This can mask and hinder adequate responses to intra-species injustices (i.e., social justice issues among humans), which have not only been linked to ecological destruction[110] but are also one of the key objectives of a transition from environmental to ecological law and essential to socioecological justice. This is largely because such an ontological stance presupposes anthropocentrism as unequivocally negative, thereby precluding critical engagement with the “human” or “Anthropos” at the centre of anthropocentrism and situated in opposition to nature in ecocentrism.[111]

Vulnerability theory, with its emphasis on embodiment, embeddedness, and interdependence, invites recognition of a new form of legal subjectivity that is aligned with the complexities of a highly interconnected world and that can transcend the dualisms of liberal philosophy that underpin contemporary environmental law. The expansions of vulnerability theory to include a conceptualization of the relational connection between human beings and the more-than-human have significant onto-epistemological implications that directly challenge anthropocentrism, as well as the potential to transcend the ecocentric/anthropocentric binary and debate.

Grounded in the extension of vulnerability theory that highlights the interrelatedness and embeddedness of humans with and within the rest of the living world, Grear proposes a new form of legal subjectivity: intersubjectivity. Under intersubjectivity, all life on Earth, including humans, is seen as one interrelational, interdependent vulnerable subject:

If we were to replace the bifurcated, disembodied Cartesian construct of “humanity” with a philosophical account expressing the nature of being itself as a form of inter-being (the interrelational coupling of self/world//world/self) and to adopt this as the most real, (as ontologically and epistemologically prior,) then perhaps there is a genuine chance that human subjectivity, and the legal subjectivity of “humans” and “non-humans” alike, can be reimagined as a form of intersubjectivity.[112]

In this way, vulnerability theory can assist in overcoming the anthropocentrism/ecocentrism divide in ecological law scholarship. A vulnerability analysis opens up the myriad complexities inherent in the ecological law discourse and emphasizes power relations and socio-material realities that are hidden by both anthropocentric and ecocentric frameworks. In terms of epistemology, Grear’s concept of the vulnerable living order

invites us to reflect upon the incompleteness of our knowing, and the related necessity of moving away from a hegemonic or “monocultural” epistemology towards an epistemology that has more in common with a diverse ecology of insights, is able to embrace systemic complexity and celebrates a methodology of ongoing, active, reflective and reflexive self-critical engagement.[113]

Ecological vulnerability has profound implications for ecological law’s conceptualization of the relationship between human beings and the rest of the living world, as well as for legal subjectivity more broadly. It opens up ecological law to respond more consciously to the vulnerability of the interconnected beings and systems of Earth and to more fully embrace the complexity of diverse ways of knowing, broader questions about inter- and intra-species justice, and the current era’s socioecological challenges. This has implications for legal personhood in Canada, including as it relates to more-than-human constitutionalism and the recognition of the rights of non-human animals[114] and of nature/ecosystems.[115] One example of the rights of nature movement in Canada is the declaration of the legal personhood of the Muteshekau Shipu (Magpie River) in Québec by the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit and the Minganie Regional County Municipality.[116] In addition to reframing legal subjectivity, ecological vulnerability’s novel paradigm for the human-nature relationship has implications for how to conceptualize responsibilities and the legal and normative mechanisms for enforcing them in ecological law, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

2. Ecological Responsibilities: Care for One Another and the Earth

Another important conversation taking place within emerging ecological law scholarship involves the role that human responsibility to care for one another and the Earth should occupy and whether responsibilities for collective well-being should take priority over individual rights. In this section, I explore some of the theoretical insights ecological vulnerability contributes to this discussion.

Before jumping into the analysis, I briefly clarify how the concepts of rights and responsibilities will be used in this section. The concept of rights will incorporate the two main types of rights that are included in the environmental law context: the rights of nature and environmental human rights.[117] In one sense, responsibilities can refer to the reciprocal obligations of a legal right. The concept of responsibility referred to in this article, however, extends beyond this purely correlative function to include those obligations that emerge from an alternative form of legal subjectivity and recognition of the interdependency of relationships among and between people and the more-than-human world.[118] Often these are ethical, moral, or normative obligations to take action to meet particular needs, but they may also be inscribed in positive law.[119]

There are several different approaches to rights that can be gleaned from the scholarship on ecological law. Certain ecological approaches to law, including the rights of nature movement and Earth jurisprudence, fully embrace the language of rights and advocate for their use in tackling environmental challenges. Earth jurisprudence stresses that all beings, not only humans, have rights and that recognition of these rights is essential to aligning human laws with the laws of nature.[120] Within the strands of ecological law that embrace rights as a positive mechanism for fostering ecological justice, scholars have proposed a “pairing” or a “balancing” of rights and responsibilities.[121] For example, both care and relational responsibility of humans towards Earth have been identified as principles of Earth jurisprudence, along with rights.[122] Other scholars disregard the potential of rights altogether, taking the position that (as they are currently understood) “human rights are unlikely to offer socioecological justice.”[123] Criticisms of rights discourse include allegations that human rights and environmental rights are not radical enough to actually disrupt the hegemonic geopolitical and economic power structures driving the socioecological crisis.[124]  Natarajan’s critique includes an argument that the language of rights “understates the obligations and responsibilities that come from living in complex integrated communities and ecosystems.”[125] In addition to finding environmental human rights a woefully inadequate response to socioecological injustice, she dismisses the transformative potential of affording rights to nature, noting that “[a]dding more entitled subjects into a crowded legal space is at best mere symbolism, and at worst increases the conflict and contradiction within an already adversarial, contingent and ineffective rights framework.”[126]

As a heuristic device, ecological vulnerability assists in exposing the limitations of rights and critically interrogating their suitability for achieving justice in the face of the socioecological crisis. Furthermore, it reveals the obligations of care that correspond with a recognition of vulnerability as a universal condition of humans and all other life on Earth. An essential implication of the ecological vulnerability frame is that once it is recognized that the human subject is interdependent and ecologically embedded within the more-than-human world, there are corresponding obligations of ecological care, which must be embraced and vigorously fulfilled.[127] Furthermore, a focus on ecological vulnerability moves us away from questions about the prescriptive value of rights and into consideration of the systems and practices driving environmental degradation and injustice and the ways of radically upending this state of affairs.[128]

Vulnerability theory’s emphasis on uncovering and challenging distributions of power and privilege has particular relevance to the conversation about the allocation and substance of ecological responsibilities. Specifically, vulnerability theory fosters critical engagement with, and helps to answer, the following questions: who is responsible, to whom are these obligations owed, and what do these obligations entail?[129] Vulnerability theory emphasizes state responsibility,[130] but existing scholarship highlights that states are not the only actors with obligations. Corporations,[131] communities/collectives,[132] individuals,[133] and even non-humans have responsibilities, too.[134] Furthermore, vulnerability theory is attentive to the particular, inequitable distribution of vulnerability and the corresponding greater responsibility of those individuals who are most privileged or advantaged by the dominant systems to respond to the vulnerability of other humans and the Earth.[135] In other words, it calls for a differentiated understanding of ecological responsibilities.

In terms of considering to whom responsibility is owed, ecological vulnerability entails obligations to respond to those beings, systems, places, and communities with the greatest vulnerability — that is, those that are currently and/or have historically been disproportionately harmed by the systems driving the socioecological crisis.[136] These responsibilities extend beyond care for other humans to care for the Earth, land, and other species.[137] With respect to state responsibility to protect and support non-human animals, Jessica Eisen has argued that a constitutional imperative stems from two features of the radical vulnerability of animals: complete political exclusion and the “pervasive infliction of institutionalized, legalized, routinized, commercialized harm” that is maintained by the legal system.[138] The emphasis on inter- and intra-species justice that emerges from a vulnerability framework also extends beyond the inequitable distribution of vulnerabilities and resilience in the present generation to responsibility for future generations and the intergenerational needs of society.[139] In this way, a vulnerability framework encourages exploration of how responsibilities might help achieve ecological law’s goal of building an ecologically just society.

In addition to highlighting the necessity of responding to ecological vulnerability through responsibilities, vulnerability theory provides a starting point for imagining what these responsibilities might entail. As the analysis above highlights, there is a deep connection between responsibility and justice. Indeed, ecological responsibilities serve to advance socioecological justice. This includes interspecies justice, intergenerational justice, and intragenerational justice, which itself includes environmental justice, climate justice, and racial justice. In terms of states’ obligations, Harris has proposed that the responsibility to respond to ecological vulnerability could be reflected in strong constitutional or statutory norms.[140] Lynda Collins’ recent book on the ecological constitution contains numerous compelling proposals for incorporating into constitutional law the following principles, all of which relate to ecological responsibility: ecological sustainability, intergenerational equity and the public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, the rights of nature, the precautionary principle and non-regression, and the recognition of planetary boundaries to secure the ecological foundations of society.[141] In Canada, embedding state ecological responsibilities in the Constitution could occur through amendment, judicial interpretation, or enactment. Vulnerability theory can also be used to breakdown the public/private divide as it relates to international and local/domestic laws and public and private actors and to highlight Canada’s responsibility to cooperate internationally with other states to address transnational and global environmental problems.[142] This would include Canada’s responsibility to take action to reduce its fair share of global greenhouse gas emissions and to contribute to the development and implementation of mechanisms to compensate poorer nations for loss and damage from climate-driven disasters in accordance with its commitments under the Paris Agreement.[143]

While a comprehensive exploration of the way in which ecological vulnerability shapes the content of individual responsibilities is beyond the scope of this article, I propose here to reflect on a few implications of ecological responsibilities for environmental lawyers and scholars in Canada as they relate to teaching, learning, and practising law.[144] First, ecological responsibilities should include a requirement of environmental law scholarship and pedagogy to be more attentive to the drivers of socioecological injustices, including colonialism, liberal legal subjectivity (i.e., anthropocentrism), and other Western worldviews underpinning Canadian laws and policies.[145] As Estair Van Wagner has explained,

[l]earning and teaching about land law, environmental law, or natural resource law is always necessarily learning and teaching about Indigenous law and relations with the earth — either as a form of continued erasure in their absence from the curriculum, or as an uncomfortable and complicated attempt to engage with the original laws of the land, confront our history, and think about how we can do things differently.[146]

Along the same line, ecological responsibilities could also include the expansion of Indigenous and non-Indigenous land-based[147] and place-based[148] learning in Canadian law schools, teaching about the fact that all law, including Canadian constitutional law, reflects particular choices, narratives, and worldviews,[149] and encouraging non-Indigenous lawyers, legal scholars, and students to listen to and learn from Indigenous peoples.[150] While these responsibilities can be understood as flowing from the ecological vulnerability framework and ecological law, they also stem from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s calls to action, requiring Canadian law schools to rethink what they are teaching and how they go about delivering their curriculum.[151]

Another key aspect of responsibility can be drawn from Grear’s scholarship on the vulnerable living order: specifically, the concept of “epistemic humility.” As embodied, vulnerable subjects, humans are always positioned, and their view of the world is always limited or incomplete. Consequently, Grear argues that vulnerability requires that humans embrace a “radical epistemological openness” to the insight and ways of knowing of others and an epistemological responsibility towards those most disadvantaged and harmed by the distribution of power inherent in the dominant systems.[152] This epistemic humility that stems from vulnerability, of which subject-positionality is a central feature, “offers potentially transformative forms of inclusion, responsibilization and openness to multiplicity and to complexity.”[153] In this way, ecological vulnerability is aligned with ecological law’s openness to legal pluralism,[154] including the adoption of non-Western understandings of law and ecology that might align better with the principles of ecological law.[155] In practice, embracing a plurality of perspectives would require, at a minimum, the transformation of existing institutions of public participation.[156] One way to increase access to procedural environmental justice in Canada would be to adopt new or amend existing procedural environmental rights legislation. Guidance could be taken from the Escazú Agreement, a regional instrument that sets out legally binding international standards on access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters.[157] Signed by two dozen Latin American and Caribbean UN member states, the agreement is also the first legally binding instrument to contain specific provisions regarding the protection of environmental rights and land defenders.[158]  

An application of vulnerability theory would extend ecological law’s embrace of legal pluralism to a broader, more radical epistemological responsibility to pay attention to patterns of injustice and to stay open to multiplicities and different forms of knowledge, including the agency and knowledge of non-human beings and systems.[159] Indigenous environmental justice scholar Deborah McGregor has argued that “the knowledge we need to survive as humanity may not derive strictly from the ‘human realm’; we need to revitalize and relearn the traditions that will ensure all knowledge is respected, including that from our various nonhuman relatives.”[160] Epistemic humility requires thinking not only about ways in which Western and colonial law can be transformed to address socioecological injustices, but also to be open to multiple and alternative forms of governance. In Canada, this would include providing Indigenous peoples with the space and support to exercise their own legal orders and governing authority over their lands and resources as well as restoring Indigenous jurisdiction over existing environmental regulatory processes, “such as environmental assessment, permitting, and climate monitoring.”[161]

There will be immense challenges with respect to the widespread adoption of ecological responsibilities. Speaking about the mechanism for implementing ecological responsibilities, Burden has commented that: “while obligations can be rationally advanced, their acceptance and enactment ultimately depends on cultivating feelings of care and concern for the plurality in which we are immersed.”[162] He also believes, however, not only in ethics, but also that law can and must be oriented around human beings and the obligations they owe to one another and the Earth in order to effectively respond to the complexity and vulnerability of life on this planet. With the application of a vulnerability framework, ecological law has the potential to meet this challenge and to foster the discharge of responsibilities to care for one another and the Earth in a manner that is conscious of, and responsive to, the differential distribution of vulnerability.

E. Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that ecological vulnerability is a powerful heuristic for exploring key features of the emerging paradigm of ecological law and assisting in the transition from contemporary environmental law to ecological law in Canada. In addition to contributing relational ontological and epistemological considerations, vulnerability theory helps to raise important questions about power, inequities, and injustices, to deconstruct taken-for-granted assumptions about the liberal legal subject, and to encourage a form of self-reflective criticism within emerging scholarship on ecological law. Furthermore, it invites ecological law to more consciously respond to the vulnerability of the entire, interconnected living order and to more fully embrace the complexity of current socioecological challenges, diverse ways of knowing, and broader questions about inter- and intra-species justice. These insights from vulnerability theory have a valuable role to play in developing and refining the principles and concepts of ecological law in order to advance its goals of constraining economic activity within ecological limits, restoring and preserving the health of ecosystems, and securing an ecologically just society.

Recognition of vulnerability as a universal trait of humans and the more-than-human world necessitates significant changes to, if not complete rejection of, existing liberal theories of legal subjectivity and a critical assessment and reimagination of individual, collective, and state ecological responsibilities. This has profound implications for ecological law’s conceptualization of the relationship between human beings and the rest of the living world and for its rejection of anthropocentrism in favour of an ecocentric approach to law. Engagement with vulnerability theory inspires the adoption of intersubjectivity, an alternative form of legal subjectivity that is better aligned with the myriad complexities of Earth’s highly interconnected worlds and that transcends the dualism of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, both of which reinforce problematic categories and hierarchies that serve to oppress marginalized groups of humans and nature.

A vulnerability framework emphasizes the importance of responsibilities to care for one another and the other species and systems of the more-than-human world in the paradigm shift from environmental to ecological law. With its main objective of arguing for responsiveness to and responsibility for vulnerability, vulnerability theory reveals the need for a full and inclusive account of responsibility that includes not only a responsive state but responsibility of the most privileged in society to address the vulnerabilities constituted and exacerbated by the socioecological crisis. Although legal and normative obligations will not be a panacea to the challenges ahead, they are one mechanism among many possibilities that might help ecological law achieve its intended aims and contribute to socioecological justice.

I hope that the reflections offered in this article stimulate future research and scholarly engagement with ecological vulnerability as a valuable tool in the ongoing process of defining, refining, and practising ecological law, particularly in Canada. Notably, further exploration is particularly warranted regarding the mechanisms for enforcing responsibilities to care for the Earth at various scales from the local to the global. The vulnerability framework, with its emphasis on complexity, materiality, distributions of power, epistemic openness, and critical interrogation, has the potential to positively influence development in these areas and beyond.


*     PhD Candidate, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law and graduate member of the Centre for Environmental Law and Global Sustainability at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law. I am grateful for the financial support of the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law Graduate Scholarship in Environmental Law and Sustainability and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program. I also want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback, which helped to strengthen this article. All mistakes are my own.

[1]     I use the term “socioecological crisis” throughout this article to define the range of interconnected social and ecological crises that define the current era, including, but not limited to, global warming, unprecedented biodiversity loss and ecological degradation, deepening economic inequality, rising authoritarianism and right-wing extremism, and the ongoing dispossession of and violence against Indigenous peoples. See, generally, Carmen G Gonzalez, “Racial Capitalism and the Ecological Crises of the Anthropocene” (2022) 21 Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 323 at 324.

[2]     Massimiliano Montini, “The Transformation of Environmental Law into Ecological Law” in Kirsten Anker et al, eds, From Environmental to Ecological Law (New York: Routledge, 2021) 11 at 14–15. See, generally, Geoffrey Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis: A Legal Guide for Harmony on Earth (New York: Routledge, 2021); Kirsten Anker et al, eds, From Environmental to Ecological Law (New York: Routledge, 2021); Klaus Bosselmann & Prue Taylor, eds, Ecological Approaches to Environmental Law (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2017).

[3]     See Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition” (2008) 20:1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 [Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject]; Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State” (2010) 60:2 Emory Law Journal 251; Martha Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear, eds, Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2016) [Fineman & Grear, Vulnerability Reflections]; Martha Albertson Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality” (2017) 4:3 Oslo Law Review 133; Martha Albertson Fineman, “Vulnerability and Social Justice” (2019) 53 Valparaiso University Law Review 341.

[4]     Fineman’s theory of vulnerability can be considered a relational approach to legal analysis, given its emphasis on the constitutive nature of relations. See, for example, Sara L Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environmental and Climate Justice” (2019) 31:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 151 at 155; Angela P Harris, “Toward a Law and Political Economy Approach to Environmental Justice” in Sumudu A Atapattu, Carmen G Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021) 453 at 468.

[5]     Vulnerability theory is inspired by feminism and a gendered lens, but does not focus predominantly, nor exclusively, on gender. Furthermore, the concept has been used and theorized in a variety of different areas of feminist inquiry and practice. As such, it can be considered a “feminist-inspired” theory. See, generally, Anne M Choike, Martha Albertson Fineman & Cheryl Wade, “The Importance of Incorporating Feminist Perspectives in Corporate Law: Analyzing the Foundations and Future Directions of Feminist and Feminist-Inspired Corporate Law Scholarship” in Anne M Choike, Usha R Rodrigues & Kelli Alces Williams, eds, Feminist Judgments: Corporate Law Rewritten (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023) 419 at 420; Ariadni Polychroniou, “Towards a Radical Feminist Resignification of Vulnerability: A Critical Juxtaposition of Judith Butler’s Post-Structuralist Philosophy and Martha Fineman’s Legal Theory” (2022) 25:2 Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory 113.

[6]     See, generally, Peter D Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene” (2020) 11:1–2 Transnational Legal Theory 33 at 37–38; Louis J Kotzé & Duncan French, “The Anthropocentric Ontology of International Environmental Law and the Sustainable Development Goals: Towards an Ecocentric Rule of Law in the Anthropocene” (2018) 7:1 Global Journal of Comparative Law 5 at 13. See Part D(1), below, for more a more detailed description of the meaning of anthropocentrism.

[7]     See, for example, Vito De Lucia, “Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in International Environmental Law” (2015) 27:1 Journal of Environmental Law 91; Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6; Kotzé & French, “The Anthropocentric Ontology of International Environmental Law and the Sustainable Development Goals,” above note 6. See also Part D(1), below.

[8]     See Montini, above note 2 at 18.

[9]     See, for example, Geoffrey Garver, “Are Rights of Nature Radical Enough for Ecological Law?” in Anker et al, above note 2 at 94 and 97; Peter D Burdon, “Obligations in the Anthropocene” (2020) 31 Law and Critique 309; Louis J Kotzé, “The Anthropocene, Earth System Vulnerability and Socio-ecological Injustice in an Age of Human Rights” (2019) 10:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 62 [Kotzé, “The Anthropocene”]. See also Part D(2), below.

[10]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3.

[11]   This theoretical expansion is reflected in the work of Fineman herself and other legal scholars and political theorists, of which only a small sampling is provided here. See, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, “Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth” (2014) 23:2 Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 307; Ani B Satz, “Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination” (2008) 83:4 Washington Law Review 513; Tanya Ni Mhuirthile, “Realising Gender Recognition: Rendering the Vulnerable Visible or Further Vulnerabilising the Invisible?” (2010) 41 UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology and Socio-Legal Studies, online: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680899; Helen Carr, “Housing the Vulnerable Subject: The English Context” in Fineman & Grear, eds, Vulnerability Reflections, above note 3 at 107; Maneesha Deckha, “Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals” (2015) 27:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 47; Shahrzad Fouladvand & Tony Ward, “Human Trafficking, Vulnerability and the State” (2019) 83:1 The Journal of Criminal Law 39; Melissa Mary Anderson & Dagmar Soennecken, “Locating the Concept of Vulnerability in Canada’s Refugee Policies at Home and Abroad” (2022) 11:25 Laws 1.

[12]   Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 8.

[13]   See Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality,” above note 3 at 142: “[V]ulnerability should be recognised as the primal human condition” [emphasis in original]. See also John Barry, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability: Human Flourishing in a Climate-Changed, Carbon Constrained World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 36 and 47: “[T]o be vulnerable is constitutive of what it means to be human”) [emphasis in original].

[14]   Fineman, “Vulnerability and Social Justice,” above note 3 at 358.

[15]   Institutions include but are not limited to the state, government institutions, laws, policies, courts, corporations, religious bodies, educational systems, the job market, and the family. Any and all public or private institutions or structures that are supported and legitimated by the state.

[16]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 9; Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality,” above note 3 at 142.

[17]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,” above note 3 at 273.

[18]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 10.

[19]   Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,” above note 3 at 269.

[20]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 10.

[21]   Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality” above note 3 at 142.

[22]   Fineman’s use of the term “state responsibility” is unrelated to and quite different from the complex, multifaceted public international law doctrine of state responsibility, which defines the circumstances in which a state may be found to have breached its international legal obligations, the legal consequences that flow from such a breach, and the mechanisms for enforcing those consequences. State responsibility for Fineman, and as it is used throughout this paper, is the notion of the state’s responsibility for the creation and maintenance of institutions, structures, and programs that organize society.

[23]   See Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 2.

[24]   See Fineman, “Vulnerability and Social Justice,” above note 3 at 356; Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 23: “[A]utonomy is not a naturally occurring characteristic of the human condition, but a product of social policy.” See, generally, Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: The New Press, 2004).

[25]   See Martha Albertson Fineman, “Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics” in Fineman & Grear, eds, Vulnerability Reflections, above note 3, 13 at 26: “Vulnerability’s values would be more egalitarian and collective in nature, preferring connection and interdependence rather than autonomy and independence in both political and personal visions.” See also Katie Woolaston, “Ecological Vulnerability and the Devolution of Individual Autonomy” (2018) 43 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 107 at 110.

[26]   Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 12.

[27]   Ibid at 8.

[28]   Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” above note 3 at 12. See also Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality,” above note 3.

[29]   Fineman, “Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics,” above note 25 at 22. See also Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,” above note 3 at 270–72.

[30]   Ibid at 272.

[31]   Ibid at 1, 17, and 21.

[32]   See, for example, Nina A Kohn, “Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government” (2014) 26:1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1; Illan rua Wall, “On Pain and the Sense of Human Rights” (2008) 29 Australian Feminist Law Review 53; Benjamin P Davis & Eric Aldieri, “Precarity and Resistance: A Critique of Martha Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory” (2021) 36 Hypatia 321; Polychroniou, above note 5; Catriona Mackenzie, “The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability” in Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers & Susan Dodds, eds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 33; Morgan Cloud, “More Than Utopia” in Fineman & Grear, eds, Vulnerability Reflections, above note 3, 77. Thorough engagement with every critique of vulnerability theory is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to consideration of those critiques I argue are of greatest relevance to the theory’s potential for addressing socio-ecological justice.

[33]   See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory” (2015) 93:5 North Carolina Law Review 1339 at 1368; Polychroniou, above note 5.

[34]   Angela P Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene” (2014) 6:1 Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 98 at 129 and 139–42.

[35]   Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene,” above note 34 at 128.

[36]   See ibid at 139. Note that Anna Grear labels Harris’s argument of the need for a subordination critique “potentially strawman”: Anna Grear, “Embracing Vulnerability: Notes Towards Human Rights for a More-than-Human World” in Daniel Bedford & Jonathan Herring, eds, Embracing Vulnerability: The Challenges and Implications for Law (London: Routledge, 2020) 153 at 169.

[37]   Cooper, above note 33 at 1370.

[38]   Ibid at 1363.

[39]   Ibid at 1373 (privilege is defined as “an unearned asset automatically conferred by the operation of social norms that favor your identity”).

[40]   Ibid at 1372 (explaining how “identities have themselves been a means of distributing resources that cut across social institutions”).

[41]   Anna Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order: Human Rights and the Environment in a Critical and Philosophical Perspective” (2011) 2:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 23 at 44. See also Anna Grear, “Foregrounding Vulnerability: Materiality’s Porous Affectability as a Methodological Platform” in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Victoria Brooks, eds, Research Methods in Environmental Law (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2017) 3 at 26: “[V]ulnerability (as a common but uneven condition of corporeality and materiality) fully suggests that dynamics of encounter, relativities of position and the co-symptomatic production of privilege and oppression should overtly inform environmental legal methodologies — and include overt attention to macro- and micro-politics.”

[42]   Anna Grear, “Towards New Legal Futures? In Search of Renewing Foundations” in Anna Grear & Evadne Grant, eds, Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of Environmental Crisis (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2015) 283 at 297.

[43]   See, for example, Gonzalez, above note 1 at 329 (noting that those most susceptible to the harms of global warming “have also been rendered vulnerable through colonialism, neo-colonialism, and decades of neoliberal economic reforms imposed through the lending policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and subsequently through trade and investment agreements”); Wendy S Hesford & Rachel A Lewis, “Mobilizing Vulnerability: New Directions in Transnational Feminist Studies and Human Rights” (2016) 28:2 Feminist Formations vii; Katie E Oliviero, “Vulnerability’s Ambivalent Political Life: Trayvon Martin and the Racialized and Gendered Politics of Protection” (2016) 28:2 Feminist Formations 1.

[44]   See, for example, S Harris Ali, “The Political Economy of Environmental Inequality: The Social Distribution of Risk as an Environmental Injustice” in Julian Agyeman et al, eds, Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010) 97; Carmen G Gonzalez & Sumudu Atapattu, “International Environmental Law, Environmental Justice, and the Global South” (2017) 26 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 329.

[45]   See, for example, Gonzalez, above note 1; Farhana Sultana, “Whose Growth in Whose Planetary Boundaries? Decolonising Planetary Justice in the Anthropocene” (2023) 10:2 Geo: Geography and Environment e00128.

[46]   See, for example, Jessica Eisen, “Animals in the Constitutional State” (2017) 15 Icon 909; Rimona Afana, “Ecocide, Specieism, Vulnerability: Revisiting Positive Peace in the Anthropocene” in Katerina Standish et al, eds, The Palgrave Handbook of Positive Peace (Singapore: Springer Verlag, 2022) 625; Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environmental and Climate Justice,” above note 4; Aiteno Mboya, “Vulnerability and the Climate Change Regime” (2018) 36:1 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 79; Deckha, above note 11; Ani B Satz, “Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property” (2009) 16:1 Animal Law 65; Sheila R Foster, “Vulnerability, Equality and Environmental Justice: The Potential and Limits of Law” in Ryan Holifield, Jayajit Chakraborty & Gordon Walker, The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Justice (London: Routledge, 2017) 136.

[47]   See Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41; Anna Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice: Locating the Vulnerable Subject” in Martha Albertson Fineman & Grear, eds, Vulnerability Reflections, above note 3; Grear, “Foregrounding Vulnerability,” above note 41.

[48]   See Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 49; Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 43.

[49]   See Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 41.

[50]   See Woolaston, “Ecological Vulnerability and the Devolution of Individual Autonomy,” above note 25 at 110; Katie Woolaston, Ecological Vulnerability: The Law and Governance of Human-Wildlife Relationships (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[51]   Louis J Kotzé, “Human Rights and Socioecological Justice through a Vulnerability Lens” in Atapattu, Gonzalez & Seck, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development, above note 4,86 at 88–89.

[52]   Ibid at 88.

[53]   See ibid.

[54]   See, generally, Gonzalez & Atapattu, “International Environmental Law,” above note 44.

[55]   See Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene,” above note 34.

[56]   Ibid at 105.

[57]   Ibid at 114.

[58]   Ibid.

[59]   Ibid at 126–27: “[T]he fully responsive state should recognize that soil degradation, water scarcity, warming oceans, and depleted fishing stocks structure our options and create opportunities just as market and family relations do.”

[60]   See, for example, Carla Sbert, The Lens of Ecological Law: A Look at Mining (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2020) at 4 and 13–17; Geoffrey Garver, “The Rule of Ecological Law: The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics” (2013) 5 Sustainability 316; Mary Christina Wood, “Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift” (2009) 39 Environmental Law 43; David R Boyd, “Sustainability Law: (R)Evolutionary Directions for the Future of Environmental Law” (2004) 14 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 357; Klaus Bosselmann, “Losing the Forest for the Trees: Environmental Reductionism in the Law” (2010) 2 Sustainability 2424.

[61]   See Sbert, above note 60 at 4–5. See, generally, Anker et al, above note 2.

[62]   See Kathryn Gwiazdon, “Launch of the Ecological Law and Governance Association (ELGA): From Environmental Law to Ecological Law” International Union for Conservation of Nature (13 January 2018), online: www.iucn.org/news/world-commission-environmental-law/201801/launch-ecological-law-and-governance-association-elga-environmental-law-ecological-law.

[63]   See, for example, Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (White River Junction, CT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011); Peter Burdon, ed, Exploring Wild Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (South Australia: Wakefield Press, 2011); Jamie Murray, “Earth Jurisprudence, Wild Law, Emergent Law: The Emerging Field of Ecology and Law—Part 2” (2015) 36 Liverpool Law Review 105; Peter D Burdon, “A Theory of Earth Jurisprudence” (2012) 37 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 28.

[64]   See, for example, Louis J Kotzé, “Earth System Law for the Anthropocene” (2019) 11:23 Sustainability 6796; Louis J Kotzé & Rakhyun E Kim, “Earth System Law: The Juridical Dimensions of Earth System Governance” (2019) 1 Earth System Governance 100003.

[65]   See, for example, Mumta Ito and Massimiliano Montini, “Nature’s Rights and Earth Jurisprudence: A New Ecologically-Based Paradigm for Environmental Law” in Elia Apostolopoulou and Jose A Cortes-Vazquez, eds, The Right to Nature: Social Movements, Environmental Justice and Neoliberal Natures (New York: Routledge, 2019) 221; Kathryn Gwiazdon, “Defending the Tree of Life: The Ethical Justification for the Rights of Nature in a Theory of Justice” in Cameron La Follette & Chris Maser, eds, Sustainability and the Rights of Nature in Practice (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2019); Peter Burdon & Claire Williams, “Rights of Nature: A Constructive Analysis” in Douglas Fisher, ed, Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016).

[66]   See, for example, Lynda Collins, The Ecological Constitution: Reframing Environmental Law (London: Routledge, 2021); Louis J Kotzé, Global Environmental Constitutionalism in the Anthropocene (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016); James R May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[67]   See, for example, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations, (London: Routledge, 2011); Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Critical environmental law as method in the Anthropocene” in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos & Victoria Brooks, eds, Research Methods in Environmental Law: A Handbook (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2017) 131.

[68]   See Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2017).

[69]   See Boyd, “Sustainability Law,” above note 60.

[70]   Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 95.

[71]   Ecological Law and Governance Association, “‘Oslo Manifesto’ for Ecological Law and Governance” (June 2016), online: elgaworld.org/oslo-manifesto [Oslo Manifesto]. Note, however, that there is not yet a universally accepted definition of ecological law; see Sbert, above note 60 at 41–42.

[72]   See Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 130; Klaus Bosselmann, “Foreword” in Anker et al, above note 2, xiv at xv.

[73]   See Bosselmann, “Foreword,” above note 72 at xv.

[74]   Anker et al, above note 2 at 1.

[75]   See Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 93; Montini, above note 2 at 14; Sbert, above note 60 at 42.

[76]   See Kathryn Gwiazdon, “We Cannot Fail: The Promise and Principles of Ecological Law and Governance” (2018) 11:2 Minding Nature 36 at 37.

[77]   Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 97.

[78]   Ibid at 97, citing Thomas Berry, The Great Work: Our Way Into the Future (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999) at 5.

[79]   See Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 114.

[80]   Ibid at 127–28.

[81]   See Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6 at 34.

[82]   Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 95.

[83]   Johan Rockström et al, “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity” (2009) 14(2):32 Ecology and Society, online: www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/:

The Earth System is defined as the integrated biophysical and socioeconomic processes and interactions (cycles) among the atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, biosphere, geosphere, and anthroposphere (human enterprise) in both spatial—from local to global—and temporal scales, which determine the environmental state of the planet within its current position in the universe.

[84]   See Sbert, above note 60 at 47; Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 95.

[85]   See Bosselmann, “Foreword,” above note 72 at xv; Sbert, above note 60 at 53; Oslo Manifesto, above note 71.

[86]   See, for example, John Borrows, “Earth-Bound: Indigenous Law and Environmental Reconciliation” in Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds, Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018) 49; Deborah McGregor, “Mino-Mnaamodzawin: Achieving Indigenous Environmental Justice in Canada” (2018) 9:1 Environment and Society 7; Gina Starblanket & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, “Towards a Relational Paradigm — Four Points for Consideration: Knowledge, Gender, Land, and Modernity” in Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds, Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018) 175; John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); John Borrows, “Living Law on a Living Earth: Religion, Law and the Constitution,” in John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 239; Clifford Atleo & Jonathan Boron, “Land Is Life: Indigenous Relationships to Territory and Navigating Settler Colonial Property Regimes in Canada” (2022) 11:5 Land 609.

[87]   See, for example, Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 97.

[88]   Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 50.

[89]   See, for example, Kotzé and French, above note 6; Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6 at 37–38; Vito De Lucia, “Beyond Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: A Biopolitical Reading of Environmental Law” (2017) 8:2 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 181 at 183–86.

[90]   Kotzé & French, above note 6 at 13; see also Peter Burdon, “Earth jurisprudence and the project of earth democracy” in Michelle Maloney & Peter Burdon, eds, Wild Law — In Practice (London: Routledge, 2014) 19 at 20. It is important to note that the term “anthropocentrism” can have different meanings in different contexts; see Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6 at 38–39. 

[91]   See Kotzé & French, above note 6 at 13.

[92]   Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 24–25.

[93]   See, for example, Oslo Manifesto, above note 71; Sbert, above note 60 at 42. See, generally, De Lucia, “Beyond Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism,” above note 89 at 185–86.

[94]   Ibid at 183.

[95]   See, for example, Peter Burdon, “Rethinking global ethics in the Anthropocene” in Peter Burdon, Klaus Bosselmann & Kirsten Engel, eds, The Crisis in Global Ethics and the Future of Global Governance: Fulfilling the Promise of the Earth Charter (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2019) 92 at 96.

[96]   De Lucia, “Beyond Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism,” above note 89 at 186.

[97]   See Montini, above note 2 at 15.

[98]   Ibid at 17–18.

[99]   See Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 99 and 104.

[100] Montini, above note 2 at 15.

[101] For an in depth discussion about the Anthropocene and its relevance to environmental governance and ecological law scholarship, see, for example, Sbert, above note 60 at 5–8; Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6.

[102] See ibid at 39.

[103] See ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] See Burdon, “Obligations in the Anthropocene,” above note 9 at 319.

[106] See Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 32–33.

[107] Ibid at 26.

[108] See, generally, Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited: Materialism, Pluralism, and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 2017) at 65.

[109] Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 26 [footnote omitted].

[110] See Anna Grear, “Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on ‘Anthropocentric’ Law and Anthropocene ‘Humanity’” (2015) 26 Law and Critique 225 at 231 and 233.

[111] See ibid at 231.

[112] Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 42 [footnote omitted]. See also Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Actors or Spectators? Vulnerability and Critical Environmental Law” in Grear & Grant, eds, Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of Environmental Crisis, above note 42 at 46–49 and 51 (arguing that the acknowledgement of vulnerability gives rise to an “ontology of being in the middle”).

[113] Grear, “The Vulnerable Living Order,” above note 41 at 40 [footnote omitted].

[114] See Eisen, above note 46.

[115] See Lynda Collins, “Rights of Nature in the Ecological Constitution” in Collins, The Ecological Constitution, above note 66, 64–92; David R Boyd, The Rights of Nature: A Legal Revolution that Could Save the World (Toronto: ECW, 2017).

[116] See Justine Townsend et al, “Why the First River in Canada to Become a Legal Person Signals a Boon for Indigenous Rights” The Narwhal (11 June 2021), online: https://thenarwhal.ca/opinion-muteshekau-shipu-magpie-river-personhood/; Yenny Vega Cárdenas & Uapukun Mestokosho, “Recognizing the Legal Personhood of the Magpie Rvier/Mutehekau Shipu in Canada” in Yenny Vega Cárdenas & Daniel Turp, eds, A Legal Personality for the St. Lawrence River and other Rivers of the World (Montréal: Les Éditions JFD inc., 2023) 113.

[117] See, for example, Burdon, “Obligations in the Anthropocene,” above note 9 at 311.

[118] Ibid at 320.

[119] See, for example, Pierre Cloutier de Repentigny’s work on responsibility in the Anthropocene, arguing that laws can and should be reformed to implement a differentiated framework of responsibility for anthropogenic environmental harm: Pierre Cloutier de Repentigny, “Responsibility in End Time: Environmental Harm and the Role of Law in the Anthropocene” in James Gacek & Richard Jochelson, eds, Green Criminology and the Law (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022) 235; Pierre Cloutier de Repentigny, “To the Anthropocene and Beyond: The Responsibility of Law in Decimating and Protecting Marine Life” (2020) 11:1/2 Transnational Legal Theory 180.

[120] See Cullinan, above note 63 at 97–98 (the term “rights” is used to mean “the freedom of humans to fulfill their duties, responsibilities and essential nature and by analogy, the principle that other natural entities are entitled to fulfill their role within the Earth Community”).

[121] See Montini, above note 2 at 11.

[122] See Judith E Koons, “Key Principles to Transform Law for the Health of the Planet” in Burdon, ed, Exploring Wild Law, above note 63; Ian Mason, “One in All: Principles and Characteristics of Earth Jurisprudence” in Burdon, ed, Exploring Wild Law, above note 63.

[123] Kotzé, “Human Rights and Socioecological Justice through a Vulnerability Lens,” above note 51 at 89–93.

[124] See, for example, Usha Natarajan, “Who Do We Think We Are? Human Rights in a Time of Ecological Change” in Usha Natarajan & Julia Dehm, eds, Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022) 200; Burdon, “Rethinking global ethics in the Anthropocene,” above note 95 at 101–2; Burdon, “Obligations in the Anthropocene,” above note 9 at 316 and 325: “[R]ights are a minimalist tool that perpetuate individualism and can be accommodated within the bounds of industrial capitalism.”

[125] Natarajan, “Who Do We Think We Are?” above note 124 at 214.

[126] Ibid at 217.

[127] See Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene,” above note 34 at 126–27, 137; Burdon, “Ecological Law in the Anthropocene,” above note 6 at 40–41 (arguing that morality is rooted in humans’ embeddedness within the Earth system and entails a responsibility to care for the Earth); Bruce Jennings, “Governing Ecological Governance in the Anthropocene: A New Covenant of Eco-communitarianism” in Burdon, Bosselmann & Engel, eds, The Crisis in Global Ethics and the Future of Global Governance, above note 95, 126 at 128. See also Didier Zúñiga, Pluralist Politics, Relational Worlds: Vulnerability and Care of the Earth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2023).

[128] See, for example, Eisen, above note 46 at 951, discussing the impact of a focus on animals’ radical vulnerability.

[129] See, for example, Mboya, “Vulnerability and the Climate Change Regime,” above note 46 at 81–82 (positing that vulnerability theory “provides a basis for questioning and critiquing current allocations of responsibility for individual and societal well-being across the individual, the state, and societal institutions”) [footnote omitted].

[130] See, for example, Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,” above note 3; Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 52:

Fineman’s call for the responsive state, when placed within the neoliberal globalised context, implies that states need now to become fully responsive, not to the current imperatives of voracious and apparently illimitable forms of consumer and corporate capitalism, but to the implications of multiple forms of vulnerability located within the substantive, material conditions of globalisation.

See also Woolaston, Ecological Vulnerability, above note 50 at 49; Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, “‘Wannabe Toxic-Free?’ From Precautionary Consumption to Corporeal Citizenship” (2017) 26:2 Environmental Politics 322 at 334: “If people are inextricably entwined with the environment as corporeal citizenship suggests, the state’s responsibility to manage and protect the health of its population is inseparable from its responsibility to care for the health of the environment.”

[131] See, for example, Seck, “A Relational Analysis of Enterprise Obligations and Carbon Majors for Climate Justice,” above note 4; Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58.

[132] See, for example, Scott, Haw & Lee, above note 130 at 336; Sean Coyle, “Vulnerability and the Liberal Order” in Fineman & Grear, eds, Vulnerability Reflections, above note 3, at 6174.

[133] See, for example, Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58 (noting the responsibility of privileged individuals).

[134] See, for example, Kyle Powys Whyte & Chris J Cuomo, “Ethics of Caring in Environmental Ethics: Indigenous and Feminist Philosophies” in Stephen M Gardiner & Allen Thompson, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 235; Deborah McGregor, “Indigenous Women, Water Justice and Zaagidowin (Love)” (2015) 20:2-3 Canadian Women Studies 71.

[135] See Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58–59. See also Sultana, above note 45. Overconsumption by the super-affluent and Global North nations is essential to conversations about responsibilities and socioecological justice.

[136] Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58.

[137] See, for example, McGregor, “Indigenous Women, Water Justice and Zaagidowin (Love),” above note 134 (discussing responsibility towards water from the perspective of Anishnaabek law); Robert YELḰÁTTE Clifford, “WSÁNEĆ Legal Theory and the Fuel Spill at SELEK̵TEL̵ (Goldstream River)” (2016) 61:4 McGill Law Journal 755 (exploring obligations under WSÁNEĆ law to care for the land, including care for the islands within WSÁNEĆ territory that were once ancestors).

[138] Eisen, above note 46 at 941–44: “[T]he state has a responsibility to care for its most vulnerable members, including and perhaps especially those who are not capable of traditional forms of constitutional self-assertion.”

[139] See Fineman, “Vulnerability and Social Justice,” above note 3 at 359. See also Deborah McGregor, “Indigenous Environmental Justice and Sustainability” in Atapattu, Gonzalez & Seck, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development, above note 4, 58 at 74; Jessica Eisen, Roxanne Mykitiuk & Dayna Nadine Scott, “Constituting Bodies into the Future: Toward a Relational Theory of Intergenerational Justice” (2018) 51:1 UBC Law Review 1; Dayna Scott & Garance Malivel, “Intergenerational Environmental Justice and the Climate Crisis: Thinking With and Beyond the Charter” (2021) 17:1 Journal of Law and Equality 165; Kotzé, “The Anthropocene,” above note 9 at 80–81.

[140] See Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene,” above note 34 at 138 [footnotes omitted].

[141] See Collins, The Ecological Constitution, above note 66.

[142] See Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environmental and Climate Justice,” above note 4 (using vulnerability theory and the insights from other feminist and relational theorists, including the writings of Indigenous women, to persuasively advance these arguments).

[143] Paris Agreement, being an Annex to the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 — Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, 29 January 2016, Dec 1/CP.21,CP, 21st Sess, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, online: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.

[144] In providing these recommendations, I am speaking from my position as a settler lawyer and legal scholar.

[145] See, for example, Jason MacLean, “Curriculum Design for the Anthropocene: Review of Meinhard Doelle & Chris Tollefson, Environmental Law: Cases and Materials, Third Edition” (2020) 16:1 McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law 1.

[146] Estair Van Wagner, “Placing Natural Resources Law: Preliminary Thoughts on Decolonizing Teaching and Learning About People, Places, and Law” in Amanda Kennedy et al, eds, Teaching and Learning in Environmental Law: Pedagogy, Methodology and Best Practice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2021) 49 (noting at 50 that she hopes to contribute to “difficult but necessary conversations about our responsibilities as legal educators in the context of both colonization and environmental crises”).

[147] See John Borrows, “Outsider Education: Indigenous Law and Land-based Learning” (2016) 33:1 Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 1.

[148] Deborah Curran, “Putting Law in Its Place: Field School Explorations of Indigenous and Colonial Legal Geographies” in Deborah Curran et al, eds, Out There Learning: Critical Reflections on Off-Campus Study Programs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019) 135; Van Wagner, “Placing Natural Resources Law,” above note 145.

[149] See Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61:4 McGill Law Journal at 847.

[150] See James Tully, “Sustainable Democratic Constitutionalism and Climate Crisis” (2020) 65:3 McGill Law Journal 545 at 564.

[151] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action” (2015), online: https://ehprnh2mwo3.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf at 3 (see calls to action #27 and #28).

[152] See Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58–59.

[153] Grear, “Foregrounding Vulnerability,” above note 41 at 14.

[154] See Garver, Ecological Law and the Planetary Crisis, above note 2 at 95.

[155] It has been argued, for example, that civic republicanism is particularly responsive to issues of vulnerability and dependence. See Barry, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability, above note 13 at 35, fn 4 and chapters 7 & 8 on greening civic republicanism. For a discussion of how ecological law has been influenced by and attracted to Indigenous worldviews, legal orders, laws, and traditions, see Anker et al, above note 2 (chapters 6, 7, and 15, in particular).

[156] Grear, “Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice,” above note 47 at 58.

[157] United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (2018),online: https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43583/1/S1800428_en.pdf [Escazú].

[158] See ibid at art 9. See also Stephen Stec & Jerzy Jendrośka, “The Escazú Agreement and the Regional Approach to Rio Principle 10: Process, Innovation, and Shortcomings” (2019) 31:3 Journal of Environmental Law 533 at 541 (noting that the Escazú Agreement extends protection to persons or groups in vulnerable situations and “provides for the introduction of vulnerability theory into [international environmental law]”).

[159] See Grear, “Towards new legal futures?” above note 42 at 303; Grear, “Foregrounding vulnerability,” above note 41 at 28 (arguing that vulnerability mandates environmental law to allow “non-human intelligences and agencies their place in the formation of law itself”). See also Kyle Powys Whyte, “Justice Forward: Tribes, Climate Adaptation, and Responsibility” (2013) 120 Climatic Change Journal 117 on the need for emerging systems of responsibilities to be flexible and responsive to the evolving nature of the injustice being addressed.

[160] McGregor, “Indigenous Environmental Justice and Sustainability,” above note 139 at 70. The agency of non-human animals has long been emphasized in Indigenous scholarship and recognized, along with human to more-than-human relationships, as a fundamental characteristic of Indigenous legal orders; see, for example, McGregor, “Indigenous Women, Water Justice and Zaagidowin (Love),” above note 134; Zoe Todd, “Refracting the State Through Human-Fish Relations: Fishing, Indigenous Legal Orders and Colonialism in North/Western Canada” (2018) 7:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 60. See also above note 86.

[161] See, for example, Yellowhead Institute, “Land Back: A Yellowhead Institute Red Paper” (October 2019), online: https://redpaper.yellowheadinstitute.org/; Dayna Nadine Scott, “The Ecological Constitution: Reframing Environmental Law by Lynda Collins” (2022) 53:2 Ottawa Law Review 293 at 298–99; Suzanne von der Porten, Yoshi Ota, Andrés Cisneros-Montemayor & Sherry Pictou, “The Role of Indigenous Resurgence in Marine Conservation” (2019) 47:6 Coastal Management 527; Jessica Clogg, Hannah Askew, Eugene Kung & Gavin Smith, “Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Future of Environmental Governance in Canada” (2016) 29 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 227.

[162] Burdon, “Obligations in the Anthropocene,” above note 9 at 324.